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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

By Henry M. Wriston

OF THE many roads by which a private citizen may approach consideration of international relations, three are worthy of particular mention: knowledge, emotion, imagination. The last of these—imagination—deserves special thought, for it offers extremely useful help in dealing with a turbulent world, and above all the acutely disturbed new and underdeveloped nations.

Knowledge is the first method of approach; the process for its creation is scholarship. This is the way to develop the specialist, a man who knows a great deal about some aspect of policy in time or space or thought—or all three. Such work is essential to progress in the quest for peace. Without specialists statesmen would lack access to essential knowledge. Not all citizens can be scholars; they have other preoccupations. But all citizens can profit by the research of scholars, for the work of many is summarized and synthesized by secondary writers. Essential knowledge is made available in palatable form, and every citizen should learn as much as possible. Above all, he should think about what he knows. One historical fact, in particular, should enter his consciousness and become firmly fixed: there never was a golden age when men lived happily, securely, without tensions.

When we read history, events are foreshortened. A century or more of progress may be covered in a sentence or two. Thus it seems as though the meaning of events must have been obvious to those who lived among them. But that is a rare occurrence; the normal rule is that only in the long perspective does the significance of the age become clear. A verse in Ecclesiastes reminds us how old is this problem: "For man also knoweth not his time: as the fishes that are taken in an evil net, and as the birds that

are caught in the snare; so are the sons of men snared in an evil time." One of the fundamentals a citizen must grasp is that every age has had its problems, its dangers, even its moments of desperation.

The second approach to foreign affairs is emotional. This road is hard packed, for it has been well traveled by idealists. No one with any sensitiveness can look out upon the world without acute awareness of the prevalence of hunger amounting to starvation, poverty almost beyond belief, disease, misery, degradation of life itself. These things prevail among the vast majority.

Those whose responses are primarily emotional will be tempted to make a direct, naïve assault upon these evils. Such sentimentalism is self-defeating; it retards reform by offending those whom it is intended to help. None the less, all impulse to action has its roots in the emotions. As the citizen who tries to be effective in shaping public opinion must seek knowledge, so also he must draw inspiration to action from emotion.

Imagination is the third method by which a citizen can be effective in forming sound public opinion regarding foreign relations. Imagination is not dreaming; by definition dreams are unreal. Imagination can be, and must be, disciplined. Those who wish to strengthen their imaginative powers will draw not only on knowledge, but also upon idealism, the urge "to do something about it." They will go further; imaginative citizens will remember that a stranger's pattern of thought and action, even his value judgments, are largely inherited. They may be modified by skill and patience, but the process cannot be hurried.

Patience must, therefore, be a principal ingredient in the discipline of the imagination. Only by the cultivation of almost infinite patience can the citizen escape the defeatism that arises when the initial effort fails to produce perfection. Such lack of patience tends to be characteristic of journalists; it explains their prevailing pessimism. They look for "news," particularly "hard" news, something dramatic, decisive. They do not usually observe the slow process of evolutionary change because their perspective is too short. Even if they could catch the drift, they would not think it worth a line of type because it lacks "impact." Thus much of the solid progress of the world goes unreported.

The man of disciplined imagination will be happy with progress which, though small, astonishes the scholar, while its slow pace will dismay the sentimentalist. Ignorance, disease, poverty,

hunger are not the fruits of imperialism, nor colonialism, nor the industrial revolution. They are as old as mankind and will not be banished easily or swiftly. That is not pessimism; it is a summons to patience.

In the discipline of imagination, persistence comes next to patience. As patience realizes that great results will not be easy, persistence appreciates that even slow progress will grind to a halt unless effort is vigorous and continuous.

II

If the idea be accepted that a vivid and disciplined imagination is a valid instrument by which the private citizen can think constructively about foreign affairs, we can offer six illustrations of how it can be applied to our relationships with the newly independent, the anciently ignorant, the shockingly poor and the sadly diseased nations of the world.

The first necessity is to rid ourselves of nervousness when "revolution" is mentioned. Politicians often shy like skittish horses at the mere word. That is nonsensical. Thomas Jefferson once wrote in a letter: "What country before ever existed a century and a half without a revolution? . . . the tree of liberty must be refreshed from time to time with the blood of patriots and tyrants. It is its natural manure."

The slightest acquaintance with history makes it clear that revolutions are as old as recorded history—and as current as today's news. The Cromwellian era in Britain was revolutionary; that should remind us that even the most stable institutions have from time to time been shaken to their foundations. The United States broke its ties with the mother country by revolution, and far from being ashamed of the fact, our forefathers made it a matter of pride. Our Civil War was long and costly in life as well as treasure.

Since the eighteenth century, revolution has been endemic in France. In the latest successful instance, when de Gaulle swept into power, legal forms were meticulously followed and violence was latent rather than overt, but the substance of the change was revolution. A series of revolutions occurred in Italy and in Germany, in both the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the same has been true in Russia. If the well-developed, relatively stable parts of the world have experienced so many explosive changes, there is no reason to be astonished that revolution is not

merely endemic but epidemic in Asia, Africa and Latin America.

It is easy to assert that all changes in government should be achieved by ballots instead of bullets, but the realities of human experience make that a mere wish-fancy which a well-disciplined imagination must reject. So common has been revolutionary change that there is a considerable body of literature in its defense. The United States is the source of some of the most eloquent pleas for the legitimacy of revolution. Even a state we regard as conservative, New Hampshire, put this passage in its Constitution of 1792: "The doctrine of nonresistance against arbitrary power and oppression is absurd, slavish, and destructive of the good and happiness of mankind." Read again the Declaration of Independence where, among the "causes" of our revolution, appears this statement: "That whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their Safety and Happiness."

It would be difficult to find more persuasive defenses of revolution. Such statements, too often forgotten or neglected in the United States, are quoted frequently in the new nations. Read aright, our Declaration of Independence makes us kin to all the new nations which have escaped from the status of wards and attained the stature of independence.

Our own interest in revolution did not wane when we achieved independence, nor did we regard it as a blessing appropriate to ourselves alone. From the days of Washington almost to the presidency of Wilson our recognition policy reflected that interest. Jefferson put it in these words: "We surely cannot deny to any nation that right wherein our own government is founded—that one may govern itself according to whatever form it pleases and change these forms at its own will . . . the will of the nation is the only thing essential to be regarded."

We rejoiced in Kossuth's effort to make Hungary free in 1849. At that time Daniel Webster said the United States could not be indifferent to "the fortunes of nations struggling for institutions like our own. Certainly the United States may be pardoned . . . if they entertain an ardent affection for those popular forms of political organization which have so rapidly advanced their own prosperity and happiness." In our current mood his words seem

bombastic, but at the time they evoked passionate approval, for they expressed a profound urge to see the whole world free. Abraham Lincoln spoke for all Americans when he spoke of the Declaration of Independence as "a stumbling block to tyrants" and giving "hope to the world for all future time. It was that which gave promise that in due time the weight would be lifted from the shoulders of all men." It would be easy to compile a long list of instances when, with public support, the Government of the United States welcomed and encouraged revolution.

Familiarity with our own record will end much of the difficulty in understanding current revolutions. For 1961 is still part of the Age of Revolution that was launched in 1776. Once the citizen has become accustomed to this idea, there will be no temptation to bewail all violent political change. The first essential in an imaginative approach to new governments, therefore, is to realize that revolution is normal, sanctified by experience and by theory.

III

The second step in the imaginative understanding of new governments is a realization that they will be unstable, that there will be keen competition to govern. The reasons lie plain upon the surface. During a struggle for independence all patriots can unite upon that one common goal, subordinating their differences to the single paramount objective. Deficiencies that have existed in the public service, of whatever sort, can be attributed to the imperial power, taxes can be blamed upon the distant rulers, and every burden can be described as "exploitation." Our Declaration of Independence contained a whole catalog of abuses.

Once independence is achieved, all that is changed. Unity of purpose can no longer be attained by fighting against an outsider; no distant devil can be blamed. There must now be purpose *for*, not against, and every man is likely to have his own program.

Again our own history illustrates the problem perfectly. Thomas Paine, one of the authors of our Revolution, whose "Appeal to Reason" was such a potent force, was as one with George Washington throughout the war. But in 1796, Paine wrote in a pamphlet entitled "Letter to George Washington":

There was a time when the fame of America, moral and political, stood fair and high in the world. The luster of her revolution extended itself to every individual and to be a citizen of America gave a title to respect in Europe. Neither meanness nor ingratitude had then mingled itself into the

composition of her character. . . . The Washington of politics had not then appeared. . . .

And as to you, sir, treacherous in private friendship . . . and a hypocrite in public life, the world will be puzzled to decide, whether you are an apostate or an impostor; whether you have abandoned good principles, or whether you ever had any.

The rift after our Revolution was not merely personal; it was revealed in the structure of government. The colonies, having become states, set up a central government, but they had been resisting centralized control and saw to it that it was weak. "The Articles of Confederation" were slow in the drafting (17 months), tardy in acceptance (over three years), feeble in action. Our first national government was a failure.

From the Declaration of Independence to the establishment of our second government in 1789, nearly 13 years elapsed. Even then we had not fully faced reality. The new Constitution made no reference to parties, which Washington and others denounced, calling them factions. Yet between the ideas of Jefferson on the one hand and Hamilton on the other there was a great gulf which neither all the efforts nor all the persuasion nor all the prestige of Washington could bridge. Parties proved to be essential to the operation of the government.

If, with all the inheritance from British constitutional tradition and all the training in self-government which our forefathers possessed, they could not remain united, how can we expect these new nations, most of whom have no such sound inheritance, to do better? At the end of 13 years of declared independence, our government was virtually bankrupt. Even after the new government was set up and fiscal order restored, as late as 1800 Aaron Burr was almost able to steal the presidency from Thomas Jefferson. Few Americans now recall that Jefferson finally won only on the 36th ballot. It took a constitutional amendment to prevent a recurrence of so scandalous a gambit—and to admit thereby how essential a role parties play.

Yet we tend to feel upset if, though none are yet so old as we were in 1789, new nations and new governments show evidences of instability, rivalry among leaders, fiscal disorder—in short the same symptoms we exhibited in our own infant days. In summary, the second point which the imaginative approach must stress in thinking about new nations is that instability is inherent in post-revolutionary states.

IV

A third characteristic of new governments, which imagination should help us understand, is the relationship of the new rulers to their political opponents. During our political campaigns, candidates denounce each other on the hustings; election over, they meet amiably. The transition from one administration to another is extraordinarily smooth. We take it for granted that foreign ambassadors will maintain social relations with leaders of opposition parties, and if, before our election, the British Ambassador had not known Adlai Stevenson, Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn, we would have felt he was not up to his job. Similarly, our Ambassador in the United Kingdom as a matter of course knows Hugh Gaitskell and Harold Wilson.

In revolutionary situations, different rules apply, for the opposition is not a "loyal opposition" or merely a political competitor; it is the enemy. The defeated opponent is likely to be plotting the overthrow of the government and may be assembling clandestine armed forces. In these circumstances, a revolutionary leader will not look with calm upon social or personal relations between foreign ambassadors and his opponents. The effort to maintain such contacts may well lead to the diplomat being declared *persona non grata*.

Again our own history should assist in understanding this problem. When these new governments curb such normal social contacts on grounds of "internal security," we should recall the dismissal of Citizen Genêt by Washington. We should remember, also, the Alien and Sedition Acts during the administration of John Adams. Like much legislation in today's new states, those acts were aimed at suppressing political opposition. We hope we have outgrown such manœuvres, but the feelings which motivated them survive in the United States today.

It required all our political sophistication to treat Khrushchev when he came for the first time, not as the author of savagery in Hungary, but as the leader of a great power with whom the realities of international life required us to deal. His second trip produced many hostile manifestations. If it is so hard for us to exhibit restraint, we ought to be able to understand the oversensitiveness of weak, new governments menaced by an opposition ready to resort to bullets at the first hope of success.

An imaginative approach should help us grasp a fourth funda-

mental point about revolutions. Revolution, as the word itself suggests, is like turning a wheel. Start a wheel and momentum takes over to some extent; it rarely stops—except in closely controlled circumstances—just where you want it to.

Even revolutionary leaders who are pure in heart, dedicated in purpose, democratic in ideals cannot make the wheel spin and stop exactly 180 degrees from the starting point. Their energies may prove deficient and move the wheel not at all—or only 90 degrees. The wheel may turn full circle—360 degrees—which, in another context, is one revolution. The French Revolution spun all the way from the Bourbons clear around to Napoleon. Revolutions develop a dynamic of their own, and no one can predict just how far they will go. The righteousness of the initial impulse does not always govern the result.

Victory is heady wine. One who has ever lived upon a college campus understands this, for he has observed the behavior of students at the moment of a football victory—exuberant, irrational, abandoned. It is the more intense when the team's record has not been good, and when some break in the game or a dramatic surge has brought victory when defeat seemed imminent. The emotional release is violent. If, with the long tradition of sportsmanship which exercises rigid control over normal behavior, so much ungoverned emotional energy is loosed over what is, relative to the great events of the world, so minor an occasion, how much more readily can we understand the intoxication that follows success in bringing an end to tyranny at imminent risk of life. No wonder it often produces wild excesses.

v

The fifth aspect of revolution we can also apprehend imaginatively: victors do not take kindly to advice. In gaining independence, they were "do-it-yourself" men. Many leaders in the world today, and virtually all the revolutionaries, have been in prison, in exile or in great personal danger: Bourguiba, Nkrumah, de Gaulle, Adenauer, Gomulka, Tito, Nasser, Diem, Nehru, Sukarno, Castro—and many more. Most of them owe no thanks to arm-chair critics that they are now in power rather than in graves.

The colonial revolutionaries, especially, feel no gratitude to outsiders. Indeed, did we not do business with their late masters and so "help the enemy"? We gave money and military goods to many of the former rulers, and though our motives were pure

and we did not intend to help hold colonies in subjection or suppress revolution, the net result of our aid often was to strengthen the metropolitan power or the predecessor government. And despite our historic anti-colonialism, we have not been wholly free, since we became a world-wide power, to exhibit our real feelings. Our relations with Europe—the necessity for maintaining alliances—sometimes conflicted with our desire for the liquidation of colonialism in Asia and Africa. We urged the Netherlands so strongly to give independence to Indonesia that we strained our relations with that key nation in Europe, yet our diplomatic pressure was neither so overt nor so dramatic as aid to the Netherlands through the Marshall Plan and NATO. Sukarno was aware of our tangible help to his enemy; our intangible diplomatic pressure was not so visible.

Moreover, revolutionary leaders are under severe domestic pressures. In rallying their own people to make sacrifices for the revolution, they made promises, explicit or implicit. They cannot now exercise power without making major changes. It may well be that the first need of the new country is wiser use of the land, improved breeds of hens to lay more eggs, better cows to give more milk. But that does not mean that such programs will have priority, for they are not dramatic and their results appear too gradually to satisfy people whose expectations have been inflated. Having achieved something great and dynamic in the moment of revolution, the new leader cannot ask his people to wait for evolutionary processes to mature over a long period of time. He is the symbol of action, not of more eggs! He will resent counsel to move slowly. As a man of wide experience has put it, we must expect that “new governments may sometimes insist on types of growth which have more to do with prestige than need.” The “revolution of rising expectations” has often, therefore, more to do with the dramatic than the necessary.

Independence, we must remember, means freedom to do the wrong thing as well as the right. That ought not to be a difficult concept to grasp, for we have pursued farm policies, for example, which pile up bigger and bigger food surpluses and higher and higher costs and deficits. Those policies add up to economic folly, but have been thought to be politically profitable. Clearly, we are in no position to be overly censorious of those who, with less experience, less training and fewer resources, make mistakes which seem to us serious.

The argument that the development of new nations should be left to private capital—or to “free enterprise”—will fall on deaf ears. The word “socialism,” far from holding terrors for them, has deep attraction. The leaders of new states know that most of the free nations of the world have now, or have had, socialist governments. Many of them are more aware than we appear to be that our own economy is a mixture—that government plays a large role in our economic life. The Tennessee Valley Authority is one of our most conspicuous exports. Our railroads were built with heavy government subsidy, and many want more now. Our canals and waterways are all public enterprises, and in most free nations so are railroads and telephones—and the universities.

These men who engineered revolution want now to manage the economy. They remember that the hated imperial control followed in the train of private trade and investment. We tend to think that the normal sequence is for trade to follow the flag, but their own history tells them that it was often the other way round. The Belgian Congo started as a private speculation of King Leopold, who became fabulously wealthy without notable benefit to the Africans. The Indonesians saw the Dutch grow rich, while they remained poor. This experience, many times repeated in many places around the world, created the image—still dominant today—of capitalism as exploitation. They view with deep suspicion, therefore, great capitalistic enterprises coming from abroad. Having once found that process a prelude to colonialism, they are doubly shy.

Many of the new nations fear the rule of prices by a free market, for they are producers of raw materials—tin, rubber, coffee, tea, cocoa, jute, and so on. Asians can point to a United Nations calculation that in recent experience their reduced incomes from such exports, occasioned by falling prices in free markets, just about offset the grants-in-aid. They are also aware that the United States puts quotas on oil, zinc, copper, sugar, and that it deliberately sets out to defeat the free market in agriculture by government intervention. Why, they ask, should we be critical when they follow the same pattern of political suppression of economic forces?

Moreover, many new nations have not the wealth to support free enterprise. There is no accumulation of domestic capital with which to finance industrial development. Poverty is so intense that domestic savings can be found only, as in Russia in

Stalin's day or now in Red China, by grinding the faces of the poor and letting millions starve. If, therefore, the nation is not to become totalitarian, the money must come from abroad. But so sensitive are the new leaders that they will regard any advice, any cautionary devices connected with aid, as "strings."

The ordinary requirements which we all accept when borrowing money, they resent. They see them as manifestations of economic—and ultimately political—imperialism, and having just escaped from one form of dependence they do not want to fall into another. Our history ought to remind us that this is the normal mood of debtors. The resentments of our Western states at what was regarded as "Wall Street control" are classic. When mortgages were being foreclosed, the great Senator from Missouri, Thomas Hart Benton, exploded: "A lump of butter in the mouth of a dog, one gulp, one swallow, and all is gone." Many a Westerner in the mid-nineteenth century regarded that as the restrained statement of a moderate.

These things partially explain why our foreign aid program is not uniformly a "success." We need to do many things better, but the point is missed completely by those who feel that, if only we had a different organizational structure or more money or made this, that or the other change in procedure, our troubles would disappear. There is no simple, easy way to achieve the desirable ends. We must do the best we can, profiting by experience, not endlessly repeating the same errors, but accepting, nevertheless, the inevitability of failure to attain Utopia in a short time. The growth of economic freedom, as of political freedom, is a slow process, with many painful setbacks.

VI

Appreciation of the fact that each individual nation has a unique perspective upon history is a sixth way in which imagination can help the citizen grasp the realities of a revolutionary world. Depending upon the national points of view from which it is observed, the same historical event carries wholly different significances; what seems trivial to one appears vital to the other. Each nation tends to regard its version as "truth," overlooking the validity of other viewpoints.

When this national emphasis is forgotten, present difficulties are too often attributed to current or recent episodes, whereas the roots of trouble frequently lie deeper in divergent national

interpretations of history. Such difficulties will not disappear rapidly, or be eliminated by some change in the style of our diplomacy. In South America, in Africa and in Asia many nations feel that we are obsessed with the menace of Communism. We can justify that concern to ourselves, for we have experienced the retreat from Wilson's vision of a world safe for democracy, and have seen the rise of Soviet confidence that Marxism-Leninism will embrace the entire world.

The historical tradition of many nations makes other menaces—such as imperialism, economic or political—seem much more real. Their experience has not sensitized them to the Communist danger. When we try to transfer our justified alarm to them, they not only do not accept the warnings, they resent them. Our interest in their development is seen as an effort to draw them into a power struggle which they regard as irrelevant to their concerns.

One of the most striking instances of different national perspectives upon history—as a cause of profound misunderstanding—is the Monroe Doctrine. It has customarily been treated in our histories as a wholly defensive concept. From the standpoint of the United States, it was an anti-imperialist pronouncement designed to let the nations of this hemisphere develop without external interference. The angle of vision of Latin countries is different. When we undertook to speak on behalf of this hemisphere, it is undeniable that we “took Latin America for granted,” since no nation had given us authorization to speak on its behalf. From the Latin point of view, we were at least impinging upon the policy formation of independent nations; to that extent we committed a trespass upon their sovereignty. It was a manifestation of the unconscious arrogance that arises from the consciousness of power. Inconceivable as it may seem to us that Monroeism could be identified with imperialism, for some Latin nations that identification seems natural.

Once this divergence in perspective is grasped imaginatively, many episodes which appear as almost insignificant in our history are seen to loom decisively large in theirs. To us Cuba is a small nation in which we have taken an avuncular interest. Cubans read history differently; for a century our statesmen spoke of the acquisition of the island as inevitable. Even after we decided against annexation, we retained control through the Platt Amendment, which limited the power of Cuba to act as a sovereign state and authorized intervention by the United States. We ex-

exercised that right from time to time, treating the Cubans as wards and determining who should govern them. The liquidation of the Platt Amendment did not occur until 1934. Cuban history stresses the reality of our control rather than the philanthropic purpose which our histories emphasize.

Mexicans recall our war with them in 1846–1848, as a consequence of which we took California, New Mexico and parts of three states. President Polk asked authority to occupy Yucatan; President Pierce arranged the Gadsden Purchase; President Buchanan proposed intervention and the occupation of two Mexican states. Even after the Civil War there were considerable periods when Mexico lived in perpetual fear of imminent invasion. Woodrow Wilson twice invaded Mexico, and sought to determine who should be its president.

The United States acquired as many of the Caribbean islands as possible and wanted more. The purchase of the Virgin Islands was negotiated by Seward, and consummated in this century. We took over Puerto Rico from Spain. President Grant's acquisition of the Dominican Republic was defeated by the Senate, but later the finances of that republic were supervised by the United States, and it was militarily occupied and governed by us for some years. In 1915, during occupation by Marines, a virtual American protectorate was established over Haiti by treaty; it went further than the Platt Amendment in establishing American control. Fiscal independence for the two republics was conceded only 20 years ago.

In 1879 President Hayes called the proposed Isthmian Canal "virtually part of our coastline." To us that seemed logical enough; to others it looked like imperialism. The British commented that the President's view would deny the states in the vicinity of the Canal "as independent a position as that which they now occupy." A Republican Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, spoke of "a long-established claim of priority on the American continent," and a Democratic Secretary of State, Richard Olney, announced that the United States was "practically sovereign on this continent and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which we confine our interposition." Later Secretary Philander Knox spoke of the area as "a portion of the world where the influence of the United States must naturally be preëminent." The word "naturally" was galling in the extreme as were the earlier statements based upon our overwhelming power.

When Theodore Roosevelt said, "I took Panama," it seemed to us merely a brash statement about a regrettable episode. For Colombia and Panama it was an event decisive in their history, one which has bedevilled our relationships ever since.

The Roosevelt corollary to the Monroe Doctrine assigned the United States an international police power; we were to determine unilaterally when, where and how much we should intervene. From the Latin point of view, we were saying: "Might makes right." The gospel of the corollary was followed by three administrations, the most extreme of which was that of Woodrow Wilson. He set out to "instruct" the Latin American republics in democracy. He held it "our peculiar duty" to teach them "to elect good men" and establish "order and self-control." He was willing to act in some cases "even if the sovereignty of unwilling nations be outraged in the process." Under the impulse of these dogmas, he violated the sovereignty of several nations, occupying some and controlling others.

The principal historian of the Monroe Doctrine has recorded that by 1915 Monroeism had "been deeply charged with an assumption of the right of control, of superior power, of hegemony over the other states of the New World." How better describe imperialism?

To use a current term, we made satellites of a number of nations. From our standpoint, American imperialism was distinctive: we did not intend our control to be permanent but a transient phase during which the people for whom we accepted responsibility gained experience in self-government. In the second place, the element of exploitation inherent in classic imperialism, though not wholly absent, was subordinated to philanthropic purpose. The recipients of our unwelcome attentions, however, resented our assumption of superior virtue and did not accept at face value our protestations of good intentions. The management of satellites proved unrewarding; it did not produce desired results and it deeply implanted fear of "Yankee imperialism" throughout Latin America.

There is, indeed, a whole literature in Latin America which interpreted Monroeism as imperialism. As a consequence, when Cleveland intervened in the Venezuelan boundary dispute, his initiative, instead of evoking support, was viewed with grave suspicion in Mexico, Chile and Argentina. An Argentinian statesman, later president of that republic, championed Spain against

the United States in 1898. When we presented resolutions in Pan American conferences, they often met with suspicion that we were seeking hegemony rather than defense of common interests. During the First World War the Mexican Government was sympathetic to Germany.

We see the episodes mentioned and many others as marginal incidents in our history, and, in any event, part of a closed book. From our point of view, we have exchanged the expansive and imperialist dreams of earlier times for the status of counselor and friend, though our relationship to events in Guatemala in 1954 seemed to Latins to go much further. The one who exercises power and the one upon whom it is exercised almost always have a different interpretation of the motives involved. The slightest hint of condescension, even in connection with economic aid, is sure to evoke deep resentment. If we approach the matter imaginatively, we will not be surprised at the lingering fears of the Colossus of the North, or at the persistent suspicion that we have not wholly abandoned imperialist ambitions.

We think we have learned at great cost that we must not let dislike of political and social retrogression induce us actively to manage other people's affairs. We may use such diplomatic instruments as are available, but beyond that it is unwise to go, except in concert with other nations through the Organization of American States or the United Nations. Otherwise, we set ourselves up as moral imperialists, seeking to choose not only our own course of action but also to direct the lives of other nations.

Latin America illustrates the need imaginatively to remain constantly alert to the different historical perspectives of other people as we attempt to understand their prejudices and fears. What we sometimes take for jealousy of our might and our wealth is, to some extent, a reaction to unconscious arrogance when we speak all too glibly of "our position of leadership." Leadership should be a combination of wisdom, courage and persuasiveness. The more fully we appreciate the folly of mistaking dominance for leadership, the sooner will the underdeveloped nations accept the sincerity of our purpose.

VII

There has been a growing feeling that the problems of foreign affairs have become so complicated that the private citizen cannot be expected to understand them, much less make a positive

contribution to their resolution. Concurrently there has been a surfeit of demands that Washington officials should develop "bold, new, imaginative policies and plans." This is tantamount to asking that those eminently desirable ends should be achieved in a vacuum. That is not only undesirable, it is impossible. We do not have a government of experts, and if we were to try to form one it would be utterly disastrous to the whole concept of democracy to which we are deeply committed. The expert has an essential but none the less a subordinate role to play; he can advise, but he cannot take the place of political leadership. By its very nature political leadership loses its effectiveness unless there is a significant degree of public consensus behind proposals for action. Many a novel and constructive idea, possibly conceived by experts but responsibility for which was accepted by a political leader, has come to nought for lack of intelligent popular support.

So long as the United States remains committed to the democratic process, there can be no substitute for effective citizenship. The development of that effectiveness with regard to foreign affairs depends to a great extent upon the application of imagination to help in achieving an understanding of events in the world. Long ago Aristotle argued that citizens need not be experts in order to exercise a sound judgment in public affairs. Time has proved him right. In practice, freshness of official thought is often stimulated by imaginative suggestions from individuals or groups of citizens. They are then ready to rally support for courageous alterations in old policies that time has made sterile.

LAW, FORCE AND SURVIVAL

By Julius Stone

THE ideal of the rule of law in international affairs has a deep attraction for all of us as a way out of our dire situation. The question is: What is its value as a practical recipe for the present crisis between states—as a substitute, in the words of President Eisenhower, for the “absolute rule of force in the affairs of nations?”

Even within our own democratic societies the rule of law ideal is not a simple remedy for the exercise of arbitrary power. England is the cradle of the rule of law; but even there, so far as law enforced by the courts is concerned, the rule of law protects against executive power but not (in the last resort) against the supreme power in the state, the legislative power. For the rest, as Lord Wright once said, “the safeguard of British liberty is in the good sense of the people and in the system of representative and responsible government which has been evolved.” And even under a written constitution with a bill of rights, as in the United States, these remain the final arbiters—as the segregation issue reminds us—after the last judgment of the Supreme Court has been handed down.

The essence of the rule of law ideal lies, therefore, not in “law” narrowly defined, but rather in the supremacy of certain ethical convictions, certain rules of decency prevalent in the community, and in the fact that those who are at the apex of power share those convictions and feel bound to conform to them. A duly enacted statute to liquidate the Opposition would violate “the rule of law” not (as it were) because it wasn’t “law,” but because it wasn’t “cricket.”

As lawyer’s law, the rule of law which Dicey so extolled merely guarantees procedural equality in enforcing such rights as the legal system distributes among members of the society. By and large in democratic societies, we accept our share of “rights” as they are—and accept third party judgment enforcing them—because legislatures, under the check of periodic elections and publicity of its procedures, are constantly overhauling the substantive law to keep it in tune with the demands of the time.

How satisfactory would the rule of law be if we awoke one bright morning to find that there was no longer any parliament

to make or change the law? But this is precisely the situation in the international community. If, without changing this, we try to clamp the rule of law on states by requiring disputes to be settled by binding decisions of an international court, this freezes vested rights as they now are, and makes it even more difficult to adjust legal rights to rapidly changing conditions. There is obviously not the slightest hope that states will agree to this. A plan for the rule of law must provide some accepted method of changing the law, and of enforcing it as it changes. The feasibility of this in the international as in a national community turns on whether there exists a modicum of common ethical convictions as to the basic principles of decency between man and man. But are not some of the main war-provoking cleavages of today rooted precisely in bitter divergencies of ethical conviction, deeply entangled with conflicts of interests?

Until the major military powers are willing to bind themselves in advance to arbitrate *all* disputes without reference to the importance of their interests involved, it should be clear that programs to establish the rule of law among nations can offer little relief to remove fears of war. Can it, then, at least be said that, even if they do no good, they can do no harm? I think not. I fear that such programs can, in fact, do very real disservice to the cause of controlling conflict. For the illusory simplicity of the phrase "rule of law" obscures the present handicaps of international law as a basis for preventing disaster.

Reinhold Niebuhr recently said that men may be dangerous, not only because "they have . . . unlimited yearning for power, but because they are creatures of dreams; and their extravagant dreams turn into nightmares if they seek to realize them in history."¹ Is the dream of escaping from the fear of annihilation by means of a régime of law and order between peoples liable to turn into one of these nightmares? Does it do grave harm, even when we seek to realize it in the name of the greatest good?

The phrase "rule of law" is used by those with this particular dream to imply that a new era of security might begin if only states would submit to third-party settlement based on known and accepted rules of law. But not only is this demand on states without hope of acceptance. It also conceals the truth that such programs could not in any case conduce to peace unless states were willing to accept, first, both binding adjudication and bind-

¹ "The Structure of Nations and Empires." New York: Scribner, 1959, p. 293.

ing legislative power of impartial authorities; and, second, an effective enforcement authority to carry out the decisions. Among the parties in the cold war such agreement obviously will not be forthcoming.

Broadly, it is disputes of an intractable nature dangerous to peace which international lawyers describe as "non-justiciable." We need not follow the lawyers into the technicalities of this concept. In essence it means that a dispute is non-justiciable if in the view of one or both of the disputant states the interests at stake are so important as to override any condition of the law. This is the area popularly covered by the notions of vital interests and domestic jurisdiction. Obviously most serious disputes fall precisely in this category. The refusal by states to accept third-party judgment in that wide range of conflicts which most threaten international peace is a stark fact of life. And no hopes for a rule of law, however eloquently expressed, are likely to make it disappear. Recent trends, not only among states but in the organs of the United Nations, have been to shrink further away from reliance on the judgment of third parties.

II

It is a platitude that the intransigence of states in insisting on the shibboleth of sovereignty is the main obstacle to the growth of the rule of law between nations. It is only a little less platitudinous to say that in order to overcome this intransigence we must educate public opinion.

But if any of us thinks that these platitudes help us much, he should stop and ponder. An American, when he feels indignant about the Soviet Union's stand on Berlin, should ask himself whether his own country would be willing to submit its position on the Monroe Doctrine to binding third-party decision. An Indian, indignant about *apartheid* or Western military alliances or Communist Chinese frontier encroachment, should ponder awhile whether his own country would submit the Kashmir dispute or the frontier dispute with Peking China to binding third-party settlement. On critical issues even the organs of the United Nations are known to shun the wisdom and learning of its principal judicial organ.

State sovereignty is not a sacred cow; but neither is it just a piece of abstract or fanatical lunacy produced by human greed or madness. It still corresponds to certain interests on which peo-

ples, rightly or wrongly, continue to insist, even at the cost of life. Other more efficient and rational principles may be building—for instance, through the United Nations—but they have not yet occupied the sphere where life-and-death issues are involved. It is even a little uncertain whether they ever will. Meanwhile, our world still stands precisely where it stands.

Any vital change does, indeed, require education of public opinion. But education about what? Surely not about the fact that living under a world rule of law would be better than living under the terror of destruction. No one really denies that. The education that is needed would be directed rather toward renouncing national concerns which may seem vital but which block the realization of this ideal so long as peoples insist on preserving their own control over them. As soon as we each put the problem to ourselves in this way, we may begin to doubt whether, after all, we would be better off than at present if we handed over control of some of these concerns to an impartial stranger.

With only two minor exceptions, the Soviet Union has adamantly refused to bind itself to accept third-party decision, even of the International Court of Justice. Why? On this, as on so many matters, Soviet political and scholarly statements are tortuous and full of contradictions as the Party line changes, but it is not difficult to understand the Communist position. The interests which Communist states are concerned to advance, as for instance the so-called “liberation of peoples,” require that existing rights of other states under international law be overthrown rather than that they be respected. The part of traditional law which has been under sharpest attack, namely the doctrine of sovereignty, is the only part on which the Soviet Union has steadily insisted—as its beneficiary, of course; for whenever one of its eyes fixes on the “liberation of peoples,” the other eye is sightless before the sovereignty of the states from which they are to be liberated. The doctrine of sovereignty is admirably suited to the tactics of a state which does *not* intend to constrain its policies within the fetters of international law, but sees the advantages of cultivating the law-abiding instincts of its opponents.

The position is not much brighter in relation to the other main focus of contemporary international struggle—the relations of Western Europe and North America with Asia and Africa. With significant exceptions which have a special history, notably India and Pakistan, the newer states of these continents have mani-

fested an attitude towards third-party settlement no less negative than that of the Communist states. But the reasons are not quite the same. The new states have generally come into being with their authority or their territory, or both, burdened with debts, concessions and commercial engagements of various kinds. They find themselves under a variety of obligations, either inherited from the colonial régime or resulting from their urgent needs for investment capital.

That these new states desire to maintain the utmost freedom of action in respect to their legal obligations is not only the common reaction of a debtor; it is also an expression of pride in their new-won sovereignty and of felt responsibility for the economic fate and standard of life of their peoples. In theory, of course, refusal to accept third-party decision does not alter their obligations. But it does leave them more room for manoeuvre, to resort to a variety of extra-legal pressures on the creditor to surrender his rights. These may range from requests for re-negotiation, repudiation, hostile propaganda and boycott, to outright confiscation and even tacit instigation of popular demonstrations and violence.

Whereas, half a century ago, militarily weak states tended to welcome third-party settlement of their disputes with stronger powers, the position today seems to be quite the reverse. If a big man and a little man are struggling over a disputed valuable, the little one naturally would prefer to take the matter to a third party to settle. How, then, does it happen that today the weaker states do *not* prefer to go before a judge? The answer, of course, lies in the nature of contemporary international politics, and particularly in the inhibitions which great powers face in using military force for limited objectives.

As Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice (the Legal Adviser to the British Foreign Office) and others have pointed out, the enthusiastic efforts to ban all use of force in relations between states, except in defense of one's own territory against armed attack, have had the ironic effect of weakening international law. Formerly, when the use of force in support of legal rights was regarded as licensed, small powers favored third-party settlement because equality before the law was better than inequality on the battlefield. But when atomic weapons are obviously too formidable to use in vindicating most kinds of legal rights, and when the opposed military bloc threatens nuclear retaliation against pressure exerted

even by conventional forces (as the Soviet Union did in the Suez and Cuban crises), then plausibility is given to the notion that force is out of the question even for defense of legal rights. When it begins to appear that small states can violate with impunity the rights of big states, the interest of the small ones in third-party settlement understandably diminishes.

In so far as a blanket prohibition is now assumed to be placed on the use of force by any state, even to enforce its legal rights, the effect is to undermine the modest binding power which international law enjoyed in the old-fashioned days before the League of Nations and the United Nations.

III

Within our own society, it is self-evident that in barring the use of private force by disputants we strengthen not only the law, but our own security. But this is far from true as yet in relations between states; indeed the very opposite may be the case.

As we aspire to banish force from the hands of individual states, there have arisen deep confusions in the notion of "force" itself. It is easy to talk in general terms about ending the reign of "power politics," but we must be careful not to commit the error of thinking that somehow we can abolish power from that area of human life which we call politics. Power, finally, is man's ability to act. And what we mean when we berate power politics is that power should be controlled so that it is not used merely for its own aggrandizement or other anti-social purposes. But how is power in this sense to be controlled without the use of power itself? The control of power (that is, of men's ability to act), whether by law or morality, is still a function of power, not merely of ethics. The ethical convictions of those who act and those affected by action are no doubt one determinant of power, but they are not an adequate substitute for it.

It remains essential, therefore, in seeking to control the anarchical manifestations of power politics, not to fall into the fallacy of wholly disparaging the nineteenth century system for maintaining the peace. The system was, no doubt, a *bête noire* of weaker states and of dependent peoples, and had many other sins. That does not, however, justify our identifying problems of power merely with the illegitimate manifestations of it. For such naïveté easily overlooks those elements of statecraft in the nineteenth century system which led Alfred Zimmern to observe, in

the days of the League, that the path indicated by history was that by which "the Great Powers" must assume the role of "the Great Responsibles." It overlooks the important fact that it was the series of equilibrations produced by the statecraft of nineteenth century leaders which made possible, without any major war for a century, the emergence of the modern politico-economic and technological structure of the world, and the rise to self-help and self-assertion of the peoples of Asia and Africa.

We should resist the fashion of assuming that the operations of power, for good or ill, can be abolished by drafting the constitution of a world security organization. Philosophically speaking, the concept of power is ethically neutral, and it remains in any kind of society a basic principle of social cohesion. It is neither necessary nor possible, in order to escape from the more evil consequences of "power politics," for our age to plunge into a vacuum of statecraft. The neuroses which produce this kind of escapism, and manifest themselves in the monolithic ideologies of our time, may well have more evil consequences than those from which they would escape. In a deep sense the vain search for a precise, automatically operating definition of aggression is a product of these neuroses, an escape into fantasy from the hard tasks of statecraft.

The question of how and when we may recognize and repress the unwarranted use of power is obviously a tough one. And it becomes more difficult still when we recognize that violence is only one means of exerting power. Other forms, such as the economic, the psychological and even the spiritual, may sometimes achieve similar degrees of compulsiveness, and may inflict even deeper suffering.

It is understandable, therefore, that in the last half-century simpler escapes have been sought in international law and politics. The tendency has been to condemn as wicked that kind of power which manifests itself in the launching of military force across the frontier of another state, and to leave all other kinds of power to work themselves out substantially uncontrolled. According to this view, the Charter of the United Nations itself forbids all resort to violence except in self-defense against armed attack or through collective action authorized by the United Nations itself.

This seems to me a dubious and over-simple interpretation of the Charter. But what is important is not whether the minority

of legal authorities are technically correct. The question is rather whether the majority view makes practical sense and whether in critical situations it will help us to ward off the danger of conflagration. For it is not enough to say that, if every state obeys the one simple rule never to exert violence across a frontier, there can never be a major war. The crucial question is whether there is the slightest chance that states will conform to a legal order of which this is virtually the only effective rule. In the absence of collective remedial action by the United Nations, must members submit to all kinds of illegality, injustice and inhumanity as long as these do not take the specific form of an "armed attack" across a frontier? Would U.N. members be under a legal duty to refrain from using force to prevent deliberate extermination of a satellite people merely because the operation did not involve an "armed attack" across a frontier? Would the United States be an aggressor under the Charter if, being warned of an imminent missile attack against its cities, and having taken every precaution to verify the report and to abort the attack by nonviolent means, it struck first? Is a state bound by law to wait for its own destruction? Such questions, we know, raise horrifying spectres of preventive or preemptive war, but the perils are there even if we do not ask the questions. Until such time as we find means of collectively enforcing peace and of adjusting the status quo within tolerable limits of justice, how can resort to force be said to be completely outlawed? I do not believe that such a position makes either moral, political or even legal sense.

Americans may perhaps be learning from the Cuban experience that no foreign policy or organization based on such "innocence" can long survive in the world as it is and is likely to be (we fear) for some considerable time. Such an organization could only become a protective shield for those states whose predatory and imperial interests can be sufficiently realized without the need for "armed attack" across frontiers, and whose plaintive motto when the injured party reacts is: "You are a very wicked animal: when we attack you, you defend yourself."

The other over-simple test for recognizing the "wicked" use of force, canvassed since League days, is also rendered rather absurd by the very dangers which it is supposed to avoid. This is the rule that when there is an outbreak of hostilities, it is the absolute duty of both parties to obey a cease-fire order by some international authority, and that failure of one party to obey the order brands

him in all circumstances the aggressor, guilty of the greatest crime against mankind.

Even before modern weapons, this "cease-fire" test would often simply play into the hands of the state morally responsible for the outbreak. That state is usually the one *not* taken by surprise, and is likely therefore to have gained a superior military position before the cease-fire order is issued. To freeze the line of battle by a cease-fire order is likely, therefore, to suit that state better than the other, since it has already gained part of its objective. Laos, at the present moment, displays these aspects of the cease-fire test in conventional warfare.

But now in the age of nuclear warfare the impracticability of any simple cease-fire rule becomes terrifyingly clear. When hostilities may be opened by a surprise thermonuclear attack, which may itself be decisive, compliance or non-compliance with a subsequent cease-fire order becomes indeed a pathetic basis for collective action aimed to prevent or end hostilities. Even if there were sufficient warning to permit conservatory measures to be taken in advance of hostilities, it would still seem perilous to have to wait for a possible act of defiance which might determine the outcome of the conflict in one awful instant.

IV

So far I have questioned our capacity at the present time to guarantee our future against the danger of war by inventing, or focussing on, any single commandment for states. But may it not still be said that even if the commandment is sure to be disobeyed sooner or later, like the commandment against murder, the existence of it and the threat of punishment for disobedience are in some degree a deterrent?

If we think about penalties after the event as a means of deterring states or their leaders from future nuclear warfare, the situation is entirely different from that of deterring individuals from murder. The whole basis of our modern sense of crisis is that a single outbreak of nuclear warfare might spell the end of civilization. Social life can survive a fair incidence of murders, but scarcely of nuclear wars.

But even apart from this, the idea of punishing those responsible for war, after the war is over, is not convincing, especially if the criminal is a major power. In a world in which most important states are aligned as allies, and the capacity for independent deci-

sion of most neutrals is deeply suspect to one side or the other, where will we find a forum capable of reaching objective and resolute decision? When the verdict of arms has given the victory to one side, the most likely forum to emerge is one that is wholly acceptable to the victor. But, by that very token, it would be suspect to survivors among the other half of mankind, as well as to historians.

The likelihood is, moreover, that what national leaders would be deterred from by the threat of condemnation in such a forum is not the *waging* of a war, but the *losing* of a war. Certainly if punishment of aggression, after the event, could deter future aggressors, happier results should have followed from the conviction of Nazi leaders at Nuremberg. World attention focussed for many months on this solemn trial and it still remains fresh in world memory after more than a decade. Can it really be said that the aggressive war-making count of the Nuremberg indictment has beneficently changed the course of international politics since 1945? Has not its influence in deterring aggressive policies and propaganda been rather negligible? And it can be no answer to this to say that, after all, nuclear weapons and the rapidity of political change have made the problems of peace more difficult than ever before. This is no doubt so; but it is the problems as they are that we are required to meet.

To meet them and thereby to improve our chances of survival we must rechannel our time, emotion and intellect away from impossible programs toward tasks that may be feasible and even ripe to be done. We can do this only when we really face the fact that, turn or twist as we may, we cannot put a perfect end to our fear of mutual destruction. Without this recognition, frustration and impatience must be our lot; and these are not the moods in which to cultivate wisdom, but rather moods to increase our grounds for fear. Campaigns which raise men's hopes and then leave them stripped of both hope and patience are a disservice to mankind, however sincerely intended. To chant "*non possumus*" is not an answer to the demand for human survival; but neither is an alternation of whistling and trembling in the dark.

When, on the other hand, we recognize that we cannot end, once and for all, our mortal danger, and learn to live and act in its company, other interests and responses may develop. They will be in the direction of reducing specific conflicts to manageable proportions and of releasing remaining tension through both peaceful

competition and coöperation. We must meet danger with steady strength and any necessary sacrifices. We must learn to abate or forbear from pressing demands, and to concede as well as to exact. We must begin to readjust our vision, through appropriate institutions, so that we can again see beyond the merely nationalized versions of truth and justice which have come to dominate in our age of ideologies and mass communication. And we must increase the range of positive tasks for human advancement which inspire a common dedication. Such precepts, and their implications for the daily conduct of affairs, apply to all states—to neutrals ever tempted to seize advantage from the shadows of hovering terror, no less than to the bristling encampments of the nuclear giants and their allies.

ECONOMIC FOREIGN POLICY ON THE NEW FRONTIER

By Jacob Viner

THE completion of the first hundred days of life on the New Frontier provides an occasion for an appraisal of the program of the new Administration in the area of economic foreign policy. These hundred days were an exceptionally difficult period for formulating long-term policy. The cold war had entered a state of acute tension, and earlier hopes that there were opportunities for fruitful negotiation, mutual accommodation, mutual understanding with Russia now seem utopian. The American economy was undergoing a recession separated from a preceding recession by a disappointingly brief period of moderate prosperity. Aside from the recession, the long-term aggregate and per capita economic growth rate was low, in fact one of the lowest ones in the world, and yet the American economy was not free from the threat of at least creeping inflation and of persistent unemployment; something structurally wrong clearly was operative, but there was no agreement in diagnosis. Europe, though flourishing economically as never before, was involved in a dispute between the Six and the Seven which threatened to split it into two trade areas manœuvring against each other and united only in making access to the European market for overseas products more difficult than before. The United States, on the other hand, was committed to bestowing blessings on any preferential tariff arrangements provided they could present claims, even of doubtful legitimacy, to the labels of "customs union," "common market" or "free trade area"—labels which in the best of circumstances designate mixtures of trade liberalization and of aggravated protectionism in uncertain and unascertainable proportions.

Our federally mismanaged agriculture was in its chronic state of growing surpluses, growing reliance on Treasury subsidies, growing dissatisfaction with its results on the part of the farmers themselves, growing resentment by agricultural-exporting countries against our massive export-dumping in the world market; only the patient consumers and taxpayers remained silent and without benefit of effective and dedicated spokesmen. An old, respected and politically influential industry, the textile industry,

was in real or simulated distress, and was campaigning vigorously and with considerable evidence of eventual success for quantitative restrictions on imports of foreign textiles as the most available remedy for its difficulties; a host of other American import-competing industries were waiting impatiently for the adoption of quantitative import restrictions on textiles and the establishment thereby of an important precedent for similar action on their behalf.

In much of the free world, and especially in the underdeveloped countries, the trend of action, and even more so the trend of opinion, seemed to be moving strongly in favor of government enterprise as against the free market. Even in countries where domestic private enterprise was strongly entrenched, there was hostility to foreign, largely American, private enterprise extending—or even maintaining—its activities in their territories, and this hostility was manifested by nationalists both of the right and the left. Added to all this was a new constraint in the formulation of American policy: the necessity of taking account of the impact of any proposed measure on the American balance of payments. Where this new limitation on choice of alternatives in policy-making pinched most was in the brake it applied to resort to government spending, the most readily available of palliatives for many domestic economic ills and, in recent decades, the most lavishly used tool of American foreign policy.

This is a formidable combination of adverse circumstances and of problems for a new President to have to face. Fortunately for the country, and for the world, President Kennedy possesses in abundance the qualities needed for coping successfully with such a situation. He has drive, energy, stamina, intellectual agility, the capacity to use advice with discrimination, the courage to make difficult decisions and to make them promptly, political finesse, style in speech and bearing. Since taking office, he has demonstrated most of these qualities in the area of formulation of economic foreign policy, which is the only concern here. On the whole, his record to date in this area, taking all relevant circumstances into consideration, seems excellent to me. I shall argue, nevertheless, that he has made some mistakes of consequence. I attribute this not to defects of judgment or insight, but to flaws in the pattern of organization of the top-level decision-making process which he has adopted.

In the first place, these past hundred days have been a crisis-

ridden period, and a President newly taking office has also a mass of detailed decisions to make which may be routine in character and individually of minor importance but nevertheless must receive immediate attention. The range of his activities since he took office makes evident that in addition to handling the critical problems and the detail which could not be deferred the President has also given considerable attention to matters which are non-essential, or could have been deferred without cost, or could have been delegated to the established agencies for handling. Since not even his time and energy are infinite, this may have resulted in some major issues getting less of his attention than they otherwise would. It is possible also that by diffusing the impact of his personality and of the power and prestige of his office over so extraordinarily wide a range of activity and of issues he has weakened his power of persuasion over Congress and the people on the particular issues of major importance.

Secondly, newspaper accounts give the impression that the President does not rely heavily upon Cabinet sessions and on continuing interdepartmental committees for the development of policy positions, but depends mainly for advice and information on his White House staff and outside experts, on individual heads of agencies and on ad hoc committees of selected membership. It is wise procedure for the President to use the brains, the knowledge and the experience of high-I.Q. men drawn for a term of years or ad hoc from the ivy-mantled towers of Academia, from the learned professions and from business and labor. There is even a stage—a late stage—in the decision-communicating process where the professional speech-writer, if kept under close supervision, can do more good than harm. Judicious selection of outside advisers can bring into the decision-making process ideas, skills, imagination, insights and enthusiasms which the routine processes of the bureaucratic machine cannot be relied upon to generate in adequate quantities. There is, nevertheless, in the personnel of the established agencies, and in their filing cabinets, a store of knowledge, information, historical perspective, which it is dangerous to neglect when important decisions are being hammered out.

I would regard it as a sound precept that wherever time permits no important decision on an issue which has many ramifications and a historical background should be decided without utilization of a staff-paper, prepared for and discussed and re-

vised by a standing inter-agency committee in which are represented all the agencies which can contribute information with respect to the history of the issue, the interests involved, possible side-effects and interrelations with other issues.

Despite the limited range of opportunity I have had over the years to observe at close hand the process of policy-formulation in Washington, I have seen a number of instances where a key factor has received consideration only because some civil servant, not always a high-ranking one, was given the opportunity, at some stage of the process, to call attention to it. I know of at least two major decisions reached without comprehensive enough consultation of the regular departmental organizations which would have led to major disasters for our country if extraneous factors had not come to our rescue.

One of these decisions was the instruction paper given to General Eisenhower in September 1944 (J.C.S. 1067), which would have required the American occupation agencies in Germany to press for the near-pauperization of Germany for the indefinite future. This paper was the product of a combination of fanatics from the Treasury Department and of generals. The State Department, which should have had the major role, was inadequately prepared, was incredibly blind to its routine responsibilities and allowed itself without a struggle to be, to all intents and purposes, merely a silent observer of the decision-making process. It was historically sophisticated British civil servants, and an eventual realization that a hostile Russia, with an insatiable appetite for reparations and an unlimited capacity to absorb them into its commodity-starved economy, would be the only beneficiary, which brought us in the nick of time partially to our senses.

The other of these decisions was N.R.A., which was essentially the product of a White House circle, and from which the Supreme Court rescued us. I would add as a third instance (but where it is conceivable that the evil effects of a mistaken top-level decision are still with us) the sinking of the World Economic Conference by White House edict in 1933. Here again the delinquency was on the part of the State Department, which did not struggle vigorously enough for its appropriate place in the decision-making process.

II

I come now to my appraisal of concrete details in the President's program, with particular attention to the content of his impressive series of Messages to Congress relating to American economic foreign policy. In these messages are a number of proposals for new multi-national agencies or for changes in old ones. It is perhaps not without significance that, unless I have overlooked something, there is no reference in these Messages, explicit or implicit, to the United Nations organization as such. This may be fortuitous. On the other hand, it may indicate a recognition that the enlarged membership of the U.N. involves a great relative increase of "debtor" or "underdeveloped" or "poor" countries to "affluent" or "advanced" countries, and of countries of varied degrees of "neutralism" to countries more or less tightly committed to the Western Alliance. In any case, I feel that our organized collaboration on economic matters with other countries is more likely to have an outcome consistent with our national objectives if it is carried on not through organizations of unlimited membership operating on the principle of one-country one-vote, but through "clubs" of countries with substantially like-minded views and aims, or through organizations of comprehensive membership, like the International Bank and the Monetary Fund, where there is weighted voting power corresponding at least roughly to the distribution of financial obligations and responsibilities. The new organizations proposed or already established, it seems to me, in the main have these latter characteristics in greater degree—or lack them in less degree—than the General Assembly of the U.N. and its sub-agencies.

The most important element in our economic foreign policy is our commercial policy, just as the most important way in which our international economic relations contribute to our own welfare and to that of the free world is through our ordinary trade as carried on by our merchants. I write here, as always in these matters, from the point of view of an old-fashioned free trader, although one who recognizes that to the qualifications which the pioneers of free trade were willing to make others need to be added in the light of new insights and changed circumstances.

Since 1934, the successive American Administrations, Republican as well as Democratic, have followed as their objective the

policy of gradual and selective reduction of the level of American import barriers, through multilateral negotiation of reciprocal concessions. They have sought also the elimination of direct or quantitative restrictions of import controls such as absolute import quotas and rationed foreign-exchange licenses. They have supported also, though with some watering down and some deviations from the narrow path of righteousness, conformity to the principle of non-discrimination as between foreign countries, or the "most-favored-nation principle."

With respect to all of this, the experts differ as to the extent and the vigor with which we have served our stated principles, and no informed person would think of claiming that in our conduct we lived up fully to our pledges and good resolutions. This is true also, however, of other countries, and in the main, I think, only a few small countries are in a position to scold us.

The President has not presented a special message to Congress on the trade-policy issue, and it does not seem likely that such a message will be scheduled until 1962, when the Trade Agreement Act of 1958 will be up for its periodic renewal. Meanwhile, GATT is engaged—with rumors that it is unsuccessfully engaged—in the attempt to negotiate a general round of tariff reductions, to be completed in 1961. The previous Administration offered to negotiate a 20 percent cross-the-board reduction of existing duties, and this offer, I gather, is in theory at least still on the agenda of GATT. It is obvious, however, that there is keen awareness on the part of the President of the fact that in Congress at least, and perhaps also in the country at large, the tide is running in a protectionist direction, supported no doubt by the current recession and our balance-of-payments difficulties.

In his references to trade, the President has declared himself an opponent of protectionist solutions of our problems. He has so far put all his emphasis, however, on the promotion of American exports, and in a reference to GATT negotiations currently under way he has stated that "we seek the fullest possible measure of tariff reduction by foreign countries to the benefit of our exports," without indicating what we are prepared to offer in return. The "peril-point" provision of the Trade Agreement Act of 1958 provides that the Tariff Commission shall determine points below which particular import duties cannot fall without danger of injury, and that the President must not carry any reductions beyond this point without reporting his reasons for doing so to

Congress. This will no doubt operate as a powerful mental hazard against meaningful duty reductions on our part and would seem to be a complete barrier to effective negotiation of cross-the-board reductions. The President has already proposed that the exemption of duty on foreign commodities brought in by American tourists be reduced from its present maximum of \$500 (of commodity-value, not of duty) to its traditional level of \$100, as a minor remedy for our balance-of-payments problem. It is as yet by no means clear that President Kennedy will be as stout a defender of a liberal American commercial policy as were his predecessors since Roosevelt. In any case, the most that can be realistically expected this year as far as American trade barriers are concerned is that some minor reductions may result from the GATT negotiations, and that on the whole our barriers to imports will emerge from this year of recession and of balance-of-payments deficit without substantial change in a protectionist direction. Tied loans and "buy American" practices will be resorted to more extensively than ever before, but, I hope, on a temporary basis.

In the last few years our imports have been running at about an even level, whereas our exports have substantially increased and have provided annually an export surplus of several billion dollars, which helped greatly to keep the recession from being worse than it has been. Of our annual imports of \$15 billion, about half are raw or semi-processed materials which could be produced in this country, if at all, only at unbearably high costs, and which we therefore for our own reasons choose to admit free of duty or at very low rates of duty. If we were to concede that all of the remaining imports are significantly competitive with domestic production, this would mean that the American economy has to meet the competition in its own market of imports from abroad amounting to only some 1½ percent of our Gross National Product. If we were to seek in a protectionist direction for a solution of our unemployment problem, our sluggish growth rate, our recession or our balance-of-payments deficit, the total area of manoeuvre as far as import barriers are concerned would be limited to this 1½ percent of Gross National Product. Among many other objections to following this route, it must not be forgotten that we export more goods than we import, and that raising our import barriers will inevitably be followed by imitative, defensive or retaliatory raising of foreign barriers against our exports.

III

Our farm policy is integrally related, in terms both of conflict and of harmony, with all phases of our economic foreign policy as a whole. For strategic reasons it commonly masquerades in internationalist costume, but if we penetrate its superficial disguise, it will be found to be essentially and narrowly domestic, isolationist and even internationally aggressive.

In the farm program of the Kennedy Administration, the internationalist disguise is made more elaborate. We are urged to embark on a Food for Peace Campaign, and we are asked to stop talking of agricultural "surplus," but to speak of "abundance," an abundance to be shared with the poor and the hungry, at home and abroad. Our agricultural superiority over the Soviet Union is to be transformed into a diplomatic weapon "to shape the future of the world." The "surplus," or as I prefer to call it, the "excess," is to be transformed, as far as *production* is concerned—as distinguished from *stocks*—from an incidental, unintended and transitional by-product of schemes to raise farmers' incomes to a permanent feature of our economy. The irresistible demands for subsidies of the farmers and of their Congressional spokesmen are to be tied up in one tightly-wrapped package with the humanitarian objective of relieving hunger abroad, the strategic objective of outmatching Soviet aid to poor countries, the foreign policy objective of aiding underdeveloped countries to attain higher rates of economic growth, and, to bring it quite up to date, the need for correcting our balance-of-payments deficit. The taxpayer, who bears the cost of the subsidies to agriculture, is assuaged by being assured that it is cheaper to give our abundance away than to store it.

The complexities of the plan and its departures from free-market processes are almost without limit. One significant phase of the plan is that for each commodity affected a committee of producers is to participate with the Secretary of Agriculture in deciding price-support levels, output restrictions and so forth, subject to a veto within 60 days by either House of Congress. Precedent is cited for this delegation of legislative authority in the trade-agreements acts and in other past legislation, but the delegation in these cases was at least confined within the several branches of the Federal Government. The closest precedent, it seems to me, is in the production-codes provisions of the N.R.A.

Act, which, it will be remembered, were treated rather roughly by the Supreme Court.

A linkage of the farm program with "our progress toward a liberalization program" is to be made by way of a redoubling of our efforts to gain access for more of our agricultural products to the markets of foreign countries by means of trade promotion and by pressure on other countries to liberalize *their* agricultural programs. Whether the emphasis is to be on "What we can't give away we'll give the hard sell" or on "What we can't sell we'll give away" is not indicated. Nor is there any sign in the Administration's pronouncements that anyone involved in drafting the program has made any attempt to determine, or had any interest in, whether under free market conditions, here and abroad, this country would produce more agricultural produce or less, and whether it would export more or export less, than under the Administration's program. It is particularly disconcerting from the point of view of friendly international relations and the preservation of orderly and defensible competitive procedures that we have not yet given the customary public promise to those of our friends and allies for whom agricultural exports are a mainstay of their national economics that we would endeavor to minimize the damage to them of our disposal activities abroad. Given the nature of the international aspects of the Farm Program, I hope the State Department had no positive part in it.

It is a sad footnote to this program, which fosters excess output and then grasps at every conceivable way of disposing of it short of burying or burning it, that the Air Force and the Navy are resorting to such practices as petty barter of government-owned farm products for oil and for the services of a private company in laying a missile range cable in the Caribbean, and that under the Food for Peace program it is planned to pay workers on development projects in part in American surplus food instead of in money. It may be that, several millennia after the introduction of the use of money as a medium of exchange, we have found this to have been a mistake. But it does seem hurtful to the dignity of his uniform that the military officer should be engaged in bartering peanuts for fuel oil and paradoxical that in our economic development activities abroad we should help laborers who have probably in many cases but recently emerged from a near-barter economy to return to it.

Peculiar farm programs have become a deeply rooted phase of

American politics, and I am realistic enough to concede that it is probably true that, unless he accepts substantially all that the farm bloc in Congress asks for, no American president would nowadays be permitted to lead his country on other important issues. The President, however, also has an important educational function, and it surely is wrong for him to support a program involving resort to barter, payment in kind, export premiums, import prohibitions, support-prices and so forth, as if these were normal long-run aspects of a healthy economy, a healthy agricultural community, a healthy system of international economic relations or healthy politics.

IV

Aid to poor and underdeveloped countries on a substantial scale has been accepted by our government and, I believe, by the American people as our responsibility. It is an activity, however, without established or traditional procedures and without accepted theory or principle to inform us how to carry it out. So far, at least, there is no consensus on why foreign aid should be given, to what countries, in what amounts, on what conditions, through what agencies, with what objectives. There is even no agreement on how to distinguish "aid" from transactions which rest on a mutual exchange of considerations. When we give food as aid, with the kind of food and the timing of the aid determined by our domestic agricultural embarrassments, should it be the American valuation of the aid in money, or the minimum amount of freely-disbursable money which the recipient country would gladly accept as a substitute, which is regarded as the proper measure of the amount of aid? Most of these and many other questions relating to foreign aid are questions which can be answered only in terms of value-choices in the light of the prevailing circumstances. Past experience can afford light as to errors to avoid, but little or no positive guidance.

The President, in his Foreign Aid Message, speaks in somewhat similar terms about the foreign aid program he found in operation when he took office. "Existing foreign aid programs and concepts are largely unsatisfactory and unsuited for our needs and for the needs of the underdeveloped world as it enters the Sixties." The President thinks he has found better guides to programs and better concepts, but I am not convinced of this.

The President is even more sharply critical of the pattern of

organization and administration of our present program. Our existing procedures are "bureaucratically fragmented, awkward and slow." The administration of the program "is diffused over a haphazard and irrational structure. . . ." He makes detailed recommendations for reorganization, both in Washington and in the field, and all of these strike me as well-formulated, practicable and conducive both to high-quality decision-making and high-quality applications. I welcome particularly the proposals for a larger role for the State Department in the planning and coordination of the various aid programs, but without assignment to it of responsibilities for operation, for which it is not suited.

The President makes a number of concrete proposals with respect to the administration of aid which have both logic and experience to support them. He states a strong preference, "special situations" excepted, for loans (as opposed to grants), including loans at low or no interest rates and with long terms to maturity. The only special situation he spells out is where countries are under strong pressure, internal and external, against maintenance of their independence. I would suggest that another appropriate exception would be for grants for low-cost pilot or training activities of a kind whose value sophisticated, advanced countries are more likely to appreciate than countries still at a relatively primitive stage of cultural and economic development.

The President's Message strongly emphasizes the need for long-term authorizations by Congress if the most productive form of aid—support of development programs based on long-range plans—is to be financed. The outstanding success in the past history of foreign aid was the Marshall Plan. I am sure that many factors contributed to that success, but surely one of them was that financing was made available in such manner as to facilitate planning ahead with assurance that the funds needed would be on hand. Persuasive also, at least to Americans, is the President's plea for a larger participation in foreign aid activities of other industrialized countries and for cooperation of such countries with the United States in the planning and administration of aid programs. I accept the Peace Corps Plan, but largely out of admiration for the President's enthusiasm for good causes, and as a contribution to American moral uplift at a time when I am told our youth are in great need of it. It carries no promise that seems real to me of a significant contribution to the relief of poverty or backwardness in Africa or Asia, but it will do no harm

and is a luxury our more or less affluent society can readily afford.

The President urges that the underdeveloped countries should receive aid in larger volume than at present, and, as I have pointed out, he wants other countries to give in increased amounts. He does not expressly recommend that the United States this year or in the future should increase its budgeted expenditures for aid, and for the coming fiscal year his only budgetary recommendation for increase of economic aid is in the form of a request for a transfer of 5 percent (\$200,000,000) of the \$4 billion authorized for the present fiscal year from the military-support to the economic-aid category.

Responsibility for our current balance-of-payments deficit is often attributed to our foreign-aid expenditures. It is not possible to assign a deficit (or a surplus) in the international balance of payments of a country to a specific debit (or credit) on the other side of the balance sheet, since there is complex causal relationship between the various items. The President claims that since over-all only 20 percent of the current program of foreign aid is not directly spent on American goods and services, it is only that 20 percent which puts a burden on our balance of payments. The problem is more complicated than this, once indirect relationships are taken into account. For example, the 80 percent of our foreign aid which in the first instance is spent on domestic goods and services contributes indirectly to the deficit, among other ways, by the import ingredients in our foreign aid exports and by the reduction in our commercial exports which results from the utilization of our productive resources in servicing foreign aid. It is also possible, on the other hand, that aid granted, say, in the form of a tied loan may result in exports financed by the recipient country amounting to several fold the amount of the aid. What can be said with justified confidence is that the responsibility for our balance-of-payments deficit attributable to our foreign aid is much smaller than the amount of such aid. How much smaller, no one can know.

The President rightly stresses the importance of self-help on the part of the underdeveloped countries, of sound planning, of sustained effort. Many persons, including myself, believe that in many underdeveloped countries a major barrier to escape from poverty is excess population. The Message does not frankly tackle this issue, and refers to population growth as a "problem" only in the sense, which may not go beyond arithmetical truism,

that the larger the rate of growth of population in an underdeveloped country the larger will be the rate of growth in aggregate real income which will be needed to maintain a given or attain a higher level of per capita real income, and the larger also (in the aggregate only? or also per capita?) will be the effort required on the part of the recipient country and those who give it aid if it is to attain "real economic progress." We are also told that by the year 2000 "Latin American population will be 592,000,000, compared with 312,000,000 for the United States," presumably to indicate the dimensions of the problem of increase in "effort" which will be required to attain any given gain in per capita real income. Nothing is said about the possibility that population control should share with increased "effort" the burden of attaining economic goals. It is at least a forward step in American state documents, however, that the words "population" and "problem" are allowed to appear in fairly close proximity.

On the question of what countries should be given aid, and in what proportions, guidance is offered in terms of the concept of "self-sustained growth," which is heavily plugged, and appears at least ten times in the Message. This term sounds somewhat familiar to me, and I suppose there is some place where it has been precisely defined, but in the context of the Message I cannot achieve more than a vague guess as to what its meaning may be. Apparently "self-sustained growth" is a "stage" in a country's development when it can "stand on its own feet" and no longer need aid; and a country is apparently worthy, or most worthy, of receiving aid when it is moving by its own resources and effort towards the "self-sustaining" stage, provided it has not actually reached that stage. Is there a way, however, of determining with even the roughest of approximation whether a poor but developing country in receipt of aid is "self-sustaining," or alternatively owes its progress to the aid? And are there not countries which are stagnant or even deteriorating which have little prospect of marshalling will and capacity for movement in the direction of "self-sustained growth" without external aid?

Even if the concept, when properly understood, would have obvious utility in the analysis of the causes of and obstacles to economic growth and of the contribution foreign aid can make to growth, I am skeptical on principle that any single concept can serve as a ruling or dominant guide to the appropriate allotment of aid among different countries. The phenomenon of growth

manifests itself in a great variety of ways and is the outcome of a large number of factors. Aid, moreover, is not and will not be granted with the sole consideration of supporting or promoting growth. It will be given to countries whose growth rate exceeds ours, and it will be given to countries which are not enjoying any per capita growth at all. It will be given as a reward for merit and effort and also in the hope of bringing merit and effort into existence. It will be given to friend and to foe, for strategic reasons and political reasons, in submission to blackmail and as bribe, and out of sheer humanity without any other genuine reason. The decisions will probably turn out to be sounder ones if they are based on consensus of preferences, on "judgment," on wide-ranging information, than if they are controlled by adherence to a formula, or an analytical model. Working rules, flexible through time and readily amenable to exceptions, reached by the coöperative effort of wise and dedicated men—that is the best that can be hoped for under prevailing circumstances in a problem like foreign aid.

v

The President's Message on the Balance of Payments impresses me as a sober, judicious and well-balanced appraisal of the problem and of the available and appropriate remedies. The problem is, of course, that we have had for a number of years running a balance of payments deficit, that in the past three years this deficit amounted in the aggregate to some \$11 billion, and that in consequence there has been a substantial depletion of our gold reserves and increase of American short-term liabilities abroad. If we abstract from loss of confidence in the prospects of maintenance of the value of the dollar, there is no immediate danger of acute financial embarrassment. But no one has ground for assurance that the drain of gold will cease, or even diminish, in the absence of corrective measures, and our internationally liquid assets are no longer so abundant that we can afford to be complacent about further depletion of them.

It is regrettable that in a period of recession and of unemployment it is hard to find remedies for a balance-of-payments deficit that are not of themselves undesirable, long though the list of possible remedies is. We could, for example, reduce or eliminate the balance of payments deficit by reducing military expenditures abroad or foreign economic aid, or by raising import barriers, or

by subsidizing exports, or by restricting American private capital exports abroad, or by preventing American tourists from going abroad. Some would say that we could restore equilibrium in the American balance of payments by depreciating the exchange value of the dollar, or by going off gold altogether and letting the dollar "find its level" on a free market, but this is a "remedy" which is less available to the United States than to any other country in the world, and even if available would, if used, remove perhaps the strongest restraint on inflation which operates in this country. As long as the United States shows concern for the stability of the internal purchasing power of the dollar, it has almost no power to manipulate downward the exchange value of the dollar in terms of other currencies, and must accept passively the pattern of exchange rates which other countries wish to maintain. In this respect small countries like Haiti have the maximum amount of freedom and the United States in particular, and Great Britain next, have the least degree of freedom.

There are also possible internal remedies, most of them belonging to the category of financial austerity. Such are, above all, credit tightening, heavier taxation, and reduction in federal expenditures. These are ideal remedies for a balance-of-payments deficit associated with an inflationary boom, but they are costly and intolerable in a period of recession and of above normal unemployment.

Under present circumstances, there are four general rules which seem applicable for dealing with our current deficit:

(1) Since most remedies are in themselves undesirable, do not concentrate heavily on any one of them, but use a combination of them so as not to press with disproportionate severity on any particular sector.

(2) Of domestic measures, choose those first which are least objectionable, in themselves or in their impact on other goals.

(3) Adopt measures only for a stated and short period of time, so that they end unless specifically renewed.

(4) Press for the adoption by other countries, and especially countries with large international reserves and current surpluses in their balances of payments, of measures which will operate to relieve the pressure on our balance of payments.

The measures which the President has adopted or has proposed to Congress seem to me to fit these specifications very closely. No one measure is a major one; in general the least objectionable

ones, among those available, have been chosen; in some cases at least, the measures are to be effective only for a limited period of time unless renewed; pressure has been put on other countries to reduce their trade barriers and to increase their foreign aid expenditures. In addition, the firm stand the President has taken on the question of depreciating the value of the dollar has visibly reduced the prospect that our difficulties might be enhanced by a flight from the dollar.

The President has expressly rejected, as unacceptable means of dealing with the balance-of-payments problem, not only manipulation of the dollar price of gold, but also reduction in our military program and in our economic aid program, the adoption of exchange controls over trade or capital movements, and the adoption of protectionism. This is all admirable. He recommends that in seeking balance-of-payments equilibrium we should place maximum emphasis on expanding our exports. Here I would suggest two amendments: We should confine ourselves to *legitimate* means of expanding our exports, with consideration for the maintenance of a liberal pattern of trade relationships in the free world; and we should not hesitate to seek and use, if we can find them, measures for increasing the capacity of domestic industry to compete with imports, so long as these measures do not involve increasing artificial import barriers.

One way of reducing the more serious aspects of a short-run balance-of-payments deficit without actually ending the deficit is to obtain credits abroad or from international financial institutions. The President proposes that the world stock of internationally liquid assets be increased by making it include more than gold, dollar balances and sterling balances, and suggests that a study be made of the possibilities of using the International Monetary Fund for this purpose. I do not believe that there is at the present moment anywhere a serious illiquidity with respect to foreign payments which is clearly attributable either to such maldistribution of internationally liquid assets as now exists, or to a shortage of the world stock of internationally liquid assets. The American and the British problems are not current illiquidity but current deficits in their international balances, from which illiquidity will result if these deficits do not cease fairly soon. Many countries are illiquid, but given their monetary and fiscal policies most of them would be illiquid again very soon after a restoration of liquidity by, say, foreign aid.

It may very well be, however, that the world will before long need, with some urgency, an increase in its stock of internationally liquid assets, and the International Monetary Fund seems the most eligible instrument to use for that purpose. A number of proposals are in circulation in this respect. Of these a probably adequate one and one which would involve the least change in present procedures would be for the Monetary Fund to negotiate with a number of advanced countries for stand-by credits for a number of years in terms of these countries' currencies, with interest to be paid at agreed rates on credit actually drawn, and with the Fund making the currencies so acquired available to member countries on the usual or more liberal terms.

The President also proposes measures which would make the United States a more attractive place for investment of foreign capital without raising the general interest rate structure in the United States. These measures involve an approach to a dual system of interest rates, under which foreign capital would receive higher rates of interest than American capital. There are technical and practical objections to these proposals, and there is considerable skepticism, which I share, as to the need for them and their effectiveness if adopted. But this is an area which has not in the past been much explored and deserves further study. With respect to long-term investments, I think it unwise to attempt to influence their volume or direction from a primarily balance-of-payments point of view, and the general principle to follow should be, for the United States at least, that capital exports and imports should be neither discouraged nor specially encouraged solely for balance-of-payments reasons. The free flow of long-term international capital is too valuable an institution to be regulated or manipulated for objectives which are transitory and can be better served by other means.

It is conceivable that even if all the concrete proposals which the President has made in connection with the balance-of-payments problem are carried out, the deficit will persist. It is likewise conceivable, though not I think at all probable, that some of the proposals made would, if adopted, operate to intensify rather than to abate our deficit. I nevertheless believe that the President's program is adequate for the time being, and that we can safely wait for clearer indications than now exist that additional action is needed.

The President's economic foreign policy program has been dealt

with in the preceding pages in mixed terms of praise and of blame. Except for the farm program, I attach more weight to the items of policy I have praised than to those I have criticized. Except once more for the farm program, even where a decision is or may be a mistake, there is for the most part no building into our laws and institutions of new elements which, once introduced, will be difficult to remove. I, for one, have a high degree of confidence that with some amendment of his mode of organization of the top-level decision-making process, the President will give the country first-class leadership in the economic foreign policy area—except once more for agricultural aspects. There remain many problems to be dealt with, one of which at least is a fundamental one, namely, what role is to be permitted—and on what terms of reward, security and dignity—to private enterprise, at home, abroad and internationally, in the programs of our government and in the agreements we reach with other countries. This is, however, not an appropriate year to deal with this issue, and there would be no conceivable criticism of the President that would be less warranted by the visible facts than that he had tackled too few issues in his first hundred days in office.

THE UNREAL AMERICA

By Julián Marías

A NATION, needless to say, is a very complex reality. But this too obvious fact should not lead us to forget that a nation is also a very simple reality, and that this is the condition of its unity, of its being *one* country. “Ces grands corps que sont les nations,” said Descartes—“Those great bodies which are nations.” That is true; they are great, sometimes huge bodies; but they are at the same time, perhaps primarily, “characters” or “persons.” Their unity is a personal one, both for themselves and for others. The representative character of societies—of all societies, each in its different way—is essential and cannot be disregarded or obscured by the fact that it often takes an unusual form. Each type of society or country—city, commonwealth, nation, empire—has its own way of being one, and therefore of being personal and representative.

For a long time, the country was identified with the King, its personal symbol, and Goethe was aware that the “Vive la nation!” of the dying soldier at Valmy in 1792 was the beginning of a new era. Diplomacy has been a substitute for this personalization, and its full development was a consequence of the vanishing of kings or at least the fading of their splendor. The personal representative of a nation has been, especially in the nineteenth century, a convenient symbol, and diplomatic meetings and conversations were and still are means of simplifying and personalizing the highly complicated and somewhat abstract relations among nations. The role of Benjamin Franklin in creating the early image of the United States in Europe—as an individual substitute for both national tradition and royalty—was extremely important and had far-reaching consequences. In our own time, the American expression “good-neighbor policy,” so influential in political practice, reflects the attitude of a people who are conscious of and sensitive to their relations with the family living next door or across the street; and this awareness is by no means less effective than statistics, polls and other ways of ascertaining the elements that constitute the reality of other countries.

When nations have been known to each other for a long time, a “national image” begins to develop. Or rather several images of

each—how many depends on the homogeneity and channels of communication between countries. These images are an important factor in the shaping of the world. European nations have been watching each other from their birth on the common soil of Europe, and it is difficult to trace their mutual images to their sources. The great French historian, Paul Hazard, in “*La crise de la conscience européenne*,” thought that these images were shaped by the end of the seventeenth century; I had thought them older, but perhaps Hazard was right. Around that time the relations among European nations may have reached a point at which their mutual images became fixed—frozen into stereotypes, despite the many historical changes which followed. A similar phenomenon can be found in individual life: fellow students may keep a fixed image of each other that preserves the features of the college years. The eighteenth-century image of Germany as a dreamy, idyllic country of poets and philosophers lasted for more than a century and was hardly shaken by Bismarck and Krupp. The “merchant” view of England has gone unimpaired through centuries of British history. As for Spain, an image coined in the late sixteenth century still prevails in the mind of the average man throughout the world, mixed, curiously enough, with a romantic cliché: Carmen superimposed on Philip II.

The European image of the United States was very schematic during the first half-century of its independence; it became considerably blurred later, mainly after the Civil War, but American isolationism made this comparatively harmless and immaterial. Until a few decades ago the United States was a closed space, within which a new, powerful country was being made and a new way of life attempted. Today, everything is changed: the foreign image of the United States—now much involved in the world—is reflected back to America and becomes a part of the image of itself. Meanwhile, people abroad are dealing with the United States in terms of their image of it, though this may bear little resemblance to an American’s idea of himself and his country, or, for that matter, to that of other foreigners. One can hardly be surprised if language seldom has the same meaning for people who are thinking of quite different things.

Unless there is a common assumption, language, instead of providing real communication, is misleading. Normally, we say only what seems necessary, counting on the context in which our words

are uttered to speak for itself and tell its part, which is often the most important. If the speaker mistakes what his listener is assuming, he omits what should be said and fails to convey what he means. When this is the rule, dialogue becomes a comedy of errors, which in hard times such as ours may turn out to be a tragedy.

These difficulties are particularly serious for the United States. The images of European countries, for all their shortcomings, have grown slowly and in continuity; Europeans have been living together for centuries, fighting among themselves with hatred, love, rivalry and admiration. The image of the United States is in most cases a haphazard one. Until recently, information has been very scarce because of distance and lack of real interest; there have been only scattered moments of concentrated attention, like spotlights focused on its face. In recent times, there has increasingly been too much information, often contradictory, of unequal reliability, from many sources, dating from different periods of time.

On top of this, the American people's own image of the United States has not been especially clear. The nation's growth has been so fast that it has been nearly impossible for the American mind to keep pace with the development of the country, with the avatars of its many-sided and changing reality. And since one's own national image is partially made up of foreign images, like reflections in a mirror, the average American is further confused by the inconsistent and mostly inaccurate reflections of himself that he is receiving from abroad.

II

Most Europeans, including cultivated people, have little knowledge of the United States. First of all, the total amount of information acquired by them between the War of Independence and World War II was incomparably less than that coming from their neighbors in Europe. Second, the increasing presence of the United States in Europe since 1945 made it difficult to assimilate and interpret correctly so many impacts, to fit them into the old, rather vague image. And third, the structure of the United States is so different from that of the European nations that any information may be taken out of its proper context, and accordingly misinterpreted. The more a foreigner thinks he knows about America and the Americas, the more he is likely to misrepresent

them—unless he has really experienced the United States and has had an adequate background for understanding news and isolated facts. This is the hazard faced by all institutions, agencies or services devoted to the indiscriminate spreading of piecemeal information.

One of the most mistaken assumptions is that the United States is a “country” or “nation” very much like those of Europe. The Federal Government and its various ingredients, the relations between Washington and the states, the meaning of the capital city to the nation, the role of the press, the function of uniformity and diversity, the weight of politics and partisanship in American life, publicity and criticism, the measure of state control of society—all these have little similarity to the corresponding institutions and situations in Europe—or elsewhere. The reader of news concerning the United States is often puzzled and sometimes bewildered because he automatically sets them against a European or Latin American background and fails to see what they really mean in their own context.

This can be demonstrated if we take as examples a couple of particularly significant and revealing aspects of American life. One of the most striking features of the United States is the wide publicity given to, and open discussion of, facts and problems that in other countries are seldom matters of common information or judgment. For example, the American Government never fails to report the launching of satellites and missiles to the widest possible audience—whether they are successes or failures. Charges against the United States or its Administration, including the highest officers, are freely printed and commented upon in newspapers and magazines—for instance, Khrushchev’s speeches, in their full official text as provided by the Soviet Embassy. The admission of espionage in the U-2 incident and the evident discomfort and uneasiness of Americans because the facts were at first concealed and the admission delayed—this was interpreted in Europe as utter naïveté or even foolishness. In America, to an unequalled degree, mistakes are admitted by political parties, their friends and supporters. When *The New York Times* came out for Mr. Kennedy as its Presidential candidate, the editorial included quite a few criticisms of his program as well as reservations about his candidacy. Everything concerning segregation, violation of civil rights, unfair conditions of labor for Negroes or Mexicans, etc., is openly discussed and sometimes exaggerated.

The United States is the land of statistics. In other countries they are scarce or inaccurate, and where they are reliable they are restricted to people particularly concerned; even if they are available to anybody who takes the trouble to look them up, they tend to circulate only within a small circle of technicians and specialists. In the United States they are common knowledge; all kinds of statistics are published in the press and widely discussed. They are spread around the world by information agencies, and reprinted by foreign publications that seldom publish similar data from their own countries. Everybody knows how many Negroes are deprived of their right to vote, how many embezzlements are committed in the United States, how many drunken drivers are arrested, how many New York high-school girls get pregnant, how many people read pornographic magazines, how many estranged couples exist in the country. All these figures seem impressively high; if the foreign reader compares them with the few cases he personally knows or even with his guess about his own country, he very easily may get the impression that things are pretty bad in the United States. But if only he knew all the relevant facts, he would perhaps reach the opposite conclusion.

All American newspapers print monthly reports about prices and the cost of living. We all know that if in 1947-49 it was 100, it is now 127 and a fraction. In Spain, for instance, we don't know, and our best guess would be that we passed from 100 to 500 or 600 without batting an eyelash. Another much-discussed issue in the United States is unemployment. Figures are frequently given and they are quoted in the foreign press, which seldom reports figures for other countries; moreover, the reader assumes that the words "unemployment" and "unemployed" or "jobless" mean exactly the same thing as the French words *chômage* or *chômeur*, or the Spanish *paro* or *parado*. Not all Americans and few Europeans—if any—are aware that everybody who did not have a job in the last couple of weeks and wants to have one is included in the American statistics as "unemployed," even if he is quite young and never was previously employed, regardless of sex, age, marital status, etc. If a man loses his job, and his wife and a couple of children, wishing to help, look for jobs they did not previously need or want, this makes four "unemployed" in the statistics.

I would say that a climate of veracity pervades the United States. I do not mean that everything said or written is true—

far from this. I simply mean that lies are "exceptional"—even if they may be quite a few—and that it is truth that prevails. In my opinion this is one of the greatest assets of the United States, a wonderful feature of its society. But it is imperative to have this in mind if one wants to interpret correctly a particular state of affairs. Most Europeans fail to realize that the distance between words and facts is surprisingly short in America; they automatically make too heavy a discount, and instead of approaching truth, they widen the gap between their interpretation and the reality. One is reminded of the Spanish peasant who came back to his village after living in Naples: nobody was prepared to believe him when he said that there was a mountain whose summit smoked.

The general disapproval of American diplomacy is mainly, I believe, the consequence of the fact that the United States is bringing, for the first time in history, its domestic ways to the international scene. And, while I believe that this can be a wonderful thing in the future, I am also persuaded that many blunders made by American statesmen and diplomats arise from the fact that they take an understanding of these ways for granted and are not fully aware that to apply them internationally means a major innovation, doubtless risky and far-reaching.

III

Disregarding the true originality of American society, and unaware of the changes which have been taking place, especially in recent decades, many Europeans—and others as well—try to assimilate all information about the United States and fit it to their own assumptions. To the extent that they do recognize some differences, they usually perform two mental operations: (1) they interpret them as basically European characteristics externally changed on American soil either by degeneration or by exaggeration; (2) they take them as inherent and permanent parts of American society, people or government, even if they belong to the past or can clearly be seen to be mutually inconsistent. Let us consider a few illustrations.

Everybody takes for granted that the United States is a "wealthy" country, but most people assume that this is a "gift," that the United States is naturally wealthy, implying that it always was and probably will be, without any particular condition or activity. This viewpoint colors foreign attitudes toward every-

thing related to American wealth and its function. It takes a little effort to demonstrate that American wealth did not exist from the beginning, that it had to be "worked out" by tremendous and well-directed exertion through centuries of hard work; that life in the United States was and still is hard; that other countries having ample natural resources nevertheless remain poor. In other words, American riches have been earned and do not come by inheritance or automatism.

At the same time, the prevailing opinion is that Americans are greedy and money-loving people, eager to earn more and more, "materialistic" to the point of referring to a man as "worth" so-and-so much money (an expression which the Spanish writer Moratín, in a text of 1793, traces back to England). Few people know—or care—about the extent of American willingness to give and their ability to find reasons and even pretexts for giving, to the astonishing amount of \$8 billion in 1960. How many foreigners would guess anything approaching this figure?

In the same context, it is widely assumed that the United States is a "capitalist" country. The label is what counts; it is generally understood in terms of other countries (European or South American), or of other times, say, the late nineteenth century. The image of the "robber barons" is more likely to come to the foreigner's mind than that of the man who pays an income tax of 91 percent. I would like to know how many educated people abroad have a fairly adequate idea of such subjects as the number and status of stockholders of American companies, workers' wages and rights, the minimum and the average standard of living. (I read some time ago in a French review: "Many workers in the United States have a car indeed, but they are mostly second-hand cars.") The true image of American economic and social organization is rarely seen abroad. Its most attentive observers usually rely on critical books by American sociologists, who, on the one hand, take for granted that their readers know the general background and, on the other hand, write with a sense of humor that the foreign reader often fails to perceive. Most American books on social problems are written in a tone not too distant from that of *The New Yorker*, despite their scholarly character, and they ought to be read accordingly.

The worker's social status is also misplaced. Most people think of him as a "proletarian" and do not realize that the American "proletariat," such as it was, has almost vanished. But when the

facts show them that American workers are no longer proletarians, Europeans stop thinking of them as workers. It is almost unbelievable how many Europeans who profess to be deeply concerned about workers' problems simply ignore the American solution. The same thing can be said of the social aspects of the evolution of American capitalism. Foreigners have no clear idea of social classes in the United States, since to identify them with "economic classes" does not work. Hence many people jump to the wrong conclusion that the United States is a "classless society." And when they realize that after all classes do "still" exist, they return to their old conception, paying little attention to the extraordinary opportunities of Americans in terms of job, education, marriage, way of life—regardless of their class.

The Negro problem is perhaps the main source of misconceptions abroad. Few Europeans know the basic facts about it: (1) that it is a real problem; (2) that therefore something has to be done; (3) that there is not such a thing as an "American solution," because there are several; (4) that the so-called "Southern attitude" is: sharply criticized within the country; not shared by a large number of Southerners; rapidly changing; and partly justified, *i.e.* supported by some reasons, even if they conflict with some better ones; (5) that the improvement in the general situation is tremendous and faster than could reasonably be expected; (6) that the vast majority of Americans—South as well as North—is persuaded that integration is the unavoidable solution of the problem, but most Americans know—or at least feel—what critics easily overlook: that integration has to be *made*, not simply ordered or spoken of, and it takes time, like growing a tree or educating a child. This brings us to a related and most serious cause of misunderstanding of the United States.

IV

The relations between state and society may differ among European or Latin American countries, but the contrast with the United States is one of kind as well as degree. On the whole, the function of the central government is far more restricted in the United States and, more important, American society is entrusted with multiple and highly complicated tasks. I underline this last point because the tremendous and perhaps too fast growth of the Federal Government in the last 20 years may lead one to believe that the traditional situation is being reversed and that American

society is being increasingly subordinated to and controlled by the Federal Government. I hope this won't happen and am persuaded that it is not yet the case. The state, as represented by the Federal Government, now has many more functions than before World War II, and accordingly much more power and resources, but it is undeniable that American society has been growing in a parallel way, and the balance has not been lost. The role of society, its possibilities and means, the variety of its capacities, its demands on its rulers, are now more important than ever.

Foreign observers are often puzzled at the "apathy" of the United States toward some social evils. How is it that they seem to be more or less tolerated for long periods of time, despite the open disapproval of the best part of the country and sometimes of the highest authorities, perhaps the Supreme Court? If integration of schools has been decided upon, how can it be that it proceeds so slowly and with so much reluctance? Is it not imperative that it be immediately and absolutely enforced? Many Europeans fail to understand why the United States cannot get rid of the teamsters' problem, or of some harmful organizations of dubious legality, or of certain forms of juvenile delinquency. Foreigners are likely to diagnose the cause as weakness or complacency or complicity; in other words, a serious illness of America.

I believe exactly the contrary. For me, this is proof of the wonderful health and vitality of the United States. It would certainly be easy for the state to apply its power and perform surgery on the social body, thereby getting immediate results. But this would be to prevent society from reacting creatively by itself to develop new organs or functions which do not confine themselves to the suppression of the disease, but act positively to cure it. One of the most deep-rooted beliefs which shapes the American conscience is that evils are to some extent justified, that there is not on earth an absolute evil. The state can suppress—surgically—juvenile delinquency. But a strong and healthy society suspects that suppressing it is not enough, that something has to be invented and positively worked out instead of juvenile delinquency. It is often better to have a little patience in order to overcome not only the present evil, but the condition that created it.

We should not under-rate the power of society. In my opinion, the greatest threat to the United States in its whole history—including the Civil War a century ago—was the attitude labelled,

for simplicity's sake, McCarthyism. No official power destroyed this menace; on the contrary, the instruments of the state were widely used in its behalf, and to some extent still are. It was American society, public opinion, that healed its own disease, by using its moral sense, its taste for fair play, its sense of humor, its confidence in man, its love of freedom. The state could have thwarted McCarthyism, but only American society could overcome it.

v

The weakest element in the whole complex of the United States is its foreign policy. Of course, America's role is exceedingly difficult, and mistakes—even serious mistakes—are unavoidable. It is easy to point to them with an accusatory finger, but I do not believe that most Europeans and Latin Americans would sleep as peacefully as they do—even allowing for some nightmares from time to time—if some other country had the position of responsibility now held by the United States. Nevertheless, American foreign policy over the last 15 years has recorded some unmistakable failures which could have been prevented and which badly hurt the American image abroad. Without trying to analyze these mistakes, I would like to hazard an explanation of their cause, for it is relevant to my central thesis about the nature of American society.

Every Administration is acutely conscious of the difficulties and risks involved in foreign policy. Concerned to avoid mistakes, and conscious of America's lack of experience in a field of rapidly increasing importance, the responsible officials rely more and more on the advice of experts. Apparently nothing could be more reasonable and safe, especially as Americans have a deep-seated tendency to rely on experts. But I see two dangers in its application to the field of foreign policy.

The first is that not too many experts on foreign affairs are available—I mean fully competent and really qualified, able to cope with the very thorny and unusual problems they have to deal with. The result is likely to be that one accepts restricted qualifications as if they were general, assuming, for example, that knowledge of Latin America qualifies one to deal with Spain. A worse danger is that expertness in one field will be considered transferable to all fields. Ortega y Gasset spoke in "The Revolt of the Masses" of "the barbarism of specialization": this describes

the attitude of men who are competent and qualified in some particular field and behave as if they were equally competent and had authority in other fields where they should be prepared to learn. Businessmen and military men rank among the best experts in the United States; but their competence is restricted to highly specialized questions. Now, I have the impression that they have played a very important role in determining American foreign policy, even in spheres where they were not properly qualified, and have often had the last word about complex and delicate matters remote from their training and experience. As a Spaniard, I am perhaps in a position to realize how often this has been the case and how many dangers are involved. Oversimplification and a tendency to overlook everything that fails to fit into a scheme designed for a particular purpose may cause far-reaching mistakes with serious and unforeseen consequences.

The second danger in unrestricted reliance on experts or self-appointed experts is of a subtler and deeper nature. It consists of depriving society of any important function in the making of foreign policy. Whereas in other aspects of American life the role of society is essential, and the state has mainly supplementary, coördinating or exceptional activities, with the result that the balance between both is preserved, American society as such plays only a minor role in the relations of the United States with other countries; public opinion is powerful in America, but it has little to say in the field of foreign policy. It is often disregarded, sometimes disdainfully, by those who "know better." If they did know better, this attitude would perhaps be acceptable, although I feel that they would benefit by paying greater attention to public or individual opinions; but it often happens that their proud assumption proves to be wrong. The reader will have no difficulty in thinking of illustrations.

The final consequence of this state of affairs is that, since the foreign image of a country is largely founded upon its foreign policy, most people in Europe and elsewhere think of the United States as represented by its Administration and, even more, by some groups of "experts" influential in policy making, rather than by the American people. One could object that this is the rule and that some allowance has to be made for the unavoidable distortion of reality in seeing any country through its representatives. But in the case of the United States this deformation is greater, because the role of society is more important than in

most countries, and therefore the image that reaches foreign eyes is unusually distant from the true outlook of the United States as a whole. And this is a major factor in explaining why there is an astonishingly wide gap between the views of foreigners who see the United States from abroad and of those who know it from living there.

VI

What can be done in order to give a more truthful and accurate image of the United States abroad, and especially in Europe? I was going to write "a better image" and I stopped, because it would be a big mistake to look for a better image. Propaganda is one of the great evils of our time, perhaps the greatest, which is spoiling a large part of the wonderful things created by the twentieth century. Besides, unlike some countries, the United States can afford the truth.

It is unnecessary and perhaps harmful to attempt to "sell" the United States. Boasting, exaggeration, omission of negative aspects and oversimplification should be carefully avoided by Americans who seek to reveal the face and soul of their country. The main trouble is that most Europeans know little of the United States, and this little in a fragmentary way, lacking background and perspective. When Americans try to "explain" America, they generally emphasize institutions, as if they were not a simple consequence of the social reality that lies underneath. It is imperative to bring to the foreigner's mind the true, deep originality of the United States—the roots of these doubtless valuable institutions which cannot be transplanted without them.

On the other hand, ideas about the United States should be up-to-date. Americans are usually very careful about this, but in a rather elementary form: they will give the last-minute developments in politics, the last week's economic data, the monthly progress in integration; but the image of the United States as an intellectual wasteland and of American writers, artists and thinkers as exiles in their own country, which may have been to some extent true 30 years ago, is prevailing and almost uncontested in European intellectual circles today. The conflicting views of the United States as both a colonialist and an anti-colonialist power peacefully coexist in many minds; foreigners jump easily and in half-good faith from one view to the other, according to the subject of discussion or simply to their momentary temper. And,

finally, Americans (and others) seldom take the trouble to understand and explain what is, after all, a little more complicated than can be encompassed by a label.

This question of labels is a very delicate one. Especially negative labels. They usually lead to confusion, weakness and defeat. Everybody remembers that in the thirties there was much talk of "anti-fascism" throughout the world; everyone who was not a fascist was an anti-fascist, which amounts to very little. It is difficult to get enthusiastic about an "anti-thing." The result was, as we sadly know, a tremendous flourishing of fascism and related ideologies in most countries, which led the world to disaster, blood, sorrow and stupidity in the forties. But the lesson was not properly learned: the fifties was the decade of "anti-Communism." A new negative label was substituted for a positive, fruitful and original reality—the United States on the one hand, Europe on the other, as the two brotherly, different, irreducible lobes of the West.

Negative labels often conceal attitudes and principles which have little in common, and some of which may be surprisingly close to what is so staunchly opposed. If it would, the United States could rally many important forces and resources around the true, living principles that positively shape it—freedom, truthfulness, self-respect, toleration, friendliness, individual opportunity, fair play, criticism, confidence—instead of collecting reluctant followers, dismayed allies, skeptical onlookers and, even worse, would-be friends who, under the same flabby negative flag, stand for opposite principles.

The most difficult task is for Americans to realize what they are like, so they can explain it to others. It is always hard to understand one's own reality, even harder if contrast with other ways of life is lacking or insufficient. Americans have been living inside the United States for nearly two centuries. They now are fatefully living also in the world. This will deeply affect their social and historical reality. The huge body of the United States will be animated by a different soul, a little older, with more experience, labored by history—that is, by illusions, successes, failures, hopes and above all the disappointment of realization. This "character," the United States, is growing more complex, and it will have to rely on its own creative and original possibilities. It is in my opinion imperative that the United States remain faithful to its authentic personality and behave accordingly.

SETTLER POLITICS IN ALGERIA

By Joseph Kraft

THE prospect of a settlement in Algeria casts a dark shadow over the fate of more than a million European settlers. For in its hour of supreme peril, the settler community finds itself without friends or allies. From the Moslem rebels of the National Liberation Front (F.L.N.) who for six years have fought them for independence, the settlers can at best expect toleration. The French army has ceased to fight their battles: even the abortive April 22 putsch against General de Gaulle was staged by the military with only the faintest reference to the settlers. General de Gaulle himself, if not disowning them entirely, is taking his distances. "Algerians of French descent," he called the settlers in his address of May 8.

But who, in fact, are the settlers? "The agricultural scum of the European countries," they were called by Marshal Bugeaud, the Governor-General from 1840 to 1847. Modern Frenchmen, not less contemptuously, speak of them as "pieds noirs"—the black feet. But it is a native son that has best caught the national character. Mersault, the hero of Camus' novel "l'Etranger," is the archetype of the Algerian settler. "A poor and naked man," he lives the life of an office worker, but is a child of nature at home in the sun and the sea, and a stranger to the sophistication of abstract codes and ideas. What happens in his firm or even to the closest members of his family barely touches him. "Mother died today," he says introducing himself with grotesque insouciance. "Or maybe yesterday." But it happened to him, without deeply willing it, to shoot an Arab. Dimly the sense of transgression is borne home: "I knew that I had shattered the equilibrium of the day, the spacious calm of this beach where I had been happy."

II

Every nation has its border peoples, cruder than the settled population of the interior, and therefore an object of fun and contempt, but tougher and more energetic, better at working and at fighting. When finally absorbed, as were the American pioneers, the frontiersmen add dynamic leaven to a nation. Dominant, as the Prussians became in Germany, they impose harsh rule and set foot on the road to disaster. The case of the Euro-

pean settlers of Algeria falls midway between the two. Not powerful enough to become dominant, they have proved too lumpy for good mixing. From ordinary Frenchmen they are set apart by reason of racial origin, occupation, a clawing struggle for survival, and the circumstance of being an outnumbered minority. In outlook a sea as unbridgeable as the Mediterranean divides them from European France. "You reason like a Frenchman of France," a group of settlers once complained to an official involved with Algerian matters. "You must reason like a Frenchman of Algeria."

Frenchmen of Algeria: it is one of many myths. Of the 1,200,000 persons officially classed as Europeans in 1954, about 325,000 concentrated in the Oran district were of Spanish descent; another 100,000, living chiefly around Constantine and Bône, had Italian lineage; another 50,000, located in the same region, came originally from Malta. There were also 140,000 Jews, made French citizens by the Cremieux decree of 1870, but half of them indigenous to North Africa. Even by French figures, in short, well over half the Europeans of Algeria are of non-French stock.

Except for the Jews, what is most common to the settler pedigree is origin in the backward, rural districts of southern Europe. The great majority of the Spanish immigrants were day laborers, *braceros* from Andalusia. Calabrian and Sicilian sharecroppers made up the bulk of the Italians. Similarly with most of the *français de souche*, or Frenchmen by descent. Attention has been directed to the special cases: the case of the 400 Rhinelanders who left Le Havre for America in 1832, only to find themselves cast up by crooked sea captains as the first Algerian settlers; the case of the 13,000 unemployed Parisians transported south in 1848 after the riots of the June days; the case of the 5,000 Alsatian refugees from the German victory of 1870. But most of the French immigrants, too, came from the backward agricultural provinces. Not the south coast of France which is so close, still less the industrial North or the Parisian region, but Corsica and the poor farming sections of southeast and southwest France provided by far the greater number of the French colonizers. These had more in common with the *braceros* of Spain and the farmworkers of the *Mezzogiorno* than with their own countrymen. In Algeria, they combined to form a homogeneous settlement.

Land drew them in the beginning. After 1840 plots expropriated from the Beylical domain, and thereafter from native hold-

ers, were made available to soldiers serving in the French forces; then to groups of official colonists transported by the French Government. After 1873, in keeping with the free enterprise doctrines of the Third Republic, private property law was applied to what had been joint Moslem holdings: purchasing Arab land became for a European about as easy, and as cheap, as taking candy from a baby.

Getting the land, though, proved easier than working it. Uncertain weather and thin soil afflicted the European peasant as much as they did the Moslem *fellah*. More than two-thirds of the 1870 immigrants had failed as farmers within five years. "Algeria," Marshal Bugeaud, one of the staunchest of the colonizers, said in a moment of desperation, "cannot be cultivated." Disease took an even heavier toll. A third of the workers transported in 1848 died of cholera within a year. "Only the cemeteries," one soldier wrote back home, "are prosperous." Moreover, for the "agricultural scum," movement off the land was a step up the social ladder. From the beginning, accordingly, scores of Europeans headed for the towns after the briefest fling on the land. By 1870, when the settlement numbered 245,000 Europeans, 60 percent were in the towns. By 1920, when the immigration began to cease, 70 percent of the 820,000 Europeans were urban. In 1954, only an eighth of the European population was on the land. Far more than Frenchmen of France, the Europeans had become a community of city dwellers. Similar in social origins, they found their unity further cemented by a common urbanism.

Even more are they bound together—and sociologically distinguished—by an absence of extremes in wealth. Sharp differences, to be sure, mark the fortunes of those—130,000 in all—who have stayed upon the land. At least 7,500 are unskilled agricultural laborers. On the other end of the scale, a comparable number of *gros colons* live off huge tracts of land planted in wine or fruits and farmed by the most modern methods. Private holdings of 50,000 acres are not unknown. Henri Bourgeaud, a senator from Algeria known as the wine king, controls a domain of 2,500 acres of prime land from which have grown important interests in banking, tobacco and transport, as well as wine. But in the urban sector of the settler population there is astonishing uniformity. Of the 200,000 active Europeans working in the cities, perhaps 10 percent are workers in light industry. But administration and the liberal professions (32 percent), services

(9.2 percent), trade (8 percent), transport (10 percent), highly skilled workers (14 percent) make up three-quarters of the Europeans—a substantial middle class. Average income is about \$600 annually, almost what it is in France.

An immense social plant, or infrastructure, is required to meet the Europeans' needs, and like settlers almost everywhere, those of Algeria have been builders on the grand scale. Forty thousand miles of straight road crisscross the territory. An excellent railroad fronts the coast, and sends spurs into the hinterland back of Bône in the east, Algiers in the center, and Oran in the west. Algiers, Oran, Bône, Bougie and Philippeville are all busy modern ports, the first two being the third and fourth most active in all French-ruled territory.

One thing the settlers could not build: inner economic balance. For labor, the farms, mines, docks and light industry are dependent upon the Moslems. From their ranks come nearly 100,000 workers on European land: over 90 percent of the total. They supply more than 150,000 workers in the mines, docks and light industry—about two-thirds of the total employed. Not so crudely, but in as binding a way, the settler economy depends upon European France. French capital supplied, and supplies, most of the funds for development. The French market, protected and heavily subsidized, buys nearly all the produce of the settler farms—which probably could not be sold competitively. Many shops and almost all industry in Algeria are projections of French firms. The external transport business is almost exclusively transport to and from France. The Administration, which directly supports 18,000 settler families, is the French Administration. Only by backing from the French Treasury could Algeria pay the enormous cost of the social services which the settlers require. In short, the settlers are doubly dependent upon others. They need first the Moslems, next European France. Out of that condition there emerges the strange phenomenon of settler politics.

III

“Art thou my master? Or am I thine?” George Meredith called this “the parent question of mankind.” For its answer civilized men have traditionally turned to politics: a way of waging war, to reverse Clausewitz’s famous dictum, by peaceful means. Wherever there are not universally accepted standards for singling out superiority, there politics will flourish. It enters, of course,

into the designation of civic leaders, but also into the awarding of fellowships and contracts, the promotion of executives and army officers, the matter of who gets the corner office. It is, as Max Weber pointed out, the art of getting something for nothing: a phenomenon bred in the bone of virtually all communities.

Settler politics are strange precisely because at first glance they seem not to exist at all. System makers and pleaders of causes may single out "ultras" and "*enragés*," identifying them with *gros colons* and petit bourgeoisie respectively. But in fact, Mersault, Camus' child of nature, is apolitical. His kind has produced no important leader. For heroes the settlers take French figures—Edouard Drumont, the author of "Jew France," in the 1890s; Pétain in the 1940s; Jacques Soustelle in the late 1950s. Still less have the settlers produced any original ideas. "The Algerian settler," Charles-André Julien, one of the great experts on the subject, has written, "never had *l'esprit politique* (the political mind)." Nor did he have the party habit. A handful of intellectuals in the liberal professions and trade unions may have joined the Socialists and Communists. But of the traditional French parties only the Radicals struck root in Algeria, and they, even in France, were less a party than a collection of notables and their clients. Most settler parties were ad hoc affairs, put together for one electoral test or another, then junked. Poll after poll was won by lists bearing such general, non-party names as Algerian Union. And hardly anyone cared anyhow. "Only journalists and candidates," a settler once said, "care about elections."

On reflection, however, the absence of politics is a mirage: what seems emptiness is filled to the brim. The settlers had no need for political leadership, for programs or party organizations. Among themselves, there was virtually nothing in conflict. "No cleavage," as E. F. Gautier wrote, "has appeared in the bloc of the European settlers." "In Algeria," Marc Lauriol, one of the most penetrating of the settlers, and currently a deputy, once noted, "the difference between right and left is glossed over. . . . The candidates have, on all the major issues, practically the same opinion. The voters come from almost the same social background. Uniformity of interests and of opinions is the striking fact of public life among the Europeans. . . . It is only natural that the political debate is distinguished by indifference. . . . Serenity is the characteristic trait of the country's politics."

Except in the two areas of dependence. On all matters touching

the nerve of relations with the Moslems or with France, the parent question came surging to the surface. On the one hand, the settlers regarded themselves without equivocation as the masters of the Moslems. On the other, their supremacy depended upon backing from Metropolitan France. In both these areas the settlers threw themselves into the political fray with the unchecked fury of men backed against the wall in a battle for survival. Apolitical themselves, they were strangers to the sense of moderation and compromise, the willingness to support ambiguity and live with problems—qualities that comprise the most cherished bounty of active participation in public affairs. Mistrustful of party, and of the complicated workings of representative government, they looked to direct action—through chambers of commerce and agriculture; through professional, veterans and student associations; through the local administration; by plot, if need be, or mob pressure. There thus evolved a unique brand of apolitical politics. The settler community was not divided by party. It was itself a party. It was engrossed in an oppressive, authoritarian movement aimed at asserting mastery over both the native population in Algeria and the government in France.

IV

Upon the Moslems, the settlers fastened a régime of barefaced inequality. "It is difficult," Jules Ferry wrote in 1892, "to make the European settler understand that there are other rights than his in an Arab country, and that the natives are not a race subject to taxes and forced labor at will." In 1955 Jacques Soustelle found "contempt for the Moslems" to be "a constant theme." In the settler lingo the Moslems were *melons* (simps) or *ratons* (coons). "They weigh in the scales," a settler mayor, Raymond Laquierre, once told me, "as feathers against gold."

On those principles, the settlers pitched the government of Algeria. Up to 1944 all European males, but only the merest handful of Moslems, voted in elections for Algerian delegates to the French Assembly. The financial delegations, which from 1900 through 1944 had the major voice in budgetary decisions, were composed of three sections: two with 48 representatives in all, for the Europeans; one with 24 representatives for the Moslems. In local government, towns where the settlers predominated were endowed with full powers (hence the name *Communes de Plein Exercice*) and elected a municipal council which in turn named

a mayor; but where Moslems predominated, the towns, called *Communes Mixtes*, were administered from above. Except for tribal affairs where hand-picked Caids held sway, the whole administrative apparatus—including the local police, the bureaucracy of the Government General, and the Algerian branches of the French ministries—were in settler hands. “Between the settlers and the government of Algeria,” E. F. Gautier wrote, “there is a symbiosis. . . . The result is that the Government General is imbued with the settler spirit.”

The discriminatory nature of that spirit showed itself in all domains. Independent Moslem political movements were savagely persecuted by the army, the administration and settler vigilantes; Jacques Soustelle found “the call for bloody repression” a constant settler theme. Direct taxation, which would have borne heavily on the settlers, was much less used as a revenue producer than indirect levies, paid mainly by the Moslems. Schooling, in theory, was open to all. But as late as 1957, over 80 percent of the Moslems had no school.

Settler reaction to the Moslem rebellion followed predictable lines. A handful of individuals and organizations not dependent upon French control of Algeria worked beneath the tide of events to maintain rapport between the Moslem and European communities. The least important and most invidiously interested was the Algerian Communist Party, largely dominated by Europeans. It tried to penetrate the rebel organization, and despite ignominious failure continued to parade pro-rebel sentiments in a bid for Moslem support. By far the most important group working for harmony was the Catholic Church. Archbishop Duval of Algiers spoke repeatedly of “peaceful cohabitation of the spiritual communities,” and called for “a brotherly dialogue,” which sounded all too much like negotiations. Catholic social service missions continued to do charitable work for Moslems in trouble, whether nationalist or not.

To these strange bedfellows there was added a commercial interest. Almost alone among the big business groups of Algeria, the *esparto* grass monopoly of Georges Blachette is independent of subsidy from France: the whole crop is sold to Britain where it is converted to vellum paper. Able to do business without France, M. Blachette, and even more his political ally, former Mayor Jacques Chevallier of Algiers, sought to work with the Moslems for a settlement by negotiation.

But after innumerable indignities at the hands of his fellow settlers, M. Chevallier was forced from office in 1958. The Communist Party was banned in Algeria in September 1955. As to the Church, the Archbishop came to be known in settler circles as Mohammed Duval; one church mission was expelled from Algeria, and members of two others were brought to trial before military tribunals, found guilty of aiding the enemy, and sentenced to prison terms. For, faithful to its traditions, the overwhelming majority of settler opinion assumed a role of defiant intransigence toward the rebellion. Henri Bourgeaud, the wine king at the top of the social scale, spoke of the rebel leaders as "a handful of agitators" and demanded that their organization be "decapitated." A rung down the ladder, Mayor Henri Baretaud of Cherchell adopted the slogan: "You do not treat with hired killers." Further down the scale, dozens of semi-private organizations echoed the Mayor in even sharper terms. A group of settler doctors issued a pamphlet showing children mutilated by the rebels, and arguing that "mutilation is an inbred trait of the Arabs." Fifty-two different veterans organizations came together behind a program that included "execution of all sentences imposed by the courts, notably the death sentence." And at the lowest end of the scale, in the underworld of politics, there sprang up a crop of shadowy conspiratorial groups, ad hoc vigilante organizations, staffed by adventurers and dedicated to terrorizing the Moslem community. "We will defend French Algeria with arms," one of the best known terrorists, Joseph Ortiz, proclaimed. "We will do justice ourselves."

v

In dealing with their other sore point, European France, the settlers played the role of super-Frenchmen. A typical settler leader, the deputy Etienne Morinaud, once described his fellows as "valiant Frenchmen maintaining here [in Algeria] the French flag and sovereignty." "With the settlers," Algerian-born General Georges Catroux once acknowledged, patriotism is a "primitive, instinctive reflex." But there was a proviso, noted by Léon Blum. "What they call French sovereignty," he wrote in the *Populaire*, "is nothing but their own domination."

In keeping with authoritarian instincts, the settlers repeatedly aligned themselves with the extreme right wing in French politics. In the 1890s Algeria was a focal point of anti-Dreyfusard

sentiment. The scene of vicious pogroms in 1897, the next year it elected, out of a total of six representatives, four blatantly anti-Semitic deputies, among them Edouard Drumont. During the régime of Léon Blum, Jacques Doriot launched his French Fascist party from Algiers. Marshal Pétain's National Revolution found enthusiastic support among the settlers. Jacques Soustelle, later to become one of the settlers' heroes, wrote of their attitude toward Pétain: "If the National Revolution had not existed, it would have had to be invented. Whipped up by family, race, and caste hates, open to [Italian] Fascist influence from Tunis and [Spanish] Phalangist influence from Oran . . . our North Africans offered a promised land for the Marshal's propaganda. Nowhere in France or in the Empire did one find it spread out so blatantly in enormous slogans defacing the walls, and in giant portraits of the 'good dictator.'" M. Soustelle put the Pétainiste support down to opportunism. A more convincing explanation comes from General Catroux: "Pétain gave the settlers just the kind of order they wanted, that is the submission of the natives." And when that order began to crack, they turned in dizzying succession to the holders of might, backing first the Allies, next General Giraud, then the Free French, then the Communists, and, after 1947, the Gaullists. At one stage, some of the settlers even threatened an appeal to the United Nations.

Authoritarian traditions also inspired the settlers' treatment of French representatives on Algerian soil. Officials whom they mistrusted they opposed with base rumor, gestures of contempt, administrative sabotage and Arabic names. Maurice Viollette, Governor General, 1925-27, they called Viollette l'Arbi; Yves Chataigneau, who held the position in 1945-47, was Chataigneau ben Mohammed. Jacques Soustelle, when he arrived in 1955, was hailed as a Jew from Constantine: Ben Soussan.

In extreme cases, the settlers resorted to more violent measures. The political underground, nursed by the settler community to cow the Moslems, also made itself available for terror tactics against French officials. Well before the Moslem rebellion got under way, political assassination was an Algerian rite. The bullet of a European assassin ended Admiral Darlan's life in Algiers in 1942. The next year an attempt was made in the same place on General Henri Giraud. The strange bazooka plot against General Salan in December 1956 was in the same tradition. So, on a far larger scale, were the settler uprisings of 1958 and 1960.

In striking contrast, but also in the authoritarian spirit, was the treatment meted out to French officials who expounded settler views. Feted in the villas of the rich, praised beyond measure in the press, saluted in endless parades by the military, they were accorded a dizzying popular acclaim. As the Fascists cheered Mussolini from the Forum, as the Nazis hailed Hitler from the Sportpalast, so the settlers found their political theatre on a huge terrace just beneath a balcony of the Government General building in Algiers. To the Forum, as the terrace came fittingly to be called, they throng by the thousands at moments of political stress. Hatless and coatless, they stand by the hour, shouting in a frenzy of enthusiasm. Amid such thunderclaps of glory, the merest civil servant sees himself a liberating Caesar. "From high on the balcony," Albert Fabre-Luce wrote of that experience, "he feels himself borne upon a shield. Above the vibrant crowd the air shimmers, as above a flame. Through this halo, beyond the noble staircases running down to the sea, he imagines the France of his dreams. The present seems less close than the antiquity of the Latins, and most recent seems Algeria's role as a platform for Liberation. Once again, Europe offers to a martial foot a soft underbelly. No more is it Fascist Italy; it is republican France."

VI

Settler efforts to "liberate" France may not yet be over. Since the collapse of the April putsch, they have adopted as their anthem the famous song of Edith Piaf: "We Regret Nothing." While hiding dozens of officers who backed General Challe, they have threatened to lynch those who remained loyal to General de Gaulle. "The European community," Jean Daniel, a former member, wrote two weeks after the putsch, "has never been more homogeneous, more monolithic, more united."

Still, if the settlers are not contrite, their plight is real. The fate of minorities elsewhere suggests that coexistence with the Moslems in an Algerian state could prove, for them, disastrous. Partition, in either a European state or a province of the new Algeria, is hardly more promising. Repatriation to Europe would involve immense strains and costs. And all the real difficulties are sharpened by uncertainty. For no responsible authority has yet developed a program to ease their lot.

THE NEUTRALITY OF FINLAND

By Ralf Törngren

WHEN reading articles on Finland in American and other Western publications, I have found that to many foreign observers Finland seems to be a puzzling phenomenon. To some, the existence of an independent neutral state, a Western democracy, next door to the Soviet Union, maintaining its freedom in friendship with, not in defiance of, its powerful neighbor, appears in itself to be a paradox. In any case, none of the conventional labels of international politics quite fits the position of Finland. As a result it is usually described as "exceptional." But an exception from what? The phrase implies that Finland somehow has evaded her predetermined place in the scheme of things, and in fact many an analysis of the Finnish situation has been devoted to seeking an answer to the question why the situation is not different. This approach is bound to lead astray. For the pattern from which Finland is thought to have deviated is constructed from the course of events in countries with which Finland never has had much in common. The mystery resolves itself, I believe, when developments in Finland are examined, not in the light of what has happened elsewhere in very different circumstances, but against the background of her own experiences and circumstances.

The foreign policy of a small nation can have but one purpose: the safeguarding of its independence and security. The means employed to this end must be adapted to circumstances over which it can have only marginal control. In 150 years of nationhood the Finnish people have used a variety of means to protect their self-determination and their identity. Yet throughout, one central idea has dominated Finnish thinking on foreign affairs. This is the idea of neutrality.

I know, of course, that strictly speaking neutrality as a legal concept has no meaning except in time of war. In today's language of international politics, however, it means different things to different nations; among all the states calling themselves neutral it would be hard to point to a single pair of identical twins. When I write of Finland's neutrality I mean a policy of maintaining the security of the country by keeping it outside the conflicts

of interests of the big powers, rather than by aligning it with one big power or a group of powers against another. This idea of neutrality is not the product of abstract thought nor is it imported from elsewhere: it has grown out of the soil of Finnish history.

As I have no space for a detailed historical analysis, I shall limit myself to a few points that may help in understanding the present. The experiences of the Second World War, above all, have had a profound influence on Finland's present position and policy. On the eve of the war, the neutrality of Finland was closely linked to an association with the other Scandinavian states. Scandinavian coöperation never developed into a defensive alliance; but it was thought to offer the kind of security that is afforded by protective coloration: the hope was, as the then Swedish Foreign Minister, Richard Sandler, once put it, that "the general staffs of the big powers would leave the Scandinavian states out of their calculations—for or against."

This hope was shattered in 1939-40. Most people in the West, I believe, still remember Finland's struggle during that winter and I hardly need go into it in any detail. But it may have been forgotten that, though Finland at first appealed for outside aid, in the end her government chose to accept the Soviet peace terms, harsh as they appeared, rather than rely on the military assistance offered by Britain and France. This decision was based partly on a realistic appraisal of the possible efficacy of Allied aid: it was feared to be too little and too late. But it was also due to an almost instinctive reluctance to allow the country to become involved in the conflict between the big powers.

Similarly in 1941-44, when Finland through the German invasion of Russia was once again drawn into war against the Soviet Union, the Finnish Government rejected all German proposals for agreements of a political character. Finland was a co-belligerent, not an ally, of Germany, and refused to take part in operations, such as the attack on Leningrad, that served German rather than Finnish war aims. Thus Finland, while at war with one of the powers involved in the Second World War, wished to disassociate herself from the conflict between Germany and the Allied powers. The fine distinctions of the Finnish case were perhaps not fully appreciated by public opinion at the time. But the separate character of the Finnish war was recognized by the United States, which refrained from declaring war on Finland, and by implication even by the Soviet Government, which aban-

done the claim for unconditional surrender and resorted to a negotiated armistice in September 1944.

Finland emerged from the war a crippled nation. Close to 100,000 young men, out of a population of 4,000,000, had been killed in action. More than one-tenth of her territory had to be ceded to the Soviet Union, and the entire population of these areas, nearly half a million, had chosen to move west of the new frontier where they had to be provided with new homes, farms and jobs. Industry had to gear itself to paying off a war indemnity which in eight years required deliveries of goods worth more than half a billion dollars at current prices. The German troops that had used Northern Finland as their base of operations had to be expelled. The Porkkala Peninsula close to Helsinki had to be leased to the Soviet Union for use as a naval base, and in the capital itself an Allied Control Commission watched over the observance of the armistice terms. Few outside Finland at that time were prepared to invest much in her future.

And yet the basis for Finnish independence and democracy had remained undamaged. Finland had been defeated but not conquered. Apart from Britain and the Soviet Union, Finland was the only one of the European nations involved in the Second World War to avert a foreign occupation. The continuity of her political institutions was unbroken. Her social fabric was intact. On this basis it was possible to build anew.

The course of Finnish policy in the years that followed was determined by the lessons of the war. Scandinavian coöperation, as vitally important as it had been and still is, had failed to provide security. The Western Allies had proved incapable of extending their power to the eastern shores of the Baltic; in Yalta they had assigned Finland to the Soviet sphere of influence. It had become apparent that it would be mortally dangerous for Finland to serve as a forward post of an anti-Soviet coalition, first to be overrun in case of conflict, yet without any real influence over decisions on the issue of war or peace. Thus necessity as well as tradition pointed to a return to aloofness from the conflicts and controversies between the big powers.

But there could be no return to prewar attitudes. The failure of neutrality in 1939 had been due primarily to the profound mutual distrust that had then prevailed between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government at that time had had no faith in Finnish neutrality; it had suspected that Finland,

voluntarily or as a result of pressure, might have allowed Germany to use her territory as a base of aggression against Russia. The foremost task of Finland's postwar policy, therefore, was to gain and secure Soviet confidence in Finland as a peaceful neighbor. This confidence was seen as the key to the security of a neutral Finland.

II

Such is the background to the policy evolved under the leadership of the late Juho Kusti Paasikivi, President of Finland from 1946 until his retirement in 1956, and continued by his successor, President Urho Kekkonen. One of the basic elements in this policy is the strict observance by Finland of all treaty obligations assumed by her. An outstanding example of this was the paying of the war indemnity in full and on time. A more permanent obligation is contained in the Finnish-Soviet Treaty of Friendship of 1948, which expresses Finland's determination to prevent the use of her territory as a route or a base of aggression against the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government, on its part, in the preamble to the Treaty recognizes Finland's desire to stay outside the conflicts of interests between the big powers—that is, her neutrality.

Purists may object that the commitments undertaken by Finland in the Treaty are incompatible with a neutral status. It must be remembered, however, that these commitments apply solely to the defense of Finland's own territory. In this the Treaty is unique among the numerous security arrangements made by the big powers, and it is worth noting that an authoritative Soviet commentary has called it an agreement for the guarantee of neutrality to distinguish it from the mutual assistance pacts the Soviet Union has concluded with other countries. From the point of view of the theory of neutrality, this may be an unorthodox interpretation. But the Treaty reflects the reality of the Finnish situation. It is indispensable for the creation of the confidence without which the neutrality of Finland would be built on sand.

On several occasions in the past years the Soviet Government has declared its respect for the neutrality of Finland. Recognition has not remained one-sided. In October 1960, for instance, a spokesman for the United States, the then Deputy Under Secretary of State, Mr. Livingston Merchant, in a speech on the

occasion of the dedication of an American postage stamp commemorating Marshal Mannerheim, stated that "the United States understood the reasons why Finland had adopted a policy of neutrality. . . . This policy will be scrupulously respected," he said. "We appreciate that Finland is bound to treaty commitments. In supporting the desire for which Mannerheim stood, that Finland work out its own future in its own way, we believe it to be the responsibility of all nations to avoid interference in Finland's affairs." Mr. Merchant also said that "United States policies were designed to foster good relations with Finland and strengthen the bonds which link Finland with countries dedicated to similar concepts of democracy and independence." At the end of President Kekkonen's visit to Britain in May, the British Government also "expressed their understanding of Finland's policy of neutrality."

The statements I have quoted defined and formally confirmed what I have found to be the established practice of the American as well as other Western governments. Western interests, as far as I have been able to judge, have in no way clashed with the friendly relations that exist between Finland and the Soviet Union. Indeed, within the self-imposed limits of her neutral policy, Finland has been able to develop her relations with the West more fully than ever before. A demonstration of this can be seen in President Kekkonen's schedule of foreign visits this year: during this spring he has visited Norway and Britain and he has accepted invitations from the President of the United States and the Governments of Austria and Canada to visit their countries later this year. No President of Finland has ever before made an official visit to other than neighboring countries, and the invitations from the other side of the Atlantic have particularly impressed public opinion in Finland as gestures of friendship for the Finnish people and expressions of understanding for the position of Finland as it is today.

I have referred to the limits that neutrality imposes on Finland's relations with other countries. Obviously she has refrained from joining any military alliances. She has also stayed away from other international associations that can be regarded as instruments of big-power policies. It is equally obvious that Finland refuses to take sides in the controversies of the cold war. An illustration of this is her attitude to the German question. While no agreement on the solution of this question exists between the

powers principally concerned, Finland recognizes neither the Federal Republic of Germany nor the German Democratic Republic; instead of maintaining diplomatic relations with the German states, Finland has placed only trade missions in both.

Finnish policy in the United Nations naturally reflects the attitudes I have mentioned. This does not, however, mean a sterile withdrawal from international life. The Finnish delegation at the U.N. has always been prepared to support practicable proposals designed to narrow differences and advance the cause of conciliation; it has consistently adhered to the view that the world organization must be used primarily as an instrument of negotiation, rather than as a tribunal whose majority rulings too often prove to be unenforceable. Finland has also actively taken part in the constructive work of the U.N., by sending troops to the Suez, for instance, and by making her modest, though increasing, contribution to assistance programs.

Within the U.N. Finland is recognized as a member of the Scandinavian group. (I use here this term, rather than the less familiar Nordic, to cover Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden.) This is not of course a bloc that would act uniformly in all circumstances, or even strive to achieve a common line of action. Geography as well as recent history has divided the Scandinavian nations in their quest for security: Denmark, Iceland and Norway have joined NATO, Sweden and Finland have chosen neutrality. Yet they have found it possible and useful to continue close consultations, both within the U.N. and outside. The five Foreign Ministers meet regularly twice a year, and more often than not find themselves thinking alike on many international problems. There is what I would like to call a Scandinavian point of view that transcends the differences of policy.

Scandinavian coöperation has received less publicity than many other forms of international effort, perhaps because it has been carried out in an undramatic manner, without a grand design based on federative ideals. It can be fairly claimed, however, that through this pragmatic approach a higher degree of integration has been achieved in many matters intimately affecting the lives of the citizens than in practically any other area of the world. I shall mention only a few examples to illustrate my point. One is the establishment of the Nordic Passport Union: within its borders citizens of the Scandinavian states can travel without any hindrance, while for outsiders passport control is exercised

only at the outer frontiers. Another example is the common labor market that has been in existence since 1954: there is no restriction on the free movement of manpower from one Scandinavian country to another. For Finland this has meant that large numbers of workers have moved over to Sweden for periods of varying length. Further, an equalization of social benefits and rights has been carried out enabling citizens of the Scandinavian countries to enjoy the same social rights wherever within the area they may reside. Legislation on matters of common interest is constantly being unified. And the Nordic Council, the joint organ of the five parliaments, is considering literally scores of new proposals for coöperation in a great variety of fields at each annual session. It has been aptly said that in important respects we are today citizens of Scandinavia as well as of our own countries.

III

In the economic sphere, Scandinavian coöperation has been perhaps least successful. A plan for a Nordic customs union comprising Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden was worked out in years of negotiation and study, but it was superseded in the summer of 1959 by the projected European Free Trade Association, in the planning of which Denmark, Norway and Sweden participated from the beginning. In this situation Finland faced a difficult and complex problem affecting its vital trading interest. The way this was solved may well serve as an illustration of Finland's special position in general.

Three-fifths of Finland's total exports, chiefly wood and wood products, are sold in the 13 countries comprising EFTA and the European Economic Community, about equally divided between the two. Whereas in relation to the E.E.C. Finland is in no worse a position than her chief competitors, the EFTA includes on the one hand her biggest customer, Britain, and on the other hand her chief competitors in the export of wood-processing goods—Sweden, Norway and Austria. It was immediately apparent, therefore, that to remain outside EFTA would decisively weaken Finland's competitive position in the British market, and this would endanger the large-scale investments made in the wood-processing industries, as well as generally impair the prospects of Finland's foreign trade. For this reason the Finnish Government at an early stage declared its interest in the talks on the free trade plan, and in the fall of 1959 it entered into negotiations

with the members of EFTA with a view to protecting its commercial interests.

It was made clear by the Finnish Government at the outset, however, that any arrangement that could be made with EFTA would have to be compatible with Finland's commercial interests in other areas and her treaty obligations toward third countries. Roughly one-fifth of Finland's trade is conducted on a bilateral basis with East European countries, notably the Soviet Union. In 1959 Finland's exports to the Soviet Union amounted to 16.8 percent of the total value of exports, and close to two-thirds of the goods sold to the Soviet Union consisted of machines, appliances and transportation equipment. While only 7 percent of all wood and wood products exported went to the Soviet Union, the Soviet share of the export of metal and engineering products was as high as 72 percent. These figures indicate the importance of the Soviet Union as a market for Finland's metal-using industries. And in order to retain this market Finland must be able to maintain imports from Russia at roughly the level of exports.

For this reason the Finnish Government in its negotiations with EFTA sought and obtained the right to retain in force some quantitative import restrictions, mainly in regard to imports of liquid and solid fuels as well as fertilizers, so as to be able to ensure the continuity of purchases of such commodities from the Soviet Union. A more difficult problem, however, was created by the fact that the Finnish-Soviet trade agreement contains a most-favored-nations clause. Since the Soviet Union is not a member of GATT, and thus is not bound to accept the limitations imposed by membership in a free trade area or a customs union upon the operations of such a clause, its juridical validity was beyond dispute. Actually only a small part of imports from the Soviet Union would have been affected by tariff reductions to be granted to EFTA countries, for the bulk of purchases from the Soviet Union consists of raw materials and other duty-free commodities. But an important issue of principle was involved, and the Finnish Government on its part, in keeping with its established policy, sought to reach a negotiated solution acceptable to both rather than unilaterally to abrogate a valid contract. In November 1960, in connection with President Kekkonen's visit to Moscow, an agreement was finally concluded by which Finland, with reference to the neighborly relations existing between the two countries, in effect accords goods imported from

the Soviet Union the same customs benefits as those imported from EFTA.

The negotiations with the EFTA countries were concluded in March 1961, when an agreement establishing a new free trade area composed of the original Seven and Finland was signed in Helsinki, to become effective July 1, 1961. In it Finland has the same rights and obligations as the EFTA countries have to one another, with some exceptions made for the protection of specially vulnerable branches of Finnish industry. The agreement will be administered by a Joint Council on which each country, including Finland, has a representative; it will have the same tasks as the EFTA Council in regard to the EFTA Convention.

This solution is entirely in keeping with the original aims of Finnish policy: it assures the continuity of Finland's exports to their principal markets in the West without conflicting with her trading interests in the East. In the protracted negotiations the Finnish case met with understanding both in Moscow and in the EFTA capitals. During his visit to Helsinki in September 1960, Prime Minister Khrushchev expressed his understanding for Finland's desire to maintain her position in Western markets; in fact the Finnish-Soviet agreement on tariffs had no purpose other than making it possible for Finland to associate herself with EFTA. The governments of the EFTA countries on their side made considerable concessions to enable Finland to achieve the solution she desired. For Finland the success of the negotiations was vitally important, but there may be even wider significance in the fact that a neutral nation has been able to maintain its trading relations across the lines of rival blocs.

Neutrality cannot of course be an end in itself. It is, as I pointed out in the beginning of this article, the means by which Finland traditionally has sought to safeguard her security and thus to protect her national way of life. "I am convinced," President Kekkonen declared in a speech during Mr. Khrushchev's recent visit to Helsinki, "that even if all the rest of Europe were to turn to Communism, Finland would retain the traditional democracy of the North if the majority of the Finnish people so desired, as I believe it does." We are not neutral in regard to the values on which our way of life is built. Though we have learnt to desist from indulging in the luxury of emotional gestures, we are none the less as determined as any nation to preserve these values.

COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM IN TROPICAL AFRICA

By Walter Z. Laqueur

ALMOST overnight Communism in Africa has become an international problem of the first magnitude. Ten years ago, or even five, all that was known, or needed to be known, about the subject could be stated in two or three sentences mainly of a negative character. Now, in 1961, Africa has replaced the Middle East as the world's chief trouble center, and it is likely to remain the main area of contest between West and East for many years to come. On the African continent the Soviet bloc and China have succeeded in gaining important footholds within a very short space of time. The Communist states are represented in most of the newly independent countries and their envoys are untiring in their exertions. There is a constant stream of cultural and trade missions and other visitors between Moscow, Peking and some African capitals. These activities undoubtedly constitute a serious challenge to the West; but even more important are the efforts of local pro-Communist or national Communist groups to gain the upper hand in the struggle for the future of Africa; one can hardly exaggerate the implications of the outcome of this struggle.

Discussion of the problems facing Communism in tropical Africa (meaning Africa south of the Sahara excluding the Union of South Africa) is frequently hampered by the absence of reliable facts. To give but one example: On August 2, 1960, the existence of a Congolese Communist party, with a central committee headed by M. Mwamba-Mukanya, was announced in Leopoldville; it was said to have been in existence for the past decade. This was the first and the last to be heard about this party and its central committee. Shortly afterwards M. Mwamba-Mukanya was introduced to the Soviet public as no more than a Congolese public figure; his party had apparently vanished into thin air. It would be unwise to assume that such practices are designed merely to confuse the outside observer. There are good reasons to believe that Russian, Chinese and other Communists are at least as bewildered as everybody else by the frequent upheavals and the changing allegiances on the African scene.

But it is hardly less difficult to arrive at a realistic appraisal

of the political forces in Africa that are commonly defined as "Communist" or pro-Communist. If Soviet and other official Communist sources have so far applied this term in Africa only sparingly, perhaps more so than was really warranted, it has been bandied about rather freely by some Western observers, for whom a trip to Moscow or Peking undertaken by some African leader has seemed sufficient evidence to that effect. Since Communism and nationalism (and/or Pan-Africanism) are very closely intermingled in the political make-up of most of these African groups, it is not at all easy to find a fitting label for their aims and general political orientation. To stress these distinctions is not mere hair-splitting; a correct analysis of African political movements is of the greatest importance for the appraisal of their future development, and, of course, for the shaping of any effective Western policy.

According to official Communist sources, there are no "Marxist-Leninist mass parties" at present in Africa south of the Sahara—with the sole exception of one on the island of Réunion.¹ The only political party considered to be very close to Leninism is the P.A.I. (Parti Africain d'Indépendance) in West Africa; it is headed by Majhemout Diop, a Dakar bookseller who has spent several years in Eastern Europe as a member of the secretariat of the International Union of Students (I.U.S.). There are, of course, individual Communists in many African countries, and the intention to establish Communist parties at some future date is clear. It is apparently thought, however, that at present Communists should work through other political movements as well as through front organizations and trade unions. In present circumstances, the existence of official Communist parties would probably be more of a handicap than an advantage, given the reluctance of Africans to get involved with super-national movements and ideologies. Moreover, there are probably no more than a handful of Communists in the whole African continent whose political education and judgment come up to Moscow's requirements. In view of the many past disappointments with African fellow travellers, who for a while coöperated with the Communists but then turned against them, or simply drifted away, it is thought preferable to delay the recognition of official Communist parties until more evidence has been received about the quality of the candidates for Communist representation and leadership.

¹ *Afrikanische Gegenwartsfragen*, (East) Berlin, 1960, p. 12.

Communism in 1961 means different things to different people. Afro-Communism as it now emerges has not very much in common with the theories of Karl Marx, not even in the modified form in which they have been applied in politically and economically backward countries. Afro-Communism represents above all a means of gaining political power for a small group of intellectuals. In foreign policy its protagonists stand for close collaboration with the Soviet bloc and/or China. On the domestic scene it implies agrarian reform, frequently a foreign trade monopoly and central planning, a one-party dictatorship and the gradual indoctrination of the population with some kind of official ideology. It hardly needs to be demonstrated that such revolutionary technique may be very efficient both in gaining power and in maintaining it; of this China will serve as an example. But it is equally obvious that the net result is a system that has very little in common with Marxism as it was originally conceived. It is in effect a new political phenomenon that can be only partly explained by reference to developments in the past, or in other parts of the world.

Clearly Afro-Communism cannot be equated with Communism as known in Russia or the West, but there are also important differences between Afro-Communism and Communism in Asia. The leaders of the Chinese, Korean or Indonesian parties were closely connected with the Comintern or Cominform for decades; they have had a thorough training in the essentials of Leninism, they have acquired the specific mental make-up of leading members of a very powerful sect, and they subject themselves to party discipline and "proletarian internationalism." In short, leaders like Mao or Ho Chi-Minh modelled themselves on the "ideal type" of the Russian Bolshevik of the 1920s.

The representatives of Afro-Communism, on the other hand, belong to a much younger generation. They grew up at a time when Communism had become much more powerful, but its ideological and psychological impact much lighter—and when various centers of Communist power had come into being. Their familiarity with the theory of Marxism-Leninism is often superficial, restricted in most cases to some knowledge of its more practical aspects such as political organization and planning, and of course a nodding acquaintance with the Leninist theory of imperialism. These are not the strong and silent heroes who had to fight for many years in conditions of illegality. Independence and

power came to them on the whole rather easily; as in Guinea, they sometimes received it on a platter. Their beliefs are, in short, less deeply rooted and they are very unlike the intransigent "Old Bolsheviks" with their iron discipline and their unending ideological squabbles. The rudimentary political training they have received may give them an advantage over their political rivals and competitors, but it does not make them Communists in the sense of the word accepted in the West; at most they are Communists of a new type. This is not to split theoretical hairs or to stick unduly to ideological niceties; it has important and far-reaching implications.

It means, for instance, that nationalism, Pan-Africanism and even racialism play an important part in the attitude of these leaders. In Moscow their *nationalisme communiste* is regarded with great indulgence as a transitional phenomenon that will in due time give way to the real thing. (No such tolerance is shown to Tito, an old Comrade who ought to know better.) But it is highly doubtful whether this "transitional phenomenon" will really end as the Communists expect. The Afro-Communists have their own ideas about what ought to be done in their continent, and they are not overawed by the authority of Lenin or the experience of Communist régimes outside Africa.² They regard themselves as the founding members of a new third group, the African ex-Colonial International; "People of the Colonies Unite," Kwame Nkrumah wrote in one of his articles.

The name of a half-forgotten precursor of this ex-Colonial Communism, Sultan Galiev, has frequently been mentioned in recent years in this context. He was a Soviet leader of Tatar origin, at one time Stalin's deputy as Commissar of Nationalities. He was expelled for "nationalist deviations" and disappeared in the purges. His theories were, briefly, that Marxism had been mistaken in concentrating its hopes on the industrialized people of the West rather than the colonial peoples of the East, who are progressive, in as much as they constitute the proletarian nations on the world scale. Since all classes in these countries had been subjected to Western rule and exploitation, the class struggle there is of much less importance. His ideas culminated in an appeal for the establishment of a new Colonial International. On

² As Sékou Touré once put it, discussing dialectical materialism: "Philosophy does not interest us. We have enough concrete tasks." Sékou Touré, *Texte des Interviews accordées aux Représentants de la Presse*. Conakry, 1959, p. 108.

some points Sultan Galiev went even farther, as in his demand for the establishment of the dictatorship of the ex-colonial peoples over the metropolitan nations.

Some of Sultan Galiev's basic notions are now generally accepted throughout Asia and Africa; to a certain extent they have even superseded the Leninist theory of imperialism, though Lenin is remembered and the name of Sultan Galiev forgotten. There is abundant evidence that the Communists are perfectly aware of the dangers involved. Commenting on the general attitude of some of his compatriots, M. Achufusi, an African Communist now teaching in East Germany, recently wrote: "Their experience in the capitalist world has strengthened the Africans in their belief that world political problems have a racial character. . . . They think that Africa is the proletariat while Europe constitutes the bourgeoisie. They demand a specific African philosophy and ideology in order to liberate the Africans spiritually. . . . They equate the workers of Europe with the exploiters and thus violate the canon of proletarian internationalism. . . . Such a trend leads to playing down the class conflicts inside Africa."⁸

Afro-Communism is taking only its first steps, and predictions about its future developments are probably premature. In view of the conflict of ambition and interest between its leaders, it seems rather doubtful whether any unity of action will be achieved in the near future. What can be stated now with near certainty is that, though strongly influenced by some tenets of Soviet ideology, Afro-Communism is showing marked political independence. This does not make it more friendly toward the West. But it is not willing to take orders from the East either; its apparent ambition is to emerge as an independent factor in world politics.

II

The observations made so far apply in varying degree to most supporters of Communism in Africa. But supporters of Communism in Africa are a very heterogeneous group—among them left-wing nationalist elements and orthodox Communists, with the great majority somewhere in between. It is doubtful whether much significance should be attributed to vaguely pro-Communist declarations made from time to time by leading nationalists. Most African political parties are in favor of some form of social-

⁸ *Geschichte und Geschichtsbild Afrikas*, (East) Berlin, 1960, p. 222.

ist planning, all are anti-imperialist, and traces of the Leninist theory of imperialism can be recognized in their views. This hardly makes them Communists, for the theory has in the past and present found many adherents (including Chiang Kai-shek) both in Asia and Europe, in circles otherwise very much opposed to Leninism. Such leaders may frequently follow the Soviet lead in the United Nations or participate in conferences convened by Communist-front organizations, but a closer analysis usually shows that they are radical nationalist rather than Communist in character.

Of greater interest in this context are such para-Communist groups as Sékou Touré's P.D.G. (Parti Démocratique de Guinée), one part of the Camerounian U.P.C. (Union des Populations du Cameroun), as well as the more radical sections of the ruling parties in Ghana and Mali. That these groups have certain features in common with the Communists is well known and need hardly be elaborated in detail. Apart from their enmity to the West (particularly pronounced in the case of Guinea and the U.P.C.), they have borrowed from Leninism the concept of "democratic centralism" and of the state party as a revolutionary vanguard. According to Dr. Nkrumah, "Once a majority decision is taken we expect such a decision to be loyally executed, even by those who might have opposed that decision. This we consider and proclaim to be the truest form of Democratic Centralism. . ."⁴

The adaptation of Communist ideas and methods has been in some cases very extensive. Guinea has been called the country in the world closest to Communism without actually belonging to the Soviet bloc, and Dr. Félix Moumié, the late leader of the Cameroun U.P.C., is said to have been criticized by Mr. Khrushchev for "infantile extremism." The U.P.C. has taken much of its inspiration and guidance from China in its six-year-old guerilla war. In conversation with a Swiss journalist, Dr. Moumié stated that he had discussed with Mao at great length the Chinese leader's writings on the strategy and tactics of partisan warfare. Moumié then produced a copy of Mao's book, first published in 1936, with a personal dedication by the Chinese leader, and said, "Here you'll find out what is going to happen in Cameroun."⁵

⁴ *Accra Evening News*, June 16, 1959, quoted in Thomas Hodgkin, "A note on the language of African nationalism," in *African Affairs*, No. 1, London, 1961, p. 34. The "majority decision," needless to say, is more often than not the decision of the leader or leaders of the party.

⁵ *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, January 13, 1961.

All these groups have received Soviet bloc support but none has been recognized as a Communist party. While Sékou Touré has called his country the "most advanced democracy on earth" and pointed to a specific Guinean road to socialism, Communist observers prefer to talk about "the Guinean experiment." They think that Sékou Touré's party has a "proletarian kernel," but not more than that, and they see a danger in the "swollen-headedness of the leaders as a result of imperialist flattery and the respect shown and homage paid to Guinea by the great powers of America, Europe and Asia" (sic). Another possible pitfall in Communist eyes is the reluctance of the Guinean leaders to "arm the working classes and the masses of the people generally with the knowledge and understanding of Marxist-Leninist theory." In order to leave no doubts of any kind, it is added that only with the emergence of a strong Communist party could a return to capitalism be definitely ruled out.⁶

President Sékou Touré, on the other hand, has more than once asserted his belief in a specific African socialism and his objection to any interference by Russia and China in what he considers his own parish. In a declaration in April 1960 he said that he refused to allow his party to follow the ideological line of Communism. If certain people wished to found a Guinean Communist party they should realize that the P.D.G. would oppose them under Sékou Touré's leadership, for Communism was not the way for Africa. The class struggle was not possible for there were no classes, only social strata. The fundamental basis of Guinean society was the family and the village community. On yet another occasion Sékou Touré expressed the view that, while dialectical materialism denied the existence of God, one would not find anybody in Africa, and particularly in Guinea, who did not believe in God. Mr. Sékou Touré has recently been to Mecca as befitting the head of a predominantly Muslim country.

Guinea has been praised in Communist publications as an example to all the oppressed and exploited; and yet there are, as these illustrations have shown, considerable differences of opinion between the Communists and the African régime considered closest to them. There are other dividing lines between orthodox Len-

⁶ *The African Communist*, April 1960, p. 26. This is the (clandestine) periodical of the (illegal) South African Communist Party, formerly published in Capetown, now in London. It is of particular interest because it is the only periodical in Africa that deals with African affairs in an orthodox Leninist spirit; it is written by Communists and for Communists.

inists and the Afro-Communists. Many of the latter hold strong opinions about the central role of the African intellectuals as the pioneers and leaders of the national liberation movement; the orthodox Communists, on the other hand, disparage the role of the intelligentsia. But the central issue on which opinions widely diverge is the question of the specific character of Africa. The Leninists do not deny the existence of peculiarities in the historical development and present state of Africa, but they maintain that all the basic tenets of Marxism-Leninism are applicable in Africa and that to disregard them would lead to dangerous nationalist deviations. The Afro-Communists, on the other hand, are much more selective in their approval of Leninist theory; while borrowing with much enthusiasm some of the tenets of this body of doctrine, they have emphatically rejected others. Some of their more sophisticated spokesmen who have read the young Marx consider Communism in Europe the natural reaction against a society in which the individual has been alienated, in which money is the supreme good, and in which spiritual values count for little if anything. Africa, in their view, is different; it may be economically backward but it is not a society with its values in process of disintegration; it still has a human richness, warmth and spontaneity sadly lacking in both West and East. These convictions are shared by a majority of African intellectuals and incidentally by quite a number of White missionaries who have called for the "Bantuization of Christianity." On the cultural level these convictions have given rise to the concept of *négritude*; on the political level they have found their reflection in the movement of Pan-Africanism.

Orthodox Leninists are bound to reject both *négritude* and Pan-Africanism as romantic petty-bourgeois nationalist deviations. They try to do so with the maximum of tact, for they realize clearly that this rejection brings them into conflict with the great majority of African political leaders and intellectuals, who all share these views to some degree. For obvious tactical reasons, the orthodox Communists want to prevent a split with the Afro-Communists, but in the long run they cannot afford to compromise, for without clearly defining their own views they cannot hope to make much headway in the future. They face a dilemma which they probably will not be able to resolve, for the prevailing political climate is overwhelmingly in favor of nationalism and Pan-Africanism. The situation in this respect is not dissimilar to

the state of affairs in the Middle East a few years ago. The Arab Communists tried very hard to evade, or at any rate to delay, a head-on clash with Pan-Arabism as represented by President Nasser. It is doubtful whether orthodox African Communists will be more successful in postponing the outbreak of what seems otherwise an inevitable conflict.

III

The orthodox Leninist camp, to which reference has so far been made only in contradistinction to the Afro-Communists, includes a handful of party stalwarts who underwent training in East Germany, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, as well as the P.A.I. mentioned above. Founded in 1957, the P.A.I. publishes a daily newspaper, *La Lutte*, in Dakar, but its influence in terms of votes is as yet minute; at last year's municipal elections in Senegal it received 300 votes. It is debatable whether to include in this category also the radical wing of the Camerounian U.P.C., founded by Ruben um Nyobe, a trade unionist trained in Prague who was shot during a guerrilla engagement. His successor, Dr. Moumié, was poisoned last year in Switzerland; one faction of the U.P.C. under Matip seceded, renounced terrorism and became the Cameroun parliamentary opposition, but another section still fights on. This wing of the U.P.C. seems, however, to be under the influence of Peking rather than Moscow. A third, comparatively orthodox group is the P.I.M. (Parti de l'Indépendance Malagache), founded in 1959 originally as a coalition of radical-nationalist and left-wing groups which quickly fell under the influence of its Communist wing. This Leninist party has the unique distinction of having a priest as its president—the Reverend Richard Andriamanjato. It has gained control of the town council of the capital of Madagascar, Tananarive, but has done rather badly elsewhere. Communist factions are also reported to exist in the Congolese “Parti du Peuple” (headed by Alphonse Nguvulu, who was minister of planning in the Lumumba government), and in PUNGA (Parti de l'Unité Nationale Gabonaise), an opposition party in Gabon. By no stretch of the imagination, however, can any of these parties be regarded as a Leninist mass party.

The main problem that has faced all these groups during the past decade, and their main dilemma at the present time, is the stand to be taken vis-à-vis the national movement in their respective countries, or, in Leninist parlance, the problem of the “na-

tional bourgeoisie." Up to about 1955 the Communist attitude, briefly summarized, was that the leaders of the national movement could not be trusted, that their struggle against colonialism was a sham, and that sooner or later they would betray the national cause. They were incapable of any consistent struggle and inclined towards compromise and collaboration with the imperialist enemy.⁷ There was considerable mistrust of the movements that had won, or were about to win, independence for their countries. Such independence, it was argued, could not possibly be genuine; it was "only a more skillful hidden form of continued association with imperialism," as the leading British Communist theoretician, Palme Dutt, put it at the time.⁸ Among those attacked were Dr. Nkrumah's Convention People's Party in Ghana and Dr. Azikiwe and his supporters in Nigeria. The R.D.A. (Rassemblement Democratique Africain), the leading political party in French West Africa, fared no better; it had "unmasked itself," made a "shameful deal with the colonizers," and its "treason" had allegedly caused tremendous anger among the toilers of Africa. It would be tedious to prolong this list, which included virtually every political leader and party in Africa at the time.

In 1955, however, attitudes towards the African national movement were substantially modified, and for a while it seemed that the Communists were willing to collaborate with practically everybody in Africa. The general assumption was that the West was the main enemy and that anti-Western sentiment in Africa should be used to constitute a common anti-Western front. But it is doubtful whether the basic attitude towards the African nationalists has really changed. African Communists believe that the support of the "patriotic elements" is essential for a speedy victory over colonialism, to quote a recent authoritative comment. But, they argue, the "national bourgeoisie" is a very unsatisfactory leader of the national movement: "They are apt to be narrow, selfishly hidebound and conservative. They are apt to be guided not by the interest of the masses but by their own special, minority class interests. Often they are parochial, chauvinistic, tribalistic, and lacking a broad vision. They are usually opportunistic, tend to compromise with the colonialists for small gains at the sacrifice of principle, because they fear the revolutionary

⁷ For a more detailed review of Soviet and Communist attitudes towards the African national movement see my "Soviet Views on Africa" in *Soviet Survey* (London), April 1959, p. 37 *et seq.*

⁸ *Allies for Freedom*, London, 1954, p. 25.

activities of the masses of workers and rural people.”⁹ According to a more recent statement, the “national bourgeoisie” is a “counter-revolutionary force to socialism.”¹⁰

Do these formidable strictures apply to left-wing intellectuals such as Dr. Nkrumah or Sékou Touré, who cannot possibly be regarded as representatives of the “national bourgeoisie”? The Communists are willing to give them their due: “They have been the founders of our national liberation movement and have carried the spark of enlightenment and rebellion from one end of Africa to another.”¹¹ But handsome compliments are about all these revolutionary nationalists can expect, for in the future, as the Communists envisage it, there will be no room for them at the top of the national movement. “In conditions of modern society, the intellectuals occupy a middle position between the rulers and the ruled, the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. . . . Many of these intellectuals vacillate between one camp and another, are always swinging helplessly between the oppressors and the oppressed. . . . We must remember that it (the intelligentsia) as a group is inherently unstable and unfit for leadership.”¹²

The intellectuals, in other words, cannot be relied upon, unless they join the Communist movement. If this is the comparatively restrained language of ideological analysis, there is no reason to be surprised by the much sharper attacks, in propaganda organs, on African leaders such as Tom Mboya, Alioune Cisse (Senegal), or Macrae (Uganda), all leading trade unionists, or on leading West African Socialists such as Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia. Clearly, for the orthodox Leninist, there are narrow limits to collaboration even with “progressive intellectuals” of the Afro-Communist brand; their leading position in the national movement is apparently to be challenged in the not-too-distant future.

It has been attempted in the present article to review the problems now facing Communism in Africa; a systematic survey of Communist activities in the trade unions and various kinds of front organizations would require lengthy and detailed studies of a specialized character. But even a cursory examination of the African scene establishes a number of facts of considerable political importance: above all, perhaps, the great difference be-

⁹ N. Numade, “Marxism and African Liberation,” in *The African Communist*, April 1960, p. 32-40.

¹⁰ F. Kumalo, “Socialism in Africa,” in *The African Communist*, January 1961, p. 36.

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² *The African Communist*, April 1960.

tween, on the one hand, radical leaders and groups who have adopted some of the ideas and much of the language of Communism, but who have remained essentially left-wing nationalist and Pan-Africanist; and on the other, the orthodox Leninists whose number and influence are quite small. The former, the "Afro-Communists," may be as extreme as the latter in their hostility to the West; they may even on occasion be more intransigent. Nevertheless, there are basic differences and it would be a great mistake not to differentiate between them. There certainly is a great temptation to judge them all alike, because of the widespread and indiscriminate use of quasi-Leninist slogans among the radical nationalists in Africa. It is a temptation that should be resisted.

It could be argued that some Afro-Communists may move at some future date towards full acceptance of the Leninist credo. This, of course, is not unthinkable. But it is equally possible that the orthodox Communists will become "nationalist deviationists." Ten years ago there could be no doubts and hesitations for a Communist: there was but one center for the faithful, Rome and Mecca in one. The situation in 1961 is much more confusing from the point of view of the orthodox believer; this is the age of polycentric Communism—the time of infallibility and of the Russian monopoly of the means of grace has irrevocably passed. If Moscow and Peking proclaim rival truths, and if Belgrade preaches yet a third way to paradise, there will have to be room ultimately for a fourth and fifth independent center. In the transition from the age of proletarian internationalism to the era of schism, we will do well to encourage independence of mind and to avoid confusing radical nationalism or Afro-Communism with orthodox Marxism-Leninism.

JOINT RESPONSIBILITIES FOR LATIN AMERICAN PROGRESS

By Raul Prebisch

THESE are decisive years for Latin America's economic, social and political future and for its relationships with the great powers. Time is running out, and much of it has already been lost, especially by those in Latin America who have been hoping vainly for external solutions to our problems; it has been lost, too, by those who advised us from abroad to ensure the free play of economic forces so that our development could be strongly supported by foreign private enterprise. It is not that a clear vision of the problem has been lacking. There is a growing conviction in Latin America that, while we do need ample international coöperation, development has to be brought about by our own efforts and our own determination to introduce fundamental changes in the economic and social structure of our countries.

Certainly some people in the United States have been thinking along the same lines, but no common language has been agreed upon. The days of Franklin D. Roosevelt have long been left behind. Now, however, the urgent need to find such a common language has been recognized, as is evident from the high-level pronouncements recently made in Washington. Already there is apparent agreement on one fundamental point: a policy of international coöperation cannot be inspired by the desire to favor privileged groups within our countries or to preserve the present order of things; its objective should be to help Latin American countries to change the existing order so that economic development will be speeded up and its fruits enjoyed by the broad masses of the population.

A very significant change in attitudes is involved. Until now, the typical nineteenth century concept has prevailed. This was that the industrialized countries were interested in the development of peripheral countries when it involved the exploitation of superior natural resources or provided a favorable opportunity for expanding trade. This concept was entirely consistent with the old order, which was characterized by export-oriented economies; no superficial political change could alter the favorable conditions for economic exploitation.

Entirely different concepts are necessary in Latin America

today. They must be responsive to the deep currents of desire for economic and social reform. I do not say that these currents are widespread in governing circles, although there are individual leaders of stature toward whom our hopes are anxiously turned. If opportunities are lost by those who could now undertake these changes, they will be made by others who are swept into power on the rising tide of popular aspirations. It is no longer a question of whether or not such changes will take place, but of who will make them, by what methods and under what political philosophies. In the great majority of cases, these changes will be brought about by men who believe in personal and political liberties and are willing to defend them, but who are not content with these alone. They believe fundamentally in individual initiative but frankly disagree with some of the forms it takes in Latin America. They are not convinced that development problems can be left entirely to the free play of economic forces. They do believe in energetic action by the state, and in the need for the planning of development. At a time when man is reaching unsuspected heights in his dominion over natural forces, they are convinced of the need for conscious and deliberate action with regard to economic forces, if their development goals are to be achieved.

The most profound convictions, however, may be shaken in the face of adverse circumstances. Development cannot be accelerated simply by transforming the economic and social structure. There must also be a rapid assimilation of new technology. This requires a prodigious effort to train the masses of the population and to increase the relatively scanty productive capital available in our countries. Although our own resources are limited, there is no doubt that they could be substantially increased if consumption were restricted—not only among those of high income where much could be done in this regard, but also among the rest of the population where the possibilities are very much less because of the low average per capita income. The farther one wants to go in this direction, the greater will be the need to resort to various kinds of coercive measures; and the more these are employed, the greater the danger to the democratic process.

International resources can play a decisive role here. If they are used with other measures to bring about a rapid rise in the average per capita income over the next few years, then we can not only raise standards of living but also increase the amount of

our own resources available for capital investment. I am convinced that if this policy were continued steadfastly over a number of years—not too many in most Latin American countries—it could generate the savings required to maintain a satisfactory rate of economic growth, without any need for drastic measures having dangerous implications. Herein lies the most important political key to the entire process.

But that is not all. It is not just a question of increasing the scope of international coöperation for development but of changing its orientation. The desire of foreigners to find new fields for private capital investment in Latin America is a legitimate one, but it cannot be the principal aim nor the one which most influences policy. The basic objective must be to enable the Latin Americans gradually to do for themselves what the more advanced countries can already do. One of the things that has most fired the imagination and enthusiasm of our people, particularly the younger generation, has been the very significant lesson to be learned from the Soviet method of economic development: No matter how rudimentary the technology in underdeveloped countries, no matter how high the rate of illiteracy, there is nothing which in time these countries cannot learn and practice—from the exploitation of their natural resources to the most complex industrial techniques.

Potentially very powerful elements of social dynamics are involved in this desire to activate our own vital forces; some might describe it as nationalism. Whatever the name, it represents our determination to find our own solutions to Latin America's great economic and social problems and to implement them by our own hands and our own free will.

II

Although there is a growing conviction that major changes in the economic and social structure of our countries cannot long be postponed, there are formidable obstacles to be overcome. Entrenched social and economic forces opposing change are very strong in some countries. Traditionally, these forces have drawn their strength from the unequal system of land tenure, but they have recently been reinforced by others which have emerged in the process of industrialization. Industrialization is an inescapable requirement of economic development and it will not only have to be speeded up but will also have to assume increasingly

more elaborate and complex form. This requires a firmly managed policy of protection. But instead, the series of measures that have been taken have usually been haphazard and improvised and therefore furnished incentives that in many cases were clearly exaggerated and damaging. High tariff walls, restrictions and prohibitions, together with relatively small markets, have all led to business practices stifling competition.

The high commercial and industrial profits which are typical in many of our countries are therefore only partly due to technical improvements in production methods. They are frequently due to the conditions just described, or to inflation which, in Latin America as everywhere else, is a powerful instrument for regressive income redistribution. The role of the Latin American businessman is generally a useful one but he expects—and usually gets—a disproportionate return. If to all this we add the consequences of certain perverse forms of state intervention in economic life, then we have the principal causes of the great disparities in income so common in Latin America. Even in the few countries where the rate of economic development has recently been satisfactory, these disparities have increased rather than lessened.

It is clear that taxation could be a useful instrument for reducing such disparities; but one must go to the root of the problem and attack the sources from which these disparities arise. This must be done not only to correct inequalities but also because these disparities cause the serious misuse of productive resources and thereby retard economic development.

First of all there is the problem of land tenure. On the one hand there is a limited number of large estates covering a high proportion of the productive land, while on the other there is a large number of small holdings covering a very small proportion. The vast estates tend to be inefficiently cultivated, since their size gives the owners a substantial income without great effort; the other holdings are too tiny for efficient operation. Hence there is a great waste of land and manpower.

Sound redistribution, then, has to be the starting point for technical progress in agriculture, where productivity is at present exceedingly low. However, in the urgent effort to find solutions, no general formulas can be applied because the problem is different in each country. Strong forces are opposed to any solution. Governments which have been willing to face the problem have

often had to confine their efforts to the costly opening up of new and distant land, leaving untouched vast tracts of easily accessible land; or they have had to be content with expropriating only such land as could be paid for on a cash basis out of current budgets. These are simple palliatives which do not lead very far. Yet, in dealing with this problem there is a need to go very far in Latin America!

In addition, great care has to be taken with regard to farm mechanization. In many of our countries the density of population on the land is very heavy and, if mechanization were carried beyond certain limits, it could cause serious problems of surplus labor. The same is true in other areas of the economy. Modern technology has been developed in countries having a great capacity for capital formation and a variety of reasons for wanting to save labor. It is this same technology which our countries have to absorb, notwithstanding the fact that capital is relatively scarce and labor abundant. Hence capital must be used rationally so that investments resulting in labor saving may bear a sound relationship to investments which will absorb excess labor. In the developing countries this certainly is not a problem that can be solved entirely by the free play of economic forces.

The degree of mechanization of agriculture that can be encouraged, then, depends on the rate of industrial development, not only because industry absorbs labor but also because of the influence which it exerts on the development of other productive activities. But the problem is difficult; even in those Latin American countries where industrial growth is greatest, relatively little surplus labor from the land has been absorbed; it has come instead from small crafts and other urban occupations having a low productivity.

Hence, there is a need to give the greatest possible impulse to industrialization, while at the same time correcting the serious deficiencies from which it has been suffering. It is not merely a question of finding a rational protection policy to promote competition but of seeking a basic solution which will cause the gradual disappearance of the 20 water-tight compartments into which Latin America has been divided.

Fortunately some good work has already been done; the Central American countries have decided to achieve a common market within a relatively short period and another seven Latin American countries, including several of those of greatest eco-

nomic importance, have taken steps in the same direction. Nevertheless, the latter are proceeding with a parsimony which—even though it can be explained by circumstances—could limit the effectiveness of this great enterprise unless they resolve to demonstrate the audacity and determination which have been shown by the Western European countries. These efforts can help considerably to achieve more efficient production by expanding markets, encouraging specialization and facilitating competition.

The resulting reduction in industrial costs will have an important bearing on Latin America's position in the export market. Increased exports of industrial products are becoming imperative for the Latin American countries, particularly those which have made the greatest industrial progress. Under the pressure of circumstances, industrialization has been directed inwards and not outwards, so that emphasis has been on replacing imports with goods of local manufacture—first consumer goods, then intermediate products and more complex capital goods. The Latin American common market will facilitate this process by ensuring coördinated efforts. But the need to produce import substitutes would not be quite so acute if our countries could add industrial exports to their traditional primary ones, which tend to grow slowly.

This, then, is an opportune moment to seek new formulas for trade between Latin American countries and the great industrial centers. Upon this depends fundamentally whether our increased industrial effort continues to be directed towards the domestic market or whether it will also look towards export markets, with mutual advantages to all.

III

There are still those among us who believe that no great step forward to industrialization can take place without continuing the chronic inflation which has been so evident in many of our countries. This is certainly a serious mistake, but no more so than the opposite position frequently preached from abroad. According to this view, inflation is a phenomenon of purely monetary origin, quite independent of the serious structural obstacles which stand in the path of economic development.

This thesis has recently been put into practice in some Latin American countries with very adverse results. These failures have encouraged the belief that monetary stability is incompatible

with economic development. Obviously, a vigorous effort had to be made to contain inflation, which was provoking ever more acute social tensions, but unfortunately this was followed by the more serious ones arising from contraction of the economy. Inflationary investments had to be stopped, but they should have been replaced by others covered by genuine savings so as to avoid interrupting economic development. This would have involved decisive use of the instruments of taxation in order to encourage private investment and provide the state with greater investment resources; but this either was not done at all, or was done with insufficient vigor. Foreign resources were also required, but almost always those who could have provided them preferred to await the outcome of the stabilization policy, when in fact such aid was essential for achieving economic stability. The same was true for attacking the structural obstacles to development, principally those which contribute to external disequilibrium. But why bother if the contraction in income had the virtue of restoring the equilibrium?

Once again orthodoxy showed its misunderstanding of the realities in Latin America and of the forces at work there. In order to break the inflationary spiral of prices and wages, the latter were stabilized—a necessary step, although the level was not always well chosen. But fixed wages generally mean a sacrifice by the mass of the people and, if this was to be accepted, reasonable measures should have been taken to see that the burden was shared by other social groups. However, profits and dividends continued to be distributed in the normal way and large rents were derived from the unequal distribution of the productive land.

In a rational policy of economic development, the instrument of taxation is of substantial importance, but as a rule it is not at all well used in the Latin American countries. On the one hand the tax system tends to be exceedingly inequitable; it neither moderates the excessive spending of powerful groups nor encourages them to realize the potential of their savings. On the other hand, even in those countries where the tax structure is adequate, its implementation frequently is not, allowing considerable opportunity for tax evasion. It would be a serious mistake, however, to assume that adequate administration of the tax instrument would reduce in any dramatic way the amount of international assistance that Latin America requires. Our needs are simply too

vast. To take just one example, there is the need for investment in human resources, which have been so much neglected in our countries. First of all, illiteracy is still very high and an unrelenting attack on it must be made. Secondly, there must be an intensive and systematic endeavor to broaden the opportunities for technical training at all levels.

This neglect of popular education, despite the many enlightened voices in our countries which clamor insistently for it, provides further evidence of the social forces hampering development. Reform of the system of land tenure and the technical training of the popular masses will free an enormous human potential that is today largely wasted. The system of individual initiative does not respond to a static conception, and where there is little social mobility it languishes. It can be restored by the initiative of new men, able men who will emerge in that process of liberating social forces which has been so slow in reaching Latin America.

IV

All these changes in the economic and social structure will gradually eliminate those obstacles which at present form such an impressive barrier to the development of the Latin American countries. But this will not, of itself, result in an acceleration of the rate of development. If we are to avoid new tensions, even more serious perhaps than the present ones, the vital forces thus liberated must be effectively harnessed to expanding economic activity. To do this, investments have to be raised substantially and this objective can be achieved within the present institutional framework only by a considerable increase in the contribution of the international community.

Fortunately, there is already wide agreement on this point. Tentative estimates have been made as to the amount which should be provided from foreign sources over the next few years. But the time has come to set aside this kind of appraisal and to base calculations on concrete data. Each country will have to prepare its own development plan and estimate the international resources needed to complement its domestic savings. The need for planning has finally been recognized after years of dogmatic resistance and loss of valuable time. But to prepare a long-term plan takes time and therefore a start will have to be made with preliminary plans that can be drawn up in a few months. Such

plans can determine the more urgent economic and social needs, particularly at those strategic points where investment is essential in order to halt inflation and at the same time step up rates of development.

For planning to succeed, each country must know with certainty that for the duration of the plan it can count on those international resources which are indispensable for putting it into practice. As a rule, international credit institutions have been reluctant to assume global obligations of this kind, but without them the plan would rest on a very uncertain foundation. It is clear that the obligations must be reciprocal; the intrinsic merit of a particular plan must be considered, in terms both of the magnitude of a country's own efforts towards capital formation, and of measures to remove obstacles to development. Although it is necessary for credit institutions to assume obligations on the basis of what is planned, these obligations are clearly conditional on the firm and effective application of the plan by the recipient country.

Once each country's needs have been determined, a global program for Latin America as a whole can be drawn up. This operation cannot be carried out at the political level. The decision as to how much each country is to receive must emerge from the technical examination of each plan by financial experts.

It is undoubtedly the responsibility of governments to discuss and reach agreement on fundamental principles of development policy, the direction of structural reforms and other measures essential to success. This process is part and parcel of the policy of international coöperation, if it is to be inspired by the fundamental objective of collaborating with the Latin American countries in changing the existing order, so as to speed the rate of development and ensure that the broad masses of the population participate adequately in the results.

If this objective is to be fulfilled, we shall need to reappraise and revise prevailing concepts about the respective roles of foreign and domestic private initiative in Latin American development. Great emphasis has often been placed on the former whereas the need for revitalizing Latin America's own private initiative has not been sufficiently stressed. After all, the strengthening of private enterprise depends less on arguments as to its abstract merits than on how effective it is in our own countries. International coöperation has a significant role to play here. As

things stand, the Latin American industrialist finds himself at a disadvantage in trying to meet foreign private competition. Healthy competition must be based on equality of conditions; otherwise it leads to the destruction or subordination of the weaker part. The resulting conflicts then overflow into political fields, causing tensions and antagonisms.

I am far from denying the useful role of foreign private initiative, particularly when it stimulates the spread of technology. However, the more it participates in the internal development of our countries—to which it has so far contributed very little—the greater the need for intergovernmental assistance as a means of strengthening Latin American private enterprises through credit on reasonable terms and adequate technical assistance. The Chilean steel industry is a good example of what might be done on a larger scale. Starting as a state enterprise with the help of Export-Import Bank loans and technical assistance furnished by private United States concerns, it is today in private hands operating on a solid foundation and employing Chilean technicians who know their work and are obviously enthusiastic about it.

Latin American objections to a common market are frequently based on an awareness of the disadvantages under which the Latin American industrialist operates, and on the fear that foreign companies will take advantage of the new opportunities to the detriment of the local entrepreneur. This fear is not unfounded. In important manufacturing centers of Latin America, industries which were originally in national hands have passed to foreign ones. No doubt in most cases this has resulted in technical progress, but an extension of the process could create political complications which would adversely affect economic development and international coöperation itself. Furthermore, competition is not usually improved by such changes, since the foreign firms continue to enjoy the same excessive protection as did the former national ones, but with the aggravating factor that profits may now become a charge on the balance of payments. The problem is not simple and several solutions should be explored. One which warrants special consideration might be to define in the economic development plans those activities which would be open to foreign private enterprise and those which would preferably be left to national initiative.

A more difficult problem is that raised by foreign enterprises

which exploit natural resources or operate public utilities. There is a strong feeling in Latin America that public utilities should be in national hands. From personal knowledge, I know that in 1940 President Roosevelt had decided to support this idea. Then the war came and this and other proposals were set aside. Two decades later there is even less justification for public utilities to be held in foreign hands; their technical operation is now well known and there is no reason at all why the Latin American countries cannot carry it on successfully.

If public utilities passed into national hands, there might open up new prospects for Latin American public enterprise. In the past this has generally been viewed unfavorably by international credit institutions. Public enterprise in some activities dates back a long time; sometimes this resulted from an effort by countries with relatively weak economies to avoid concentration of private economic power; in other cases, it seemed the best way of overcoming technical and economic backwardness; or again, public enterprise in some fields was necessary for economic development. Even those who believe in private initiative have often had to resort to public enterprise, despite its defects, because there was no other alternative. With assistance from abroad, private national initiative could fill this gap. But measures for encouraging private enterprise should be linked with others for encouraging competition or ensuring effective state control in cases where the very nature of the activity precludes genuine competition.

Enterprises exploiting national resources pose another problem, not only because they generally involve an elaborate technology, but because of the complexities of the international market. Nevertheless, I cannot accept the idea that there is no possible escape from the dilemma of continuing the present state of affairs, or nationalizing foreign-held corporations. Other formulas can be found. Of course, this is a controversial issue. On the one hand, there is admiration for the technology and organization of these enterprises, and for the higher wages which they frequently provide. On the other hand, their operations are geared to their own particular interests, even though the important decisions they make involve the nation as a whole. To allow this situation to continue is likely to lead to extremist solutions.

Let us not forget that economic development should be essentially a process of learning to do everything that other more ad-

vanced areas are already able to do. In some cases the process may be rapid, in others it may take rather long, but in every case we should look ahead and do what we can to make sure that development occurs with a minimum of disturbance. Our goal is by no means to close the door to foreign enterprise; far from it. We all can see how that monument of wisdom, the Marshall Plan, helped to raise the technology of Western Europe to the level of the United States, and how foreign private enterprise now lives harmoniously with its European counterpart. This has to be Latin America's final goal, too.

There must be positive evidence that a fundamental aim of the policy of international coöperation is not so much to open new fields of investment for foreign capital as to develop the capabilities and resources of the Latin Americans themselves within a system of private enterprise and individual initiative. Unless this can be accomplished in a dynamic way, the policy of international coöperation, no matter how vast the resources involved, will continue to lack an essential quality: the ability to reach the popular masses, to fire the imagination and encourage the constructive efforts of the younger generations in Latin America, particularly those who now tend to break impetuously out of the present restrictive environment.

SUCCESSION AND DIVISION IN INDIA

By Frank Moraes

WITHIN a few months India will be holding her third general elections. The latest census tentatively places the country's population at around 468 millions which makes India the largest democracy in the world. Yet in India, as in some other Asian countries where democratic forms and the apparatus of parliamentary government subsist, democracy has still to take firm roots in the people and the rulers.

Mr. Nehru has been Prime Minister for 14 years, a term longer than any of his contemporaries with the exception of Sweden's Prime Minister Tage Erlander, who has held his post since October 1946. Even in the West, however, it is doubtful if for every ten who could name India's Prime Minister, five could identify Sweden's Premier. Despite her lack of military power and her developing but still underdeveloped economy, India exercises a moral influence in world affairs out of all proportion to her material strength. Much of the credit for this must go to Mr. Nehru who has steered his way through the jungle of international politics with consummate skill and understanding. India may be politically young but Mr. Nehru is the doyen of the Commonwealth Premiers and a veteran on the world stage.

Therein lies the paradox of India and Nehru, for while externally the Indian Prime Minister's political stature is unimpaired and to a degree enhanced, the signs internally are that his domestic prestige and reputation are at an ebb. Tibet, followed by China's territorial incursions into India (some of which, as in Ladakh, had preceded China's aggression on Tibet but were not at the time disclosed to the Indian Parliament or people), stirred public opinion deeply and generated the first defined cohesive rumblings of criticism and opposition against the establishment. Many Congressmen privately shared the disquiet felt by the opposition and publicly expressed by the Socialists, Independents and other miscellaneous groups and individuals. The Communists, also in the opposition, were caught in a cleft stick, and not for the first time their ideological schizophrenia betrayed itself in the rambling confused resolutions released after each of their increasingly frequent party conclaves.

Some years ago I asked Nehru which of our foreign missions he

considered the most important and was surprised when he answered, "Pakistan." He explained this by saying that the success of a country's foreign policy was determined largely by the relations it evolved with its immediate neighbors. Judged by that yardstick India's foreign policy has failed, for while her relations with China have deteriorated dismally her relations with Pakistan have not improved to any discernible degree. By instinctive more than by rational processes the Indian public has over the years come to apply the same yardstick to the country's foreign policy as the Prime Minister did, and the impact on the people has been more immediate and sharp, particularly in relation to China. *Panchsheel*, as most thoughtful Indians acknowledge, is as dead as a doornail. Peace, they now realize, is a bilateral business.

This does not mean that Indian public opinion increasingly rejects the policy of non-alignment. On the contrary, the vast majority of Indians support it, though since the Hungarian uprising of 1956 a growing body of opinion, both within and outside Parliament, has insisted that in implementing the policy the scales should not always be weighted heavily in favor of the Sino-Soviet bloc. Tibet and China's aggressive attitude to India have intensified this insistence and made it more articulate. In that sense Nehru has been put on the defensive in relation to his foreign policy, and even the artful Mr. Krishna Menon's transparent efforts to distract the country's attention from China to Pakistan have failed.

If Nehru is on the defensive in regard to his foreign policy, he is even more so on the domestic front. Congress prestige has slumped heavily over the past 14 years, and though it is only since the last general elections of 1956-57 that Nehru's policies have come under more open and concentrated fire, there existed even before that a fair degree of restiveness over the direction taken by his policies, internal and external, political, economic and international. While the shibboleths of socialism, the welfare state, planning for prosperity, and peace were initially taken at their face value by the vast majority of the Indian people a growing minority has started to question the real purport and motivations behind these slogans. Need socialism sail so dangerously near Communism? Does the welfare state imply less and less room for individual enterprise and for the so-called private or business sector? Is planning for prosperity to end in the ultimate

elimination of the prosperous trader, businessman and industrialist? Is peace to be bought at the price of security?

With the launching of the Second Five Year Plan in April 1956, on the eve of the second general elections, such doubts and questionings crystalized in the economic sphere while in the political field the linguistic rivalries and clashes, the internecine feuds within the Congress Party and the growing indiscipline in the country, particularly among the youth, triggered off sharp criticism of the ruling clan. The Congress emerges as the god that failed, and even Nehru's personality and prestige, powerful as they both still are, have been unable to reconcile factions inside the party or to still controversy and criticism in the country. Nehru's home state, Uttar Pradesh, along with the Punjab, Orissa, Andhra, Bihar and Mysore, are stormy centers of Congress strife which intermittently erupt and subside into uneasy calm.

These unseemly internal wrangles within the ruling party have not only damaged its prestige but demoralized the country. In Indian eyes the Congress Party had for long been identified with selfless service, sacrifice and integrity. The mistake the Congress made on assuming office was to identify the country with the party, and to project an image of itself as a group of dedicated servants of the people which, having won freedom for the country, was concerned only with continuing its tradition of service. Ten years in office have dimmed the lustre of those claims. Congress followers can no longer preen themselves on being a cut above their other countrymen. The scramble for positions of patronage and power and for lucrative appointments at home and abroad, accompanied by the usual petty intrigues and recriminations, has demeaned the Congress in the country's estimate and impaired its once unchallenged prestige.

More recently the factional trends within the Congress in various States have been highlighted by factionalism at the Center. During the Prime Minister's absences from India it has been customary for him to appoint a deputy leader who would temporarily preside over the cabinet and over the meetings of the Congress Parliamentary group. No particular significance was attached to these appointments until Nehru's last absence from India to attend the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in London last March. Since independence, the deputy leaders appointed for a temporary period were, firstly, the late Maulana

Abdul Kalam Azad and the late Gopalaswamy Aiyangar who were both ranked as deputy leaders jointly, on the basis of the former being Leader in the Lok Sabha (lower house) and the latter being leader in the Rajya Sabha (upper house). Before them Sardar Vallabhai Patel had held the rank of Deputy Prime Minister, but this office lapsed with his death in 1950. Following Mr. Gopalaswamy Aiyangar's death Maulana Azad officiated as deputy leader in the Prime Minister's absence, and he was succeeded by Pandit Pant who died during Nehru's last visit to London. Pandit Pant was seriously ill when the Prime Minister left Delhi and died before Nehru reached Geneva. The Finance Minister, Mr. Morarji Desai, was then appointed deputy leader.

This started off an unseemly controversy within the highest Congress echelons involving primarily cabinet ministers who had their eyes glued to the successorship. In terms of seniority the Communications Minister, Mr. Jagjivan Ram, who happens to be a Harijan, ranks foremost on the list, and he and his supporters were not slow to point out that his claims were overlooked. So long as the old Congress giants such as Patel, Azad and Pant lived there was neither opportunity nor inclination on the part of the lesser-known cabinet ministers to enter into the scramble for power. Today, with the exception of Nehru, the old guard has disappeared, and a special significance attaches or has suddenly attached to the minister nominated as deputy leader.

The Prime Minister is not lacking in political guile or caniness. Even when appointing Mr. Morarji Desai as deputy leader in March 1961 he was careful to point out in a directive which soon leaked that he did so with two important reservations, the first being that, though Mr. Desai would preside over cabinet meetings in his absence, a decision in the event of any controversy or difference of opinion within the cabinet would be "decided by consultation." This virtually reduced Mr. Desai to the equivocal status of not even being *primus inter pares*. The second reservation was more significant for it stipulated that in the field of foreign affairs, at a time when Laos was very much in the headlines, decisions should be made by Mr. Krishna Menon. As in the case of the well known English politician of the Restoration period, Mr. Desai was confronted with the discovery that "fortune had turned rotten ere it turned ripe."

Not surprisingly this was a signal for those waiting in the wings

to attempt to muscle into the near-center of the stage. On his return from London, Mr. Nehru was faced with a divided cabinet and a divided Parliamentary party eager to know whether his appointment of a deputy leader signified his personal choice of successor. The Prime Minister is never more adroit than when poised on the horns of a political dilemma. Sensing the division within the inner Congress ranks and conscious that the rivalry for successorship had begun, he took immediate and drastic steps to squash both. Like Fabius, Nehru always wants to conquer by delay. Initially he temporized—but with conscious calculation. He announced that the choice of a deputy leader would be left to the election of the Congress Parliamentary party and should not be determined by his personal choice, a stratagem calculated to bring the respective rivals and their supporters out into the open and enable him to assess their individual strength and weakness. Mr. Morarji Desai, after rather pontifically declaring that he would allow himself to be put up for deputy leadership only if he were assured of a unanimous election, unwisely permitted himself to be persuaded later to let his supporters canvass for him. Meanwhile Mr. Jagjivan Ram had also entered energetically into the fray. This was the opportunity and occasion for which the Prime Minister was waiting. Nehru rebuked his cabinet ministers for unashamedly canvassing for the deputy leadership and asserted that it did not imply that the deputy leader chosen by the party was automatically next in the line of succession. He went on to say that there was no reason why any Congressman “whether eighth or ninth in the rank of cabinet seniority” should not aspire to the rank of deputy leader. His final decision was to downgrade the deputy leadership by reverting to the original system of two deputy leaders.

As a result the Prime Minister has temporarily stilled the clamor and controversy within the Congress camp as to who should succeed him. The two aspirants who revealed their hand with untimely haste have lost ground within the party and, to a degree, favor with the Prime Minister. But it would be misleading to deduce from this that as a result Nehru himself rides on the crest of a new popular wave. The open internal race for supreme power has shaken public confidence which was already deeply affected by the internecine wrangles of a party whose leaders, while quarreling within a glass house, adjured others to maintain national unity, selfless patriotism and integrity. Nehru

provides the cement of his own integrity and prestige to hold together the ramshackle structure of his party. But what when he departs?

The old question still recurs: After Nehru what and who? The Prime Minister's refusal to face the issue is partly a confession of his feeling that he himself sees no one on whom he can confidently bestow the mantle of leadership and partly an expression of an escapism which seeks an intellectual excuse to avoid an urgent political exercise. Politically the Prime Minister is too strong a realist not to recognize the urgency of having a successor recognized by the Congress Party and the country at large during his lifetime. But other considerations obtrude and have prevailed. Clearly neither Morarji Desai nor Jagjivan Ram is acceptable to Nehru as his successor, since neither follows faithfully in his economic footsteps. It may be that the Prime Minister is also realistic enough to recognize that Krishna Menon has no political roots in the country and he realizes that the Congress pack will descend on Krishna Menon like hungry wolves once he himself is gone, and tear him politically apart. For these reasons Nehru prefers to say that his heirs are the people of India, whose judgment he trusts, rather than any single individual or group of individuals. Personally I feel—though this is a purely instinctive hunch—that Nehru would like to have Lal Bahadur Shastri as his successor. Shastri is devoid of personality but is dedicated to the Prime Minister's political and economic ideas. He has succeeded Pant as Home Minister and like Pant and Nehru he also comes from Uttar Pradesh, a not unimportant consideration in the Prime Minister's calculations.

The factionalism now prevailing in India is not only an internal battle within various Congress groups at the Center and in the states, animated primarily by considerations of caste, community and language, but it has also deteriorated into a tussle between one Congress-ruled state and another as evidenced in the clash between West Bengal and Assam as to what place the Bengali language should have in the latter province. The breakup a year ago of the old state of Bombay has created fresh rivalries between the two new Congress-governed states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. In turn Maharashtra has differences with Congress-governed Mysore over the border area of Belgaum. And in other states there are disputes about the division of river waters much as that which existed between India and Pakistan. Punjab poses

a challenge of its own, pointing out that if New Delhi can allow the creation of a virtually Christian state in Nagaland on India's vital eastern frontier and the existence of a Muslim state in Kashmir on her equally important western frontier, the Sikhs should be trusted to rule their own state within India. The Congress argument that this would be yielding to religious jingoism is not over-convincing in the context of the new Nagaland and Kashmir.

It is always easy to be wise after the event, but looking back on developments since India's independence, we can see that Nehru's major mistake was to yield to the creation of Andhra State on linguistic grounds following the fast-unto-death of the Telegu Congressman, Potti Sriramulu, in 1953. Logically this generated a movement for linguistic states which at times found explosive expression, as between Maharashtra and Gujarat, and which could still erupt in the Punjab. Inside the Congress-governed state of Madhya Pradesh there have been Hindu-Muslim riots in Jabalpur, involving the loss of several lives, which Nehru has condemned and deplored, and the Bastar shootings which also caused considerable casualties among the aboriginal Adivasis and which a commission appointed by the Government has courageously and rightly censured. Plainly the monolithic foundations on which the Congress Party reared its Government over the entire country are being badly shaken. The basic mistake of the Congress was to identify the party with the country in the national process of reconstruction, for once the cracks showed in its own facade and foundation they were bound to be reflected in the country.

Riven itself by caste, linguistic and communal divisions, particularly as the general elections draw near, the Congress is in no position to chide other parties or groups organized on similar lines. So one finds the old communal groups such as the Muslim League, the Hindu Jan Sangh, the Kazaagam Dravida Munetra, the Scheduled Castes organizations and others rearing their heads again. Opposition to the Congress comes mainly from the Right—from the Hindu and Muslim communalists, from the princes and from the rapidly shrinking private sector represented by parties such as the Ganatantra Parishad which has its stronghold in Orissa, and the Swatantra Party which, under the 82-year-old Chakaravarti Rajagopalachari, former Congress president and former Governor General of India, is attempting to offer a strong challenge to the Congress, during the next general

elections. In the last elections the only non-Congress group to succeed in forming a state government was the Communist party in Kerala, though it could not sustain its administration beyond July 1959. Whether the Swatantra Party will be able next year to capture one or more states is debatable but its leaders expect success in areas such as Orissa, where the Congress Party was able to carry on the administration only with the coöperation of the Ganatantra Parishad; in Rajasthan, where the princes are beginning to mobilize politically; and in disgruntled regions such as the Punjab and Andhra Pradesh.

For all practical purposes, as Lord Attlee confessed after a recent visit to India, the Indian Socialist Party is dead, Nehru having spiked its guns by committing the Congress and the country to a Socialist pattern of society. China for the moment has hamstrung the Communists, leaving them divided and demoralized. Nehru seems assured of another five years of office with the Congress controlling the Center even if it loses its hold on some of the states. But the Congress, already straining at the seams, is likely to burst apart with Nehru's demission from the political stage. It may then conceivably split into two main groups representing the Right and the Left, for only Nehru's presence holds the two wings uneasily together. In a sense that would be an improvement on the present position of artificial unity, for it might lead to the growth of a two-party system which would stimulate the healthy development of democracy in India. But there is also the likelihood that along with it the divisive tendencies now very much to the fore will assert themselves more actively. Only the glow of the battle for independence, according to Mr. Morarji Desai, controlled and concealed the disunity in the Congress ranks which was prevalent even before independence. It is ironic that Nehru, who throughout his political career has fought to maintain the unity and stability of India, should have failed during his long years in office to ensure it. Indeed history, one fears, will indict him for not having more consciously restrained the divisive forces which after more than a decade of independence threaten the unity and stability of India.

PEACEFUL ENGAGEMENT IN EASTERN EUROPE

By Zbigniew Brzezinski and William E. Griffith

THE United States has never had a realistic and effective foreign policy toward Eastern Europe. During World War II the official American position was that the disposition of Eastern European problems should await the peace settlement, but this was primarily a rationalization for a lack of policy. After the war, when the area became dominated by the Soviet Union (to some extent because of Western passivity), the American interest in Eastern Europe was overshadowed by the policy of containment. Containment was meant to halt further expansion of Communism, but by its nature it had only indirect bearing on areas already under Soviet domination. As a result, Soviet control of Eastern Europe was not seriously contested by the West during the period roughly from 1948 to 1953. The Eisenhower Administration then enunciated the policy of liberation. Subsequent events increasingly demonstrated the lack of realism and purpose behind this, and it soon became an empty slogan. The popular risings in East Berlin in 1953 and in Budapest in 1956 were the final nails in its coffin.

Since 1956 there has been uncertainty about the goals and means of American policy toward Eastern Europe. It is by now fairly well agreed that the situation there is far more diverse than was the simple Stalinist pattern of uniformity. It is also recognized that the new situation offers both a challenge and a hope to the free world. Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to discuss the goals of American policy in Eastern Europe and the most effective means for pursuing them.

In dealing with the Communist régimes in Eastern Europe, American policy must operate on two levels: it must consider the régimes as such and it must consider the peoples they rule. To focus on one alone distorts our appraisal and prevents us from taking advantage of existing opportunities. In dealing with areas outside their bloc, the Communists have always realized that in order for foreign policy to be successful it must operate simultaneously on more than one level. A dual policy is equally necessary for the United States.

II

At the present time, the situation in Eastern Europe is dominated by two processes: the tensions which erupted so violently in 1956 are subsiding while Sino-Soviet disagreements persist. The interaction of these two factors has profoundly changed the Eastern European scene. Since the Second World War, each country in the area has had until now to deal only with the Soviet Union; today for the first time each has room for manoeuvre between the Soviet Union and Communist China. Most of the Communist leaderships have cast their lot with the Soviet Union—the Polish and the Hungarian enthusiastically, the East German and the Bulgarian less so. The Albanians, on the other hand, seem clearly to have opted for the Chinese, but apparently—and this is the new element—they have been able to do so and still remain within the bloc.

Another new factor on the present Eastern European scene is the basic alteration in its prevailing climate of political opinion. Eastern Europeans now think that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union wants war (although the Chinese may); that there will be no overthrow (by the West) of their Communist régimes; and that further changes are likely to stem from evolutionary developments within their own countries and within the bloc. Some of the régimes themselves also show more confidence in their dealings with East and West.

On the domestic scene, the Eastern European governments are now beginning to face the crisis of generations. The present generation of prewar Communists is made up of men in their late fifties and early sixties at least, and there is a major age gap between them and the young postwar careerists. Specifically, when the important First Secretaries die, as is likely to happen within the next decade, the problem of succession will immediately become linked to the crisis of generations. Aggravating the situation is the fact that both Khrushchev and Mao are of an age when they may leave the scene at any time.

In addition, the events of 1956 in Poland and Hungary dissipated most of the orthodox Communist belief. It has now given way, particularly among younger Communists, to less dogmatic, vaguer, albeit still Marxist, notions which are in some respects akin to Western Social Democracy but which can perhaps be more usefully labeled as "Marxist-Leninist reformism": certain basic and primarily socio-economic socialist notions are endorsed

but without fanaticism. Also, the basic outlines of a socialist welfare society have taken root in Eastern Europe, which has not had the most fortunate experience with either free enterprise or foreign capital. Even staunch anti-Communists accept the notion of a planned society with the public sector dominant.

In this situation it would seem that the United States should adopt a policy of what might be called peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe. This policy should: (1) aim at stimulating further diversity in the Communist bloc; (2) thus increasing the likelihood that the East European states can achieve a greater measure of political independence from Soviet domination; (3) thereby ultimately leading to the creation of a neutral belt of states which, like the Finnish, would enjoy genuine popular freedom of choice in internal policy while not being hostile to the Soviet Union and not belonging to Western military alliances. Finally, American policy must dissociate itself from any notion that it favors a restoration in Eastern Europe of an economic system patterned on that of the West.

Such a policy would be fully in keeping with the American long-range goal of a free and pluralistic world with diversity of political and social structures. It would also be in accord with the interests of the East European peoples and potentially with those of some of their ruling élites. Lastly, while not in harmony with Moscow's present desire to continue its domination of the area (and indeed to expand beyond it), the policy proposed is not in conflict with the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union—specifically its need to deny the area to any hostile military and political grouping.

A policy of peaceful engagement in Eastern Europe would not include an explicit demand for Soviet withdrawal from the area ("liberation"), especially as we are prepared to offer only verbal protests when the Soviet Union takes military measures to assert its primacy. On both political and moral grounds our policy ought to combine a continued demand for national self-determination in Eastern Europe with an effort to promote the peaceful transformation of existing régimes from Communist-type, Soviet-sponsored systems into something like Western-type social democracies, closely tied to the socio-economic development of Europe as a whole.

The East European régimes are not based on popular consent; and they exist in violation of a number of international commit-

ments undertaken by the Soviet Union. The United States therefore has every right and duty to reiterate its strong condemnation of them. We must not allow Soviet sensitivity to such charges to stop us from making them, especially since the Soviet Union at the same time maintains that peaceful coexistence does not preclude its right to intervene in the affairs of the West.

Moral considerations apart, the United States must insist on self-determination in Eastern Europe in order to prevent the violent anti-Western reaction there which would follow any apparent endorsement of Soviet control and any act which seemed to recognize that Communist rule was permanent. Our failure to maintain this position would weaken the democratic spirit which persists in Eastern Europe despite the passivity of the Western democracies in 1956. It would strengthen the cohesion of the Communist world, compromise the principles on which American policy has been based and weaken the United States as a symbol of freedom and self-determination.

However, a general attitude of disapproval does not preclude our attempting to improve our political, economic and cultural relations with the East European states, provided these régimes refrain from hostile acts toward us. On the political plane, we should strive to maintain reasonably correct and even in some cases coöperative relations with them. There is no reason, for example, why some of the Eastern European leaders should not visit the United States and high American officials go on reciprocal visits. People in Eastern Europe are sophisticated enough to be able to distinguish between formal American relations with the régimes that rule them and American approval of those régimes, with an implied falling off of interest in their own welfare. The enthusiastic reception given Vice President Nixon in Warsaw in 1959 was not due to or affected by any formal relations with the Polish Communist régime, but a popular response to what the Poles construed as evidence of continuing American interest in them.

On the economic plane, there is no overriding reason why America should not aid the economic development of some of the Communist nations of Eastern Europe. It no longer seems likely that economic crises would lead to the collapse of their régimes; thus "the worse, the better" theory does not apply, as it possibly did during the Stalinist period. The Soviet Union promotes the economic development of non-Communist states which in its eyes

are controlled by "bourgeois nationalists" who are "subjectively" hostile to it. We should adopt a similar attitude toward Eastern Europe. The populations there are friendly to us; they hope for a change in their lot. A betterment in their economic conditions, brought about in part by our efforts, could be in our interest.

A free society by definition and interest should favor the freest possible flow of ideas and persons across national boundaries. Communist régimes have traditionally opposed it. It would be natural, then, for American policy to welcome any increase in contacts, of whatever character, with Eastern Europe. Only two points need be made in this connection. First, an exchange limited solely to technical and artistic personnel should not be viewed as a satisfactory basis of agreement. The least we should ask and insist upon obtaining is a balanced representation also of the humanities and social sciences. Otherwise, cultural exchange can become merely a Communist technique for closing the scientific and technical gap. The second point is that in Communist eyes peaceful coexistence means many things, including, as Mr. Khrushchev has recently reminded us, intensification of the ideological struggle; he is right. For this reason, we should strive to develop informal but regular contacts with the East European élites, perhaps on the model of the recent Dartmouth and other meetings with Soviet intellectuals.

At the same time, we should encourage some of our allies to undertake a more positive attitude toward Eastern Europe. Some of them have traditional bonds of friendship with the East European countries. The French and the British could help the United States greatly in establishing closer links with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In this regard the Germans, for some decades to come, can probably do little more than reduce the hostility felt toward them; but it would be a forward step if the Bonn government could make a substantial offer of compensation to Nazi victims in Eastern Europe, as it has done so successfully in the case of Israel. As regards Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria, the Germans can do much more through political, economic and cultural relationships. The French have already accomplished much there in the cultural field, a task for which they are uniquely fitted; and they might do even more. Italy already has established remarkable economic and cultural relations with Yugoslavia and could gradually develop the same with other Balkan countries.

In this connection, the time seems to have come for the West

German government to reëxamine its rather rigid refusal to enter into diplomatic relations with any country which recognizes East Germany. (When Yugoslavia recognized the East German government in 1957, Bonn immediately broke off relations with Belgrade and to this day they remain suspended.) This so-called Hallstein doctrine has already been waived with respect to the Soviet Union. In German eyes this is a proper exception, since the Soviet Union occupies a part of Germany. But though many proposals have been heard both inside and outside Germany for the establishment of diplomatic relations between Bonn and Warsaw and Bonn and Prague, the West German government has so far refused; it has held that some 20 African and Asian states would then recognize East Germany, which they are still restrained from doing by the Hallstein doctrine and the manner in which Bonn applied it to Belgrade.

Perhaps our West German allies might be well advised to consider seriously the possibility of distinguishing between free and captive nations. The West Germans could state that the Hallstein doctrine must apply to free nations which can exercise a free choice but not to captive ones, the Soviet satellites. If a free nation decided to recognize East Germany, the West Germans would break relations with it and presumably apply economic sanctions. The threat of economic sanctions more than anything else has prevented most nations from recognizing the East German régime. Thus a distinction between free and captive nations in so far as the Hallstein doctrine is concerned will not seriously hurt West German interests while at the same time it would give Bonn a freedom of action in respect to Eastern Europe which they do not have at present.

At the same time we should encourage all of our European allies to invite some or all of the East European countries into West European economic and cultural undertakings. Such invitations will probably be unanswered or rejected, but they should be left standing so that even an immediate rejection does not permanently close the door. At every sign of economic difficulties in Eastern Europe, these invitations ought to be renewed, so that the régime concerned would have to take account of the reaction of their peoples, who are anxious to become again a part of Europe and are aware that their régimes prevent them from securing the advantages of doing so.

Let us remember, as a last general guide-line, the importance

of maintaining as much popular contact between the East and the West as possible. Given the Soviet violations of the Yalta and Potsdam agreements, the West has a right and obligation to maintain direct contact with the peoples involved and to keep them informed on both international and domestic affairs.

The Communist régimes naturally seek to maintain their monopoly on the means of communication in these countries, because otherwise they cannot transform them into totalitarian societies. In broadcasting to the captive peoples, the West is performing one of the roles of a free democratic opposition which the Soviet Union and the East European Communist régimes deny to their peoples. We should not consider stopping these broadcasts in return for some Soviet concession. The only kind of concession which would justify suspension would be for the Soviet Union to implement its earlier commitments regarding free elections, free speech and a free press. On any other terms, a compromise that caused us to give up our broadcast coverage of internal affairs in Eastern Europe would be a bad bargain.

III

Let us now consider, country by country, how we might accentuate the trend toward diversity and non-dependence in the states of Eastern Europe without seeming to try to wrest them from the Soviet sphere of influence.

Poland. This is the largest, the most important and the most complicated area with which the suggested American policies must deal. Our attitude toward Poland involves very directly one of our major allies, the German Federal Republic. The reason for this is, of course, the Polish-German boundary issue. Since this is the crux of Polish-German relations, the American attitude toward it must be a major factor in any American policy toward Poland. At present the lack of clarity in official American policy on this issue is exploited effectively by Communist circles interested in maintaining Soviet control over Poland. Since it is to the advantage of both Washington and Bonn to diminish Polish links to Moscow (a development without which German reunification is out of the question), it follows that it is in the joint interests of Washington and Bonn to reduce genuine Polish fears.

Initiative here must rest with the United States since the present state of public opinion in Western Germany makes it impossible for any democratically-elected government in Bonn to appear

more yielding than its allies on this issue. Former inhabitants of the territory east of the Oder-Neisse rivers are an influential sector of the West German electorate, and this alone means that it would be politically suicidal for the government to move on its own to give formal recognition of the Oder-Neisse line. These "expellees" claim the human and moral right to return to the homes from which they were expelled (at Soviet initiative, with American and British approval) in the wake of the Second World War, and then to decide whether their homeland shall again become a part of Germany. But the present Polish inhabitants of these territories (between the Oder-Neisse and the 1939 Polish Western boundaries) were also expelled from the 1939 Polish Eastern Territories, which the Soviets will not return to Poland. And, as one always hears in Warsaw, Poland cannot exist as a nation on wheels. Besides, the Poles have largely rebuilt and fully resettled these territories. In point of fact, the present frontier cannot be changed in the foreseeable future except by force. This would mean a general war, probably a thermo-nuclear one. It therefore follows that the present Oder-Neisse frontier is here to stay.

The Polish Communist régime, with the full encouragement of the Soviets, has been taking political advantage of the existing legal ambiguity surrounding the boundary question. It has concealed from the Polish people the profound changes in West German society, the democratic development in the Federal Republic and above all the Europeanization of Western Germany. Communist circles cynically equate Adenauer with Hitler. They fan the sense of insecurity among the Polish settlers in the former German territories in order to achieve some degree of popular support for themselves. The occasional—and regrettable—presence of former high Nazis in important positions in West Germany is always mentioned, while the trial and sentencing of German war criminals by West German courts is ignored. All of this has a clear political purpose: to portray the Communist régime as the protector of the Polish people against West German revanchism and the Soviet Union as Poland's indispensable ally.

Practically every Pole suffered personally under the Nazi occupation, and most Poles seriously fear both that the Germans will again use force against them and that the United States will support or at least tolerate it. Thoughtful Poles who are aware that they need not fear this at present fear something else: that a

reunified Germany might some day apply political and economic pressure on Poland, and might do so with American (and maybe even Soviet) tolerance and perhaps encouragement. In other words, they fear that Poland, a minor power, will once again have its frontier decided under foreign pressure.

This fear, unreal as it now seems, might some day have some basis, and American moves to allay it would also go far toward diminishing Polish fears that Germany will resort to force. A major ally of the United States and West Germany, General de Gaulle, leader of a country with historic ties to Poland, has already stated that in his view the Oder-Neisse line is not subject to change. Authoritative persons in Great Britain have said more or less the same. Although the reaction of democratic German leaders in both cases was restrained, it does not follow that their reaction to a similar American step would be the same, since America is West Germany's major ally.

What are the implications of these facts for American policy? A formal recognition by the United States of the present Oder-Neisse frontier may not be feasible at the present time, since in international law it would involve either recognition of the boundary of a state which does not exist—namely, a reunified Germany (to the establishment of which we are committed)—or of the boundary of East Germany, which we do not recognize. Politically it would be a gamble. To calculate the risk of losses to us in West Germany as opposed to gains in Poland is not possible; a good case could be made that the risks are too great to be acceptable. This being so, two alternatives present themselves: to support West German efforts to revise the boundary in favor of Germany, or to maintain the present policy of non-commitment pending a peace treaty with a reunited Germany.

The first is undesirable, since it involves a policy objective which is impossible to achieve without force. Politically, it would throw any government of Poland (and Czechoslovakia) permanently into alliance with any government in Moscow and destroy the great reservoir of friendship for us in those countries. Its moral justification would seem dubious, and it would raise a serious problem in our domestic politics. The second, the present policy of vague non-commitment, gives us the worst posture on all sides: it does not help us much in West Germany, it gravely weakens our position in Poland, and it gives the Russian and Polish Communists an effective means for keeping alive Polish

fears of a resurgent Germany and doubts as to whether we may not support German interests on the boundary issue.

As always with such problems, there is no perfect solution, but there nevertheless is something which it is possible to do—namely, reduce Polish popular fears of German-inspired revision of the boundary (which will not in fact occur) and thus diminish Communist influence in Poland and increase Western influence, specifically our own. Therefore the United States should impress upon West German public opinion that the reunification of Germany is impossible without major changes in Polish-Soviet relations. From this point of view a change in the American posture on the Oder-Neisse line could be viewed as favoring long-range German interests.

This is a vitally important point, and one not fully appreciated in Germany or the United States. Until German-Polish differences have been resolved a completely united Europe is impossible; the continuance of them is bound to be reflected in unsatisfactory relations between Germany and its western neighbors. Since Bonn has already formally committed itself not to use force toward Poland, the United States, both alone and also as a member of NATO, should endorse this West German commitment, pledge itself to resist any change in it, and commit itself to having this pledge included in a future German peace treaty. Both countries and NATO should also formally agree that in any future negotiations on a German peace treaty Poland will not be compelled or pressured to accept any change in the existing Oder-Neisse frontier which it feels contrary to its basic national interests. As a gesture indicating that the United States neither expects nor favors any change in the present frontier, even though this may not now be formally stated, we should now consider opening a consulate either in Szczecin or Wroclaw.

The Oder-Neisse question, of course, is not the only issue in U.S. policy toward Poland. American economic aid should be maintained and probably increased, and negotiations undertaken to find some mutually acceptable way for the United States to put its by now very large counterpart funds to work in ways which will benefit the Polish people. The construction of a National Reference Library and Archives in Warsaw might be a desirable project. Cultural exchanges with Poland should be expanded, particularly those under American foundation auspices, and under the present conditions whereby Polish recipients

are not to be chosen solely by the Warsaw government. Technical and material assistance might well be given by the United States toward the modernization of Polish agriculture. All of the above is predicated on the expectation that the present Polish situation will not drastically change for the worse.

Czechoslovakia is a Western industrialized country with a neo-Stalinist political régime which enjoys considerable domestic stability. The Czechs are anti-German; they were traditionally pro-Russian but may now be less so. The Slovaks are Catholics, increasingly industrialized, generally anti-Czech, more anti-Communist and less anti-German than the Czechs. The Czechs have the same fears as the Poles do of the Germans, especially since the claims of some of the Sudeten expellee organizations in West Germany bring back memories of Munich and the Nazi destruction of the state of Czechoslovakia. Fortunately, both Washington and Bonn endorse the 1937 German-Czech boundary. What causes Czech uneasiness, however, is the frequently reiterated claim of some Sudeten leaders that their ethnic group should be free not only to return to their former territory but also to determine which nation it ought to belong to. While neither Bonn nor Washington has associated itself with such claims, it would be desirable from the American viewpoint to have it made clear that these do not represent official American or West German policy.

It is very desirable to reestablish traditional Czechoslovak links with France and America, initially by action in the cultural field. In view of Czechoslovakia's increasing role in technical aid to underdeveloped areas, we should extend to Prague the offer we have already made to Moscow to join the West in multilateral economic development plans sponsored by the United Nations. Here as elsewhere, anything which tends to dilute the Marxist-Leninist image of essentially antagonistic patterns of world change is to the good.

Rumania and Bulgaria. Both these Balkan countries are primarily agrarian, with limited democratic traditions. To Rumania, France and Germany were historic friends and allies; Bulgaria's friends were Germany and Russia. The Rumanians are anti-Russian and anti-Hungarian; the Bulgarians, pro-Russian by tradition, are anti-Yugoslav and anti-Greek. Though Rumania has often been ridiculed in the West as effete and corrupt, the most remarkable reverberations of the Hungarian Revolution were there; if that revolution had not been promptly crushed,

Rumania might well have been the next country to revolt. At present, the Rumanian and Bulgarian Communist leaderships are stable and particularly repressive. Short of some new divisive force (such as a Soviet-Yugoslav rapprochement arising out of the Sino-Soviet dispute), rapid or drastic internal change seems unlikely. Nevertheless, it is a welcome sign that the United States recently concluded a cultural exchange agreement with Rumania and has reestablished diplomatic relations with Bulgaria after a lapse of more than a decade. The intensification of cultural relations offers the best available avenue for influencing the outlook of the ruling élites in these countries, making them realize that socio-economic change throughout the world is an organic and evolutionary process, inadequately encompassed by the dichotomic categories of Marxism-Leninism. In some ways, a stronger case can be made for economic aid to Rumania and Bulgaria than for any other Eastern European country except Poland—since Czechoslovakia and Eastern Germany are industrialized and relatively prosperous, and Hungary is a special political case. Bulgaria and Rumania are still impoverished, underdeveloped societies; their people are profoundly aware of their lot, and increasingly impatient. American or perhaps preferably German offers to assist Bulgarian and Rumanian economic development might well be made, if for no other reason than to help the Rumanians and Bulgarians to squeeze more aid out of Moscow.

Hungary, Albania and East Germany. The régimes of these three countries are unstable and they therefore see danger in relaxation at home and in increased contacts with the West.

The Hungarian régime steers a middle course between revisionism on the one hand and neo-Stalinism on the other. The presence of Cardinal Mindszenty in the American Legation, the continued incarceration of political prisoners, indeed, our duty not to forget the Hungarian Revolution, create special problems in our relations with Budapest. Should it prove possible to normalize them in such a way as to be of help to the Hungarian people (through increased contacts with the West and some alleviation of the present secret police terror), it might well be in our interest to send our Minister back to Budapest. One prerequisite should be the release of Hungarians still in prison for their participation in the revolution. Furthermore, West Germany in those circumstances might consider extending economic aid to the Hungarians, and the West in general might increase cultural contacts

with them. However, as long as the Soviet Union makes capital out of posing as an anti-colonial power we should retain the Hungarian issue on the United Nations agenda.

Albania is Stalinist at home, pro-Chinese and anti-Jugoslav abroad. The United States has no diplomatic relations with Tirana, and there is little likelihood that they can soon be resumed. The Hoxha régime has claimed that a joint Yugoslav-Greek-Italian-American conspiracy aims at the partition of the country. The United States should make it clear, through expanded broadcasts to that country, that this charge is a figment of Hoxha's imagination, devised to conceal the reality of an unsuccessful Soviet attempt last summer to overthrow him. Our information about Albania and our analysis of conditions there are inadequate, and steps should be taken to improve them.

The Ulbricht régime in East Berlin, composed of Stalinist Quislings, rules on Soviet behalf one-third of Germany. Since East Germany is being increasingly depopulated by the mass flight to the West and since his régime is hated and highly unstable, Ulbricht constantly presses Moscow to provoke a crisis over Berlin. The Bonn government feels strongly that the Western powers should take no steps which would appear to recognize the Ulbricht régime as legitimate; the United States is of the same view. Although the status quo is far from satisfactory, it is the best to be had, and it must be maintained. It is worth noting that the Soviet Union, while rejecting the so-called "two Chinas" policy, demands that we recognize the eastern part of Germany under its military occupation as a *bona fide* state.)

IV

The statement is often made that conditions in Eastern Europe depend largely on the status of American-Soviet relations. However, this is affected directly, on the one hand, by the Soviet insistence on simply treating the area as a satellite region, and, on the other, by Soviet fears that the United States rejects the status quo and wants to transform the region into an anti-Soviet, perhaps German-dominated, Western outpost. A policy of peaceful engagement would deny either that Eastern Europe is a satellite region or that we plot to make it a Western outpost. In the long run, a gradual change in Eastern Europe which neither challenges Soviet security nor abandons the area to the Soviets, may also help to improve American-Soviet relations.

THE NEXT-TO-LAST ACT IN AFRICA

By Elspeth Huxley

SHORTLY after Sir Winston Churchill remarked that he had not become the King's First Minister in order to preside over the dissolution of the British Empire, the voters relieved him of that responsibility; he is alive to see a successor not merely presiding over that dissolution but eagerly speeding it up, the sails of his party set to catch the full force of the wind of change. By the end of 1962 it is unlikely that any part of Africa will remain under the control of any white-skinned race, except the Union of South Africa, alone and isolated, and perhaps the Portuguese provinces of Angola and Mozambique which, unlike the territories until so recently controlled by France, Britain and Belgium, have had some 400 years of European government.

Empires have broken up before—according to Toynbee, well over 20 have come and gone—but never, it is safe to say, so quickly and with so little bloodshed. Within the last five years, some 23 separate countries formerly under French or British rule have gained their independence, or are just about to do so, almost without the firing of a shot or even an exchange of insults—on the contrary, with goodwill and compliments all around. In these often despondent days, this is something to put to the credit side of the twentieth century.

The wicked colonial oppressor, in fact, has been getting out just as fast as he can. This hotfoot exit has made embarrassing the task of those determined to build and sustain a myth of the ruthless white tyrant hanging on to power, and a matching myth of the gallant freedom-fighter wresting it from him—an illusion so necessary to an emergent nation's self-esteem. Mythologists have had to do the best they can with a few mishandled parades and displays of colonialist pique, as when the French removed telephones and typewriters after Guinea had opted out of the French Community. But the more realistic nationalist leaders have punctured the balloon by speaking of their departing overlords as human beings who, in the words of Nigeria's Premier, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, acted "first as masters, then as leaders, and finally as partners, but always as friends."

It is in West Africa that the path to independence has run, by and large, so smoothly. In the east and center of the continent

it has been uneven, remains dangerous and is not yet fully traversed. Instead of a relatively homogeneous population of Blacks, these countries embrace a mixture of races. Whites, and in some cases Browns, have been settled there for several generations. They consider that they have as much right to be regarded as Africans as have the Negro/Bantu races, and that the economies of their countries, built upon the enterprise and capital of Europeans rather than upon the subsistence farming of peasants, will collapse if they are forced out.

These are the so-called multi-racial countries. I shall attempt briefly to survey their immediate past, glance at their present and suggest some possibilities ahead. One of the great unknowns, the joker in the international pack, is the nature and political expression of what President Nkrumah of Ghana has called "the African personality." Non-Africans who guess about it stick their necks out even farther than commentators on the European or American scene. Peering into the fog, the observer can do no more than describe the shapes that loom ahead as he sees them, leaving every man to interpret them as he can.

II

A useful starting-point is the conspicuous difference between the progress towards independence made in Tanganyika on the one hand and in Kenya on the other. These two East African neighbors have much in common. Although Tanganyika was a German colony from 1884 until its conquest by the Allies in 1917, then became a mandated territory of the League of Nations and subsequently a trust territory of the United Nations, both countries have been under British colonial tutelage for over 40 years. They are loosely linked (together with Uganda and Zanzibar) by the East Africa High Commission in a merger of economic services like railways, posts and telegraphs, customs and taxation. Their coastal districts share a history of previous Arab rule, their interiors one of constant wars and raids between tribes far more primitive than those of West Africa.

In both countries, there has been settlement by Europeans. Their important plantation industries are European-owned. In both, Indians and Pakistanis have a near-monopoly of the retail trade, own most of the city real estate and occupy a key position in the economy. But Tanganyika is to gain its independence next December after a peaceful and orderly transfer of power; whereas

Kenya—in trade, wealth and social services the more advanced country—was for four years torn by the bloody Mau Mau revolt, costing several thousand lives and some \$150 million in cash, and today is far from peaceful and settled; nor has any date yet been fixed for independence.

Why have these two countries, apparently so alike, advanced in such a different manner towards the same goal? Among a number of reasons, two stand out. In Tanganyika, white farmers have been fewer, more scattered, less secure in their land and politically less powerful than in Kenya; they have therefore acquiesced more readily in their own political submergence under Black rule. Chance provides the second reason: the accident of leadership. In Julius Nyerere, Tanganyika has found a wise, sincere, moderate and yet inspiring leader who has been able to unite the 120 or so different and distinct tribes that make up its heterogeneous population. In Kenya, no leader of Nyerere's stature has emerged.

The only way to unite tribes jealous and suspicious of each other has been to whip up their hatred of a common enemy; and the White settler has been there to distort and magnify into the image of this common foe. Politics in Kenya have therefore been shot through with a racial bitterness lacking in Tanganyika. Now that the time has come to form a government from politicians of all three races, Kenya's atmosphere is poisoned. Tolerance, a slender plant at all times, has been wilting away. There is no unity either between the Africans, whose tribal differences have been carried over into political organizations, or between the three races. And without at least a modicum of unity, you cannot form a government.

In desperation the disunited Kenya Africans have turned to a curious figure who has, in the last ten years, congealed into a myth. This is Jomo Kenyatta, the 70-year-old convicted organizer of the Mau Mau revolt. The odd thing about Kenyatta is that he belongs not to the new wave of westernized, college-educated politicians more at home in a television studio than up a palm tree, but to the dark, tribal past of Africa. "Burning spear" is his other name; the frontispiece to his book on his own tribe, the Kikuyu, depicts him fingering a spear and clad in a leopard-skin. He was a boy of ten before he ever saw a European—a missionary doctor who saved his life by operating for a spinal disease. Later he entered politics and for 15 years lived in England, aside from two trips to Moscow, pressing the cause of African freedom.

Within two years of his return to Kenya in 1946, his fellow-tribesmen were taking the secret and obscene Mau Mau oath to murder Europeans and drive them from Africa. Open warfare, conducted by gangsters who used revolting tortures to terrorize their fellows into collaboration, broke out in 1952 between his tribe, the Kikuyu, and the colonial government. Kenyatta was sentenced to seven years imprisonment. Now to Kenya's 6,000,000 Africans he has become a symbol of freedom, the only man they believe can create among their jealous tribes a unity that even Tom Mboya, the bright young travelling salesman for African nationalism, has failed to bring about.

But most British civil servants and White farmers, and some anti-Mau Mau Africans, will not accept as national leader the man they hold responsible for Kenya's greatest tragedy, and for the depravity of the ritual with which it was invested. Since 1958, he has been kept under a form of house arrest. In this sense it is Kenyatta—and not a White refusal to accept Black rule—that stands at present between Kenya and its freedom, just as it is Kenyatta, in nationalist eyes, who alone can achieve the unity essential if Kenya is not to become another Congo. Elections held on a wide suffrage last February have put a majority of Africans, for the first time, into the country's parliament, but the majority party has refused to form a government. While a coalition between the African minority party and some Europeans has resulted, political instability has reduced confidence almost to the vanishing point; capital has fled the country, the value of investments has declined by 62 percent, unemployment is growing and much that has been built up in the last 40 years seems in jeopardy. Such a state of affairs offers to the forces of disintegration, so tragically at work in the Congo, another point of entry. And behind these forces of disintegration lie the forces working to defeat and expel Western influence from Africa.

III

Present uncertainty and fear of future trouble prevail also in the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, formed in 1953 to strengthen and develop the economy of the three constituent countries¹ and to provide the world with a working model of racial partnership. African leaders in Northern Rhodesia and

¹ Southern Rhodesia, a self-governing colony with an all-White government; Northern Rhodesia, a British Protectorate with a mixed Black/White government; and Nyasaland, also a British Protectorate, with an African majority.

Nyasaland opposed federation from the start, on the ground that it was a device for perpetuating indefinitely the rule of the Whites in Southern Rhodesia. It was the hope of British statesmen—both political parties were involved—that the economic advantages of federation would in time win them over, and that such practical effects of partnership as the founding of a multi-racial university, a greatly improved health service and a common voters' roll for Blacks and Whites, would convince them that the best hope for Africa lay not in strident Black nationalism, but in racial coöperation.

Last year, a large commission was appointed to inquire into how the Federation had worked, and to advise all the governments concerned on the next step. The Monckton report, published last fall, made depressing reading for those who had staked everything on the success of what had come to be regarded as the last chance in Africa to work out a genuine partnership between the races. Broadly speaking, the Commission found two things. First, that the economic advantages everyone had hoped for from the federation had been realized. Federation had brought capital investment, expanded trade, new industries and good prospects for better living standards among Black and White alike. Second, that none of this had influenced African opinion, which had steadily become more anti-federation until it had reached a stage the Commissioners described as pathological. African nationalists identified federation with White domination, and especially with the racial policies of the all-White government of Southern Rhodesia, and so they wanted federation scrapped.

Nationalists do not speak for all Africans. Some supported federation, and still do; there are African ministers in the government; but their influence has waned. Partly by means of intimidation, partly by the pressure of outside events, a majority of Africans appear to have rejected the multi-racial ideal in favor of undiluted Black nationalism. The Commission's report presented a regretful picture of an ideal of racial partnership that was virtually dead; yet it did not recommend the winding up of federation. The Commissioners outlined a plan to continue an association between the three British Central African states, but to narrow this down to economic matters, leaving each country free to go its own way politically, save for a common defense and foreign policy. In fact they hoped that by jettisoning a lot of the cargo, the ship itself could—possibly—be saved.

With the great majority of Africans in both Nyasaland and in Northern Rhodesia implacably against federation, and even the Whites in Southern Rhodesia—by now thoroughly alarmed at the prospect of Black domination—hostile or at best lukewarm, one might well ask what has kept it from immediate dissolution. The answer lies in one man. The most powerful political figure in Central Africa today is Sir Roy Welensky, the genial, bland, outspoken and single-minded ex-pugilist, ex-locomotive engineer, son of a penniless Jewish immigrant from Poland and an Afrikaner mother, who rose via the trade unions to become Prime Minister of the Federation. Welensky is probably the most hated and the most adulated man in Central Africa. I have seen crowds of Africans burning his portrait while they stamped with rage; the White miners of Northern Rhodesia's copperbelt will rise to cheer his name and to volunteer in vigilante groups to fight his battles. For, as they see it, his struggle is nothing less than that for White survival—Africans say White domination—in Africa. He is the chief architect of federation. To secure it he founded the United Federal Party which is now in office, and he has convinced the British Government that the Federation must be kept going at all costs—save that of sacrificing finally African goodwill throughout the continent.

It would be wrong to dismiss Welensky's motives as merely personal. It is true that he has ridden to power on federation and that if it crashes, he will crash too. But he is convinced that partnership between Black and White can be made to work, that here in Central Africa this will be proved or disproved, and that if it fails, not only will the Whites be run out of Africa, but the Blacks will be self-condemned to a tragic collapse of all their hopes of advancement. At the best the end of federation, he believes, would spell the end of capital investment and development, the worsening of poverty, and goodbye to many schemes of education and training for a richer life. At the worst, it could bring about "another Congo"—the collapse of law, order and administration, and a return to the standards of the jungle. For African nationalists lack the three Es—education, experience and equipment—needed to keep their countries from confusion and decline.

Last year the sight of thousands of fleeing Belgians, some wounded and some raped, flown out by the Royal Rhodesian Air Force and passed through emergency camps, did nothing to diminish the fears of the Whites that the end of federation would

mean the end of civilization in this part of Africa. It is the core of Welensky's position, and of his party's policy, that political control must be kept in "civilized hands." These hands need not be White. The United Federal Party is, in theory anyway, multi-racial. Since federation was established, many *apartheid* practices in Southern Rhodesia have been modified or abolished. But only people who are "civilized" are to be allowed to vote.

To measure civilization in an individual is a task to confound the deepest philosophers. Politicians roughly achieve it, at least to their own satisfaction, by a qualitative franchise. A citizen must pass certain tests in order to vote. These tests include literacy in English and a combination of a minimum income and level of education. Both Blacks and Whites must pass these tests; at present, the standard is so set that at the last federal election only 2,000 Africans got themselves on the common roll, as against 90,000 Europeans. More Africans could have qualified had they bothered, and as education snowballs more and more will qualify for the roll, until eventually Africans outnumber Europeans. This, the Europeans say, will be perfectly all right so long as the Blacks are "civilized."

The Blacks will have none of this. They believe that, as more Africans qualify, the tests will be stiffened, so as to maintain indefinitely a White preponderance. In any case they are in no mood for waiting. The sense of haste and urgency, the intolerance of even small delays, is impossible to realize unless it has been experienced at first hand. Talks on constitutions to achieve a freedom that may be expected to last a thousand years will founder on proposals to delay their completion by six months. Pie in the sky is not for today's Black nationalists. They want pie, and plenty of it, here and now. In political terms they want universal suffrage immediately.

Throughout non-free Africa, "one man one vote" is now a rallying-cry possessed of all the emotional appeal, and more, once summoned by such a phrase as "Remember the Alamo." I have heard it chanted like a magic incantation by thousands of tribesmen, and by women with babies strapped in slings on their backs who could not understand a word of English. But they understand "one man one vote" to mean the end of being pushed around by people of an alien race and culture, the restoration of their self-respect. That they may well get pushed around far more ruthlessly by men of their own race and culture does not, at

the moment, bother them. They do not care for economics. They do not really even care for politics. When it comes to putting a mark on a piece of paper they cannot read, they are not troubled about the platforms of political parties. They are concerned merely to record, in this new fashion, their loyalty to a man: perhaps a father-figure, perhaps the modern image of the chief for whom respect is inborn and essential. They vote for Kenyatta, for Nyerere, for Banda, for Nkrumah, for Nkomo, for whoever is the man of the hour and the time. And it is useless to talk to them about economics or, it would seem, with few exceptions, about partnership and multi-racialism. Naked racialism, Black racialism, is on the rampage in Africa and to stem it needs more than the strength of Hercules, or even of Sir Roy Welensky.

IV

During the past 20 or 30 years both France and Britain have striven to introduce into their African dependencies the concept of democracy. The cry of "one man one vote" from end to end of the continent suggests a brilliant success. This is indeed partly true. The idea of voting for representatives, which everywhere at first had almost to be forced on the people, has caught on to a dramatic extent. Elections, parties, votes, slogans, parliaments, universal suffrage, all these are part of the equipment of every newly independent state. On the surface, democracy looks like a healthy, well-rooted specimen successfully transplanted from Europe to Africa. And in places it is thriving more happily than anyone had a right to expect. But in Russia also there are elections, parties—at any rate one party—votes, slogans, parliaments and universal suffrage. The framework is all there. It is the spirit that is lacking; and this is the case also in some, already, of the new African states. It is likely soon to be the case in others. Transplanted trees may stand for some time after the sap ceases to run.

The story of Ghana is already familiar. Within a year of independence, President Nkrumah had swept away the careful safeguards for minorities set up by the departing British. Within another year, the effective members of the parliamentary opposition were in jail. All outward opposition to Nkrumah's régime has been suppressed under laws enabling the government to jail anyone it likes without trial for five years. There is plenty of free speech if you support the government party—very little future if you do not.

Yet it would be a mistake, I believe, to see Ghana in the same light as a Communist satellite such as Hungary or Poland. The set-up may be similar—it would be out of the question for Nkrumah's party to be voted out of office—but Ghanaians have never had the sort of system we understand by democracy, and there is no reason to suppose that they have ever wanted it. Under Nkrumah's brand of dictator-democracy they are getting a good deal of what they do want: prosperity, prestige, panache, a feeling of going places and of cutting a figure in the world. If they are also getting a good deal of corruption and some tyranny, there is no evidence that they mind these things very much. Everything has its price, and this probably seems to most Ghanaians a light one. They are at last getting the Volta project and over \$300,000,000 in foreign loans, and that is worth a cross in the right place on a piece of paper now and then. So is the pride and pageantry of a leader who has put their country on the television screens of the world. If it had been an African crowd that had seen Caesar wave aside the crown of laurels in the Roman Forum, I doubt if they would have applauded. But they would have cheered him to the echo if he had put it on.

A trend toward dictatorships cannot be regarded by the West as a happy outcome of half a century of colonialism. At the same time it would be unrealistic, I suggest, to expect anything else. In an established democracy we take a good many things for granted. These include an overriding loyalty among the mass of citizens toward their country and its rulers; a willingness to live at peace under whatever government is freely elected, even if it is one you dislike; and tolerance toward minority points of view. For thousands of years the people of Africa have been divided into thousands of tribes—each with its separate language, faith, customs, territory and tradition—most of them jealous and suspicious of their neighbors. Fifty or sixty years of colonialism have only blurred the edges of these deep divisions. After a brief colonial interlude, tribalism is emerging as the major problem of an independent and partially balkanized Africa.

In a tribal society, the citizen's first loyalty lies toward his tribe and its leaders. In modern terms he votes for a fellow-tribesman, not for a member of a rival group. He is not prepared to accept, without the use of force, government by other tribes; he is not prepared to be persuaded to a different tribal point of view. Political parties tend to follow lines of tribal divisions. In such con-

ditions, democracy as we know it simply cannot, and does not, work. Of course tribalism is fading—education is slowly bleaching its color and strength. But the process is uneven. Belgian withdrawal in the Congo revealed it in a virtually pristine condition; tribe fought tribe and they are still doing so. In Ruanda-Urundi it has twice exploded in the last few years into open warfare; in Kenya it is preventing the formation of a truly representative government; in Uganda it is holding up an overdue independence.

But in Nigeria an Ibo Governor-General, Dr. Azikiwe, presides with all-round approval over a federation embracing his people's traditional enemies, the Yoruba and Fulani. In Ghana, an ancient enmity between the Ashanti and the coastal groups no longer threatens the republic's unity. The methods followed in these two countries illustrate two ways in which tribalism may be overcome: in Nigeria by a federation which grants to each ethnic group a large measure of internal self-determination,² and in Ghana by the strong-arm methods of a central party controlled by the president. The first method is compatible with democracy, the second obviously is not.

From this we may perhaps draw the firm conclusion that, after independence, tribalism will lead either toward authoritarian rule or toward separatism. In both cases there are obvious dangers. Separatism can be made the basis for a federation only where the units are large enough to develop into viable states. In Nigeria there are over five million Yoruba-speaking people, as many in the Ibo community, and perhaps six or seven millions in the Hausa language group. These units are amply big enough to form self-governing states within (or even without) a federation. It is where the units are too small, or too mixed up with others, to allow a federal form of government to develop that trouble must arise.

Although education, plus the nationalist movement in politics, is drawing people out of tribalism, there is at work also a counter-revolutionary force which may tend to revive rather than to bury tribal differences. There is one aspect of nationalism that glorifies the African tradition, the African past; that reminds its followers of the lost empires of Songhai, of Mali, of Axum, of Monomotapa;

² Nigeria became independent only on October 1, 1960, and cannot yet be said to be out of the tribal woods. It is a federation of three regions, Northern, Western and Eastern, each of which has a separate government, but strong forces are at work to split all of these regions into smaller units on tribal lines. If this should happen, a break-up of the whole federal structure could occur.

that looks back to the African arts of dance and sculpture; that seeks the roots of "the African personality." These roots were tribal, and it is only in the tribe that Africans can trace their cultural heritage.

So it would be facile to assume that tribalism has been all but swept into limbo by education and the pan-African ideal. Undoubtedly this pan-African vision currently inspires most of the leading Black nationalists. The more sober, like Nyerere, see it primarily as a means of countering the economic and political dangers of the balkanization of Africa which has already followed the folding up of two colonial empires. The more flamboyant see in pan-Africanism the means by which the Black races will expel the White race from the whole of Africa, and become a power to be reckoned with in the world: a great bloc of united, forward-moving peoples who will be listened to with respect in Moscow, Peking, New York and London.

Such pan-Africanists have no time at all for the multi-racial approach that still forms the basis of official policy in East and Central Africa. In their view, any Whites who remain in Africa must stay as the hired servants of Black masters. Some will be needed for a number of years, but as crash programs of training in all the skills of modern society proceed, these numbers will dwindle rapidly. When Africans are fully trained, they will take over all branches of government, commerce, industry and teaching, and there will be no need for any Whites at all, except as tourists.

Such an extreme view is held only by a small handful of nationalists; but then, it was only a small handful of nationalists who led the mass of Africa's 230,000,000 people to the brink of the promised land. It would be a mistake to underestimate either their strength or their dedicated resolve to rid the continent of its Whites. In this they have been, and are, helped and supported by the United Arab Republic and, behind that, by the Communist and anti-Western world.

The extent of such support is as difficult to estimate as its effectiveness. That the Russians are in Africa is of course a fact: they are there in some force, as experts, and advisers, in Egypt, in Guinea and elsewhere; they are there as a financial power, expressed through loans, in several other countries, including Ghana; above all they are implanting themselves as an idea in the minds of a large number of African students at present enjoying free training and concentrated indoctrination in a number of

Iron-Curtain countries, from Peking to Prague, and from East Berlin to Moscow.

The number of such students cannot be accurately told, but it runs well into thousands and is growing rapidly. Every one of these graduates will return to a country avid for the services of trained men and women, each to a position of influence and prestige. The Russians, still more perhaps the Chinese, are in no great hurry; they are prepared to let the fruit ripen on the tree. There have been failures, of course. Nigerians have returned from the Friendship University in Moscow disgusted with the poor conditions, the harsh discipline and the lack of freedom, compared with the treatment they received at the hands of their colonialist oppressors. But there will also be successes. The real challenge will not come until a sufficiency of these trained young men and women have returned to countries by then, no doubt, embroiled in the troubles that flow from lack of experience, money and experts. The Communists are looking ahead five, ten, even fifteen years. In the meantime non-alignment, the new doctrine of the independent states, suits them very well.

v

Three bodies now exist to provide for consultation among the emergent nations, and to help freedom-fighters in countries still in the grip of colonialism. These are the Afro-Asian Solidarity Conference, supported by President Nasser and in receipt of Russian advice and money, with headquarters in Cairo; the All African Peoples' Conference started by President Nkrumah and run from Accra; and the Conference of Independent African States. We may expect in the immediate future to see an intensification of their efforts to sweep White control from its last African strongholds—namely, the Portuguese colonies, Southern Rhodesia and the Union of South Africa. The virtual expulsion of Dr. Verwoerd's South Africa from the British Commonwealth last March may well mark the start of a major onslaught on that country's Afrikaner government and its policy of *apartheid*. If one thing unites all these diverse newly independent states it is an implacable, irreversible hatred for this policy and this government. Even the moderate Nyerere has declared a rigid boycott of all things South African. Nkrumah now obliges every South African in transit through Ghana to sign a document repudiating *apartheid*. If he refuses, the aircraft in which he is travelling may

not land. Virtually all the airfields in the continent may soon be closed to South Africa's aircraft, all harbors to its trade and all commercial avenues to its export goods.

The existence among the South African Bantu of an underground movement planning a nation-wide uprising against the Whites is no mere back-velder's nightmare. This rising would be timed to coincide with direct intervention by the independent African states. Nearly every new African country of any size has already started to build up an army and an air force on modern lines. As yet these forces are small, but they are growing. Nor can one discount rumors of troops secretly in training. An all-out military attack against South Africa, Mozambique and Angola by an alliance of free African states, using small but modern forces equipped by powerful outsiders, and timed to coincide with a widespread anti-White rising, is not such a very remote possibility. It is almost certainly being discussed, even planned, today in Cairo, Conakry, Accra and other African capitals.

It would hardly be possible for such a race-war to be waged without intervention by non-African powers. Nor would it be possible for the Western powers passively to watch Africa drift, jump or topple from its uneasy and precarious perch of non-alignment into the Russian-Chinese camp. Strategically, economically, Africa is too big a stake to let go.

If Africa is to be a cold war battlefield, as it already is and will increasingly become with this racial bomb ticking plumb in the middle, it would seem disastrous for the Western powers not to work in harmony. Yet coöperation between them is wholly inadequate, and the temptation to play one another off in order to secure some temporary advantage sometimes proves irresistible.

The anxiety of the Kennedy Administration to back the big black horse in Africa is understandable and justified. Too many worn-out, knock-kneed old animals destined to fold halfway down the course have carried American money. No sensible person can be other than delighted that this mistake is not, it would appear, about to be made again—although there will be some awkward moments ahead in, say, Ethiopia, before the matter is resolved.

But it is one thing to express American sympathy and support for African nationalism and quite another to do so by attacking America's partners in NATO who have had the practical and exceedingly delicate task of de-colonializing their vast inherited empires. American information services have played the Com-

munist game by pursuing a propaganda line that roughly runs: "We got rid of King George's redcoats—now it's your turn, and we're here to help in your freedom-struggle." In fact, at times American propaganda has been accused of being almost indistinguishable from that of the Russians and of President Nasser. Such protestations anger the United States' allies without really impressing the Africans, whose leaders have reached a stage of sophistication where they judge America by what she does in Mississippi, not by what her representatives say in Lagos, Cairo, Salisbury or Nairobi. In short, it is one thing to back the right horse and quite another to scramble onto the bandwagon.

American aid for underdeveloped countries is already percolating, as yet hesitantly, through this vast continent; it can be expected to increase in volume, speed and effectiveness. At present the channels through which such aid may come are too confused and sometimes too clogged. No one would wish to see a torrent of dollars rain down upon just and unjust projects alike, nor is a Dutch auction between the Eastern and the Western powers to gain nationalist favors a desirable development. Aid in Africa is hedged in with many formidable difficulties and complexities and the approach at present is too fragmented, too piecemeal and too little coördinated among the partners in the Western alliance.

If a mass attack by the Western nations on the problems of the underdeveloped countries is to become (as some anticipate) the great challenge, opportunity and adventure of the second half of the twentieth century, two needs are paramount. The first is for top-level planning and assessment of priorities. What do the new African states really need, and need most urgently? How can their different needs be tied in together? (This assessment would cover such matters as education and technical training.) The second is to coördinate, again at top level, the policies of the nations concerned and their parts in the campaign. That Belgium, one of the NATO powers, should have acted as she did in the Congo, without any consultation whatever with allies who have been seriously embarrassed by the consequences of her acts, seems in the highest degree irresponsible. This irresponsibility was displayed not by the Belgians alone. One of the reasons behind their panicky withdrawal was the constant sniping at colonialism in which some of her NATO partners had indulged. And now an overspill from Congo anarchy is disrupting Angola. If no man is an island, still less is any African country.

In retrospect, it will surely seem little less than suicidal for the Western nations to meet the forces released by one of the great revolutions of history with so little preparation, so little consultation, so little planning and thought and, at times, so little sense. What is surely needed is some permanent machinery among the nations of the Western alliance to consult, to pool ideas, to plan a strategy for the cold war in Africa. This has to be fought, whether we like it or not. It might as well be fought effectively, not at half-cock.

We have NATO to concert our military effort to contain the forces of Communism. We need now a new civil body to concert the efforts of the free world to bring aid to Africa in an orderly and productive fashion, and to help her inexperienced peoples to develop not only their land and industries but themselves, and in such a way as to avoid the disasters of race-hatred, continental warfare and internal tyranny. These are not bogeys: they are dangers at once very real and very close. If the West stands by and lets Africa succumb to them, the free world may have lost the last trick but one.

SOUTH AFRICAN PROSPECT

THOUGHTS ON AN ALTERNATIVE RACE POLICY

By Sir de Villiers Graaff

A PROMINENT Black South African recently came to the Houses of Parliament in Cape Town to speak to members of my political party. In the course of his speech he said: "In Europe and America I have found that the people will not listen to the White man from Africa. They only listen to the Black man. I sometimes have difficulty in persuading people over there that I might be mistaken—even although I am Black." He joined in the laughter that followed, which proves to me that with all their vexing difficulties South Africans have not lost their sense of humor. For those words he spoke are to White South Africans tragically true, and it is not their fault that it is true.

In the cold war now being waged between democracy and Communism, Africa is the great uncommitted continent. The allegiance of the 230,000,000 people who dwell on this vast land mass is one of the greatest prizes for which the giant contestants are striving. At the beginning of the cold war the Communists had an initial advantage in Africa. They could in accordance with the teachings of Lenin exploit the potential anti-colonial sentiments of millions of Africans who for a hundred years had been the subjects of metropolitan powers in Europe.

It had to become the policy of the West to move this weapon from the hands of the Communists. Colonialism, whatever benefits it had conferred upon less advanced people, had to go. The forces of anti-colonialism were greatly stimulated when the mighty United States of America, after Hitler's war, emerged from its traditional isolationism and accepted its full responsibility for the maintenance of peace and the frustration of Communist aggrandizement throughout the world. America's historical dislike of colonialism coincided with the strategic need to abolish it wherever it had persisted. Inevitably, the days of the colonial administrator from Europe, the plantation manager and the transient trader were numbered.

Throughout most of Africa the transition could take place smoothly. Europeans living in most parts of central Africa were

not permanent settlers. They were sojourners temporarily resident in those areas to maintain the liaison which existed between the metropolitan power and the colony, primarily in the interest of the former, but incidentally also to the great advantage of the peoples in the colony.

In these areas the handing over of power to the indigenous people caused a minimum of disruption and, even if the new governments which replaced the colonial administration did not always correspond with Western concepts of democratic government, no great injustice was done, because the new forms of government corresponded with the national customs and character of the people affected.

But the position is different in those African territories where the White man is not a bird of passage but a permanent settler as truly identified with Africa as any Black man can be. To them the prospect of being submerged in a wave of African nationalism foreign to their concepts and to their way of life is truly frightening.

This is the reason why the problem of emancipation in Africa becomes increasingly difficult the larger the permanent European settlement. In the case of Ghana and Guinea and even Nigeria the problem was small. It becomes more involved in Kenya, where out of some 6,000,000 inhabitants 65,000 are Europeans. It is confusingly involved in Southern Rhodesia where some 200,000 Whites have made their permanent homes. It is the despair of statesmen in the Union of South Africa where, over a period of 300 years, more than 3,000,000 White people have settled and have become passionately attached to the land of their birth.

In the Union of South Africa the challenge to statesmanship is to devise a system of government and an order of society which will permit freedom to all its motley peoples while protecting the civilized standards brought to the subcontinent by the White people—standards passed on by them to 1,500,000 Colored people and 500,000 Asians, standards achieved by some and derived by all of the country's 9,000,000 Africans.

The Verwoerd Government now in power in South Africa seeks a draconian solution. Possibly influenced by precedents of partition established in India and in the Middle East, it believes in a policy of separate development for all the peoples of the Union. For the Africans it wants to set aside land areas where they will

be free to develop to the utmost of their ability and, if they so desire, to full sovereign independence. Morally this policy is perhaps not the evil thing which world opinion believes it to be. Sincerely applied, with the White people willing to make the sacrifices it will involve, it might be beyond reproach. The policy is, however, threatened with failure.

The seeds of this failure lie far back in our history. A century before the first European reached Australia, 30 years after the Pilgrim Fathers landed in New England, White immigrants were entering Africa at its southernmost point. Only 150 years later did these immigrants make their first contact on the eastern frontier of the Cape Colony with the central African Negro, or Bantu. These people, it is believed, had a thousand years before begun a migration southward down the African continent. The first contacts between European and Bantu were clashes of strength over land, water and stock, so that the history of South Africa during the latter part of the eighteenth and the first part of the nineteenth century is in many ways a remarkable parallel to that of the United States, where a similar situation arose between the White settlers and the American Indians.

The clashes ended in the subjugation of the Bantu to White authority in return for the allocation of just over 21,000,000 acres of land for the undisputed and protected occupation of the defeated tribes. This separation of the Bantu tribes and the wise paternal administration of White magistrates in the Reservations brought peace to South Africa.

But increases in the Bantu population over the years and especially the rapid economic development of South Africa made it increasingly difficult to restrict the Bantu to the land areas set aside for them. In the last 50 years the Union of South Africa's Bantu population has grown from 3,500,000 to nearly 11,000,000—a tribute to the benefits which accrued to them when they exchanged their former warlike way of life for the orderly administration of the White man. In the same 50 years the Union's White population increased from about 1,000,000 to 3,300,000.

In 1910, when the Union of South Africa was founded, 85 percent of the Bantu population lived in the Reservations and in the rural areas. The bulk of the Bantu population was composed of tribal Natives and farm laborers. Today 70 percent of the 11,000,000 Bantu live outside the Reserves, 25 percent having moved into the cities. Three out of every four workers in the

manufacturing industry are non-Whites, while the proportion in agriculture and mining is 90 percent.

This integration of the Black man into South Africa's economy is an indisputable and inescapable fact. It is the crux of our objection on practical grounds to the "separate development" or *apartheid* policy of the present South African Government. Together with the considerable divergence of cultural levels and living standards of the White population and those of the vast mass of the Bantu people, this fact of integration is also the crux of the South African dilemma as a whole.

Let us look at the divergences. Fifty years ago almost all our Bantu were completely illiterate. Today the school attendance of Bantu in South Africa has reached 1,500,000, and the figure is increasing by 100,000 a year. Most of these children admittedly go little beyond the equivalent of the American fourth grade, but about 8,000 reach the tenth grade and about 650 matriculate each year. In 1958 there were nearly 2,000 Bantu students at universities and in that year 200 graduated. In spite of obvious deficiencies, these figures are commendable; no other territory in Africa south of the Sahara can even approach this achievement—and we are justly proud of it. We know that much work still has to be done to educate the Bantu people of South Africa, and the great advance we have achieved as compared to the rest of Africa has certainly not caused us to rest on our laurels. But we cannot do the impossible with limited resources. After all, the revenue of the South African Government is only about \$1 billion a year, and only about a tenth of this comes from the Bantu in both direct and indirect taxes.

The process of civilization through education has, therefore, unavoidably been a slow one; nor is civilization a simple process of exposing tribal man to educative influences with a certainty of uniform "civilizing" results. The mass of the Bantu are primitive and uneducated. In spite of the progress mentioned, probably fewer than 300,000 of the Bantu have reached the equivalent of the eighth grade.

As things are at present we cannot ignore the fact that the men who greeted our Dutch settlers 300 years ago were men of the Stone Age. The cultural gap of 10,000 years cannot, unfortunately, be bridged in a couple of decades, and it is the fear of the White African in the Union that he may become submerged in a reassertion of primitiveness if he surrenders political power. This

explains what to many people outside Africa seems to be the psychosis of the South African people.

There is also a wide gap between the standards of living of the Blacks and the Whites in the Union and this also militates against an easy solution of our problems. This is true although the Bantu has undoubtedly made great advances in this sphere, too. Today 25 percent of our total national income is directly attributable to the earning capacity of people who 50 years ago were capable of only the most primitive forms of agriculture and the simplest forms of manual labor.

It is difficult to measure improvement in standards of living when that "improvement" involves a change-over from a communal and primitive subsistence economy, in which people do not even wear clothes, to a modern competitive money economy. But our Bantu are sharing in a rate of development that has made South Africa, whose geographic area is under 5 percent of the total African continent and where only 16,000,000 of its 230,000,000 people dwell, responsible for nearly a third of the output of the whole of Africa.

In the company of the White South African, the tribal Native has made extraordinary strides from an era of frequent famine and murderous internecine warfare as well as from what, if he had been left on his own, would have undoubtedly been a forlorn struggle to wrest a livelihood from South Africa's niggardly soil.

Today South Africa's real national income per head is about four times that of India and it is steadily rising. This growth of national income is based on the investment of new capital each year of about £200 million, of which 80 percent comes from local sources. This is no mean feat if one takes into account the vast drag of an undeveloped country and a largely backward population.

Today, too, South Africa's food consumption of 2,740 carbohydrate calories and 75 grams of protein per head compares very favorably with the United Kingdom's at 3,250 calories and 85 grams or with India's at 1,890 calories and 50 grams. Some luxury living is not beyond us either; the number of persons per motor vehicle in South Africa is about 19 compared with 23 in West Germany or 1,170 in India (1957).

Yet ignorance and poverty remain the stumbling blocks to an early or easy solution of our race problems. They are, in fact, the gravest obstacles to the stable development of Africa as a whole.

We have to face the fact that the "color" revolution of the second half of the twentieth century has taken time by the forelock. In little more than a decade, two-thirds of Africa's 230,000,000 have achieved independent, indigenous rule. What this will mean to people who are for the most part nations in name only is not yet clear.

Professor Frankel, an eminent South African now resident in Oxford, has stated the problem in terms which those of us who know Africa can understand. He said:

The subsistence economies of Africa still dominate the economic pattern of the newly independent states of Africa. . . . The real enemy of the African people is social and economic stagnation—and the perpetuation of, or return to, the isolation on which it rests. . . .

It is clear, therefore, that any consideration of the economic aspects of the political changes now taking place in Africa must eschew mere wishful thinking or misplaced enthusiasm. The mere wish to attain the economic benefits of a modern way of life does not supply the means wherewith to do so. . . . The cost of pacifying the continent and establishing the rule of law and ordered government in it was borne mainly by the Colonial and Metropolitan Powers. . . .

It is the paradox of our time that just when science and technique stand poised for major advances in easing the burden of Man's labour and in multiplying his powers over the hitherto unopened, uncultivated or under-utilized regions of the world, the forces of unbridled nationalism and outworn tribalism bar the way to that private and collective international coöperation without which these advances cannot be made.¹

Nothing could be more naïve than to assume that the withdrawal of White influence—which can mean the withdrawal of Western influence—from a country like the Union of South Africa would mean the immediate establishment of broadly based, responsible democracy on the Western model. Democracy, after all, is not merely a question of representative institutions of government. It is a way of life, acquired by many nations of the world who have practiced discussion and decision by majority at every level of life. We of the West, for example, practice this way of settling our affairs not only in our parliaments and congresses but also in our business organizations, our churches, our trade unions, our charitable undertakings, our scientific foundations and even in the heart of our families. Very often the practice of democratic methods in these varied aspects of our daily life preceded the culmination of democracy in representative and responsible forms of government. It is surely too much to expect

¹ *Overseas Quarterly*, The Campfield Press, St. Albans, December 1960, p. 105-107.

that the natives of an area such as the Union of South Africa will overnight accept Western democracy and make it part of their way of life when only yesterday they were subject to, and accepted as natural, the fierce authority of the tribal chief and the dictates on moral issues of the witch doctor and his superstitions.

Were European influence and authority to be withdrawn from the Union of South Africa, we are convinced that a spiritual and political vacuum would result. Our ingenuousness would be incredible if we were to ignore the opportunity that such a situation would offer for the expansion of Communist influence, as experience elsewhere in Africa is already warning us. This situation is fraught with danger for Africa and the world at large; the wind of change can indeed become a destructive tornado.

II

This knowledge does not mean that South Africans are smug or complacent in a changing world. We do not ignore the fact that "self-determination-at-all-costs" is the political philosophy of our century and that the newly independent peoples, whose voices are now heard and whose influence is increasingly being felt in the councils of the world, find fault with the rate of adjustment by South Africans to this new ideal. It would be ridiculous to contemplate a hold-up in the evolutionary process of any racial group in Africa toward higher economic or political status. But that evolution, which cannot be held back, also cannot be forced without running the risk of grave and unhappy repercussions. That is why I believe that the White man in South Africa has a duty as the bearer of the older and more experienced civilization to guide that evolutionary process, where it is within his power to do so.

I sincerely believe that all South Africans accept this responsibility and seek a just solution to our race problems; I believe this is true of the Nationalist Party Government now in power. The difficulty with the Verwoerd Government's proposed solution is that they have thought of it 200 years too late.

I have said that there is in theory little wrong with separate development. The 36,000,000 acres of land (increased by legislation over the years from the original 21,000,000 acres) now allocated for the reserved and protected occupation of the Bantu is a considerable slice of South Africa. If we include the three British

territories—Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland—geographically inseparable from the Union, nearly 50 percent of the country would belong to the Bantu peoples. But it would not be enough, and the policy of separate development can never be implemented. Integration, at least on the economic level, has gone too far; the egg cannot be unscrambled, even if the Government were tomorrow to begin spending colossal millions on the Bantu homelands. In the meantime the negative aspects of *apartheid*, which show up in attempt by legislation to “clear the lanes” and to keep the population moving in parallel lines of development even outside the reservations, are continuously running into impossible impasses.

Our industry depends on the labor of the Black man, and as we grow it will do so even more in the future. Dr. du Toit Viljoen, a prominent South African economist on whom the present Government leans heavily, has calculated that in the absence of considerably increased immigration there will be by the year 2000 some 329,000 artisans in the Union’s industry, of whom fewer than half could be White. He has also calculated that whereas the Whites provided the workers in 41 percent of our tertiary activities in 1946 they will form only 25 percent of those workers by the end of the century. How does one maintain parallel development and rigid separation for the races in those circumstances?

In spite of this growing interdependence, Dr. Verwoerd, to further his policy of separate development, has said a categorical “no” to any representation of the Black people in the Parliament of our country. His intention is that the Black man should develop his own parallel institutions all based on the Native Reservations. But since, on sound opinion, it would appear impossible to provide a home for more than a quarter of our total Native population in those Reservations, the remaining 75 percent living in the “mixed” area will still constitute our biggest problem. The Government’s policy of separate development is therefore no answer to South Africa’s problem. The development of the Reservations, while a praiseworthy and necessary aim in itself, provides only an arm to lean on and does not bear the whole man.

An alternative policy must be found. It should be a policy which will retain for the millions of White South Africans their standards and the system of values which they have proudly derived from their Western forefathers. It should at the same time be a policy which will evince the will to share the fruits of

Western civilization with all those emergent peoples in our country who are eager to prove their desire to coöperate in retaining the Union of South Africa as a bastion in Africa of the Western way of life.

We are persuaded that there is a community of 1,500,000 non-White people in South Africa who already satisfy this test. It is composed of those of mixed blood in our country known here as the Cape Colored people. They have accepted Western standards. They are civilized. The policy of the United Party, therefore, is that they should in every way be regarded as part of Western society in South Africa, enjoying the rights to which that status entitles them. They should be placed on a common voters roll and be free to nominate and elect their own people to Parliament on that roll. Any measure that may be necessary in the economic field to protect the higher standard of living of our civilized people should not apply to them.

Our 500,000 Asians are in a similar position. Attitudes to them in South Africa are bedeviled for historical reasons by the fact that they have in the past looked to India for protection and help, thus derogating from their status as South African citizens. But when my party, the United Party, is in power, it will reopen discussion with this important community with a view to reëstablishing their status as citizens of South Africa.

The formulation of a policy towards the Native people is more difficult, for reasons I have tried to explain before. When people are at varying stages of development one cannot be dogmatic about their position in society. The approach of the United Party to the Native people in South Africa is not one based upon hide-bound theory or the arrogant belief that we have a blueprint for the future or that we can tie anything as dynamic as the evolution of man in an ideological strait-jacket. Our approach is to a large extent empirical, motivated by a sincere desire to do what is necessary and just in the light of circumstances presently obtaining and guided by the belief that every man is entitled to develop his God-given potential to the utmost of his ability.

And so, because our experience has shown that many of the moral problems which we have in South Africa are rendered intractable by the White man's fear of being submerged under a wave of primitive nationalism, we want to strengthen our White population in order to diminish that fear. We shall seek to augment our White population of 3,000,000 by increased immigra-

tion and by social planning to increase the birth rate. Relying on our vast natural resources and the untapped potential of our country, we shall strive to build our European population to at least 15,000,000 before the end of the century. When this is achieved we believe that the psychology of the White man in South Africa will be changed. His influence will be supported by numbers, as democracy demands; and his good intentions will then not be frustrated by the fear that justice done to the Native may mean his own cultural, economic and political annihilation.

Our other population groups will also benefit by such a vigorous policy. That policy will initiate, and will be maintained by, rapid economic development, and from this accelerated growth will arise greater opportunities for all the peoples of South Africa.

The second fact which we realize is that, while the White man's experience and knowledge may be invaluable to our country, our problem of living together here is a joint problem for which no solution can be found except when the races come together and act in concert. This requirement is not unique to South Africa; it is a universal truth that people will not coöperate unless they enjoy a sense of participation.

It is obvious that in order to be successful a South African race policy will have to gain the support and understanding of both Whites and non-Whites. Consultation with the non-White leaders will therefore play an important part in the implementation of our policy. We shall build bridges and make contacts which can never be attained if contact is limited to the official level or to the relationship of master and servant. Such consultation will take place at all levels. It will take place at the highest level in our Parliament, with parliamentary spokesmen for that responsible class of Natives qualifying for registration on their own voters roll. It will take place at lower levels with elective bodies—not archaic tribal authorities—in local government and in the administration of the Reservations.

The third fact which we appreciate is that if South Africa is to prosper it cannot be dismembered. That is another reason why we oppose the present Government's policy which envisages the partition of South Africa. We accept, nevertheless, that the Native Reservations must be developed energetically with capital and skills from all available sources in order to improve the standards of the people who live there; but they must remain an integral part of the Union of South Africa.

A fourth consideration underlying our policy is that primitive people should be given the opportunity of acquiring democratic ways. Experience in Africa has shown that the indigenous populations do not take readily to the democratic way of life and that institutions which the Westerner prizes can suffer grievously at the hands of over-zealous politicians. It will be our earnest endeavor to train the people in the Reservations to accept increased responsibilities so that they may gain experience of modern administration and the ways of democracy. In this way we see that in time the development of indigenous institutions in those areas will make it possible to give a geographical content to the principle of racial federation, which we believe is the ultimate pattern of development in the Union of South Africa. In the future I can foresee a South African Parliament retaining full control over major policy but delegating as of right certain powers and functions to these local institutions on a federal basis. Representatives of these areas will naturally be elected to the central government.

That is for the future. As an immediate step, the United Party will restore the representatives of the Native peoples to the central Parliament of the country. Parliamentary representation, which had in the past been limited to the Cape Province, will be extended to the whole country. At least in the initial stages the representatives will be White people; they will be chosen by Natives registered on the ground of character and responsible status on a separate voters roll.

We are sincerely convinced that a separate voters roll is a wise device for a multi-racial country like South Africa where the races exist on highly divergent levels. It makes unnecessary the odious task of devising "civilization tests" which must be at best arbitrary and unscientific. Moreover, the separate roll is a constitutional safeguard which the South African public understands, and it can be adapted from time to time to meet future constitutional developments.

There is a fifth important factor that the South African Opposition accepts. It is the necessity to differentiate between those Natives who are still rooted in their tribes and whose culture is based upon tribal ways and those who have left the Reservation for good and have become detribalized. As long ago as 1946 a Native Laws Commission of the Government under the chairmanship of Mr. Justice H. A. Fagan reported:

The townward movement of Natives is simply an economic phenomenon, which is also occurring with regard to the other races—and in the case of the latter, in proportion to their numbers, to even greater extent. . . .

It can be guided and regulated, but it is impossible to prevent it or turn it in the opposite direction. . . .

We, therefore, have to accept the fact that there is a permanent urban Native population.

At the same time there are differences between the races to which legislation has to pay due regard and which make a measure of separation in administrative affairs necessary and advisable.

We shall therefore accept these Natives in the mixed areas as a permanent and indispensable part of our population outside the Reservations, and treat them as such. But I should add, in agreement with Mr. Justice Fagan, that a policy suited to the South African situation will not for some years be able to avoid compromise necessitated by the fact that our population groups are at different stages of development. This will, for example, mean separate residential areas and separate institutions for lower education. But already there is no justification for segregation in our universities.

Our most immediate and urgent task in the urban area will be: 1, to amend those laws which offend against the dignity of our Native peoples as human beings; 2, to take steps which will bring real improvements in their standards of living and education; and 3, to give the urban Bantu a stake in the community by developing them into a responsible, property-owning, middle class in contrast to the dangerous proletariat which they may well become as things are at present.

The final fact which we accept is that the first demand which a man is entitled to make upon the society in which he lives is the right to rewards for his labor which will enable him and his family to live as decent human beings. We have for years pleaded that the gap between White and non-White wage rates should be narrowed. This differentiation has its origin in obvious historical accidents and has persisted in spite of the considerable improvement in the living standards of all our people. It is only sound common and economic sense that the necessary increase in the wage standards of our Bantu should go hand-in-hand with increases in productivity. This aim will require greater opportunities for the training of Native labor in modern technical skills. At the moment, it happens all too often that Black labor is regarded as not being "worth" more.

Part of our plans to give greater opportunities to all our peoples is our intention to abolish the Government's policy of "job reservation"—an attempt to protect different classes of labor by limiting certain categories of work to particular races. We in the United Party believe that the principle of "the rate for the job," which is upheld by trade unions throughout the civilized world, is all the protection that workers need against unfair competition or against the undercutting of wages.

Because economic advance in a modern state becomes difficult for the uneducated and the illiterate, we will adopt a policy that will end illiteracy as a first priority and will then allow for those who want it to share in education of the highest possible standard. Our Bantu people have a deep respect for learning; we would be missing our greatest chance to bring them all into the orbit of Western civilization if we were to deny them the opportunities to acquire the learning for which more and more of them earnestly yearn.

Such a policy as I have outlined will mark the change of direction in South Africa which is urgently necessary. It can bring us a long way toward a happier future for South Africa. There is so much good will amongst the races in our land—so much more than our caustic critics will allow—that our chances for an amicable solution of our problems are real, certainly better than in many other parts of Africa. But we have to act fast; we have to act before the agitator with his tongue of fire can set our lovely land ablaze.

The circumstances, the population distribution and the history of this multi-racial country which is the Union of South Africa combine to lay upon its people the duty of proving that men of different races, different color, different backgrounds and different standards of culture and civilization can work and live together successfully and in harmony in order to prosper together and to raise those who are lower in the historical stratification of society to the level of the higher. We must prove that. Otherwise the peoples of South Africa will become disillusioned in the promise of Western democracy and turn to that evil ideology which is today the alternative to our way of life.

POPULATION PRESSURE AND POLITICAL INDECISION

By Jack Zlotnick

DEMOGRAPHERS and economists, academic cousins in the lineage from Malthus, carry forward the somber tradition in the literature dealing with underdeveloped countries. In current expositions, the rapid increase in the population of many poorer nations is a crucial factor preventing "takeoff," keeping them on the ground, so to speak, and from the stage of sustained economic advance. The reason for special concern is that the rate of population growth is unprecedented. It is not, as many scholars see it, the same old problem; it is a problem unique in history. In the underdeveloped countries, rates of population growth exceeding 3 percent annually are becoming increasingly common. So high a figure was rarely recorded before the 1950s.

The drop in the death rate is the core of the problem. Here again, we confront developments that are without parallel in demographic history. In Western Europe, the decline in death rates was fairly gradual at first, reflecting the enlargement of food supplies and other concomitants of economic advance. By the time medical science made possible the sharpest reductions in mortality, birth rates in Western Europe had also begun to decline, and the process of economic growth was well under way.

Since the end of World War II, the relationship between falling death rates and the economic capability to support larger populations has broken down. The poorest countries can undertake public health measures that bring down death rates precipitately, while birth rates stay as high as ever, in some cases go even higher. Algeria, British Honduras, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Guatemala, Jamaica, Laos, Malaya, Mexico, Nicaragua, Syria, Taiwan, Turkey, Trinidad and Venezuela are growing at rates that if continued will double their populations in 20 or 25 years.

This aspect of the problem has a certain novelty to the American who associates baby booms with business prosperity. His outlook has been conditioned by the economic analysis which predicates full employment on the existence of investment opportunities for all the funds that people insist on saving. By this

analysis, there is a clear advantage in an expansion of population, which brings new opportunities for investment, thus new outlets for savings.

In the poorer countries, however, the task is not so much to find outlets for savings as to find the savings. If the population is growing rapidly, increases in national income cannot be drawn upon to pay for ambitious development programs but must go largely to provide the bare necessities of life for more and more people. The quandary is not merely one of overpopulation but rather of the speed of population growth; it confronts even those underdeveloped countries where present population densities are quite low and which can ultimately support many times their present numbers. The Somalis might make automobiles if they adopted Detroit's technology, and might in time adopt Detroit's technology if they could accumulate the capital and skills. They can probably accumulate neither if they keep doubling in number every 20 or 25 years, so that increasing national incomes are merely new multiples of the old per capita figures.

The food sector is a particularly critical one, for free-world and Communist countries alike. In India, where the average diet deficiencies are among the most serious in the world, food output went up substantially under the First Five Year Plan ending in 1956. But with crop failures under the Second Five Year Plan, the government was forced to defer economic goals in order to import food for the expanding population.

The problem has also thwarted the best efforts of the Communists in China; food production there has been running neck-and-neck with population growth. The "leap forward" in 1958 raised Communist hopes of a breakthrough to a new ground, but the crop statistics fell back in 1959. And 1960 was another poor year in which cultivation of city garden plots and collection of wild plants provided desperate supplements to starvation diets. The authorities have been sufficiently concerned to purchase several million tons of food grains abroad. Ordinarily a net exporter of food, China now faces a payments crisis that has necessitated a curtailment of industrial imports and scaling down of construction programs.

A brief word on the subject of dramatic technological breakthroughs in food production. The avenues of possible development here are many. Hydroponics (water culture) may come to be economical in areas where native soils are poor. A lowering of

the costs of converting sea water would bring irrigation benefits to arid lands of North Africa, South Asia and other areas. Open-sea fishing, which today accounts for only a small percentage of total catches, may increase significantly. The development of edible synthetic proteins and carbohydrates is receiving attention. Unicellular plant organisms may be widely cultivated one day for animal feed, if not for human consumption.

New seeds, new fertilizers, solar energy, nuclear power and still other lines of advance also hold promise. We may be on the threshold of great developments. But there will be an inevitable lag between technological attainment and everyday performance. More than 100 years after the value of artificial fertilizer was demonstrated in England in 1843, the per acre application of fertilizers in India was only about 1 percent of the European average. The implementation in field and factory of laboratory successes takes time and capital, and the impasse created by the relationship of savings to population impedes the accumulation of capital in underdeveloped countries.

II

The problem perturbs some officials in Washington, where there is growing uneasiness about its bearing on American security interests. There are also reservations about the expediency of taking the issue into consideration in reaching policy decisions.

In October 1959, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee published a report prepared by the Stanford Research Institute on "Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Problems of the United States." The report considered the two lines of attack on the population problem—increasing production and limiting births. The conclusion was that population pressures could become significant causes of social unrest and war, that "some means of controlling population growth are inescapable" and that for this purpose the United States should provide funds to foreign agencies and laboratories.

The efficacy of American aid that appears merely to encourage the survival of more people at old subsistence standards of living was also considered in 1959 by the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program ("Draper Committee"). In its Third Interim Report, the Committee declared: "The United States and other more advanced countries

can and should be prepared to respond to requests for information and technical assistance in connection with population growth."

These two recommendations bristled with emotional and moral implications. The reactions of presidential aspirants and other leaders in both political parties were qualified or negative. President Eisenhower said: "I cannot imagine anything more emphatically a subject that is not a proper political or governmental activity or function or responsibility." Arthur Krock observed that the President's words were welcome to both parties, which shied away from taking any stand on the question. Not a candidate for office himself, Mr. Krock added: "But the problem of overpopulation cannot be swept under the carpet because that is politically advisable for both parties."

It was in fact not swept under the carpet; too many Americans were perturbed about the problem, felt strongly about the related religious issue or simply saw opportunities for political advantage in it. Senator Kennedy was the obvious target for the most searching queries. His reply was that if the matter came up while he was President, either in the form of legislation or recommendations from the executive branch, he would decide in accordance with his oath to do whatever was best for the country. He did, however, intimate his current view of the country's best interests. He observed that it would be a "mistake" for the United States Government to advocate birth control in other countries; it was a decision for the countries themselves to make. He further expressed the opinion that the "available resources of the world are increasing as fast as the population."

The Roman Catholic clergy took the expected stand. In a statement released in November 1959, the Catholic Bishops of the United States acknowledged that attention must be given to the challenge of population pressures in the world. They simply asked for solutions that were morally permissible. The principle was unassailable, but the moral standard was in dispute. Non-Catholic Americans expressed exasperation with the position that "artificial" contraception was a "grave sin"; so uncompromising a view seemed to rule out really effective programs to limit the number of births where population pressure was greatest. The Right Reverend James A. Pike, Protestant Episcopal Bishop of California, commented that the Catholic statement condemned millions "to starvation, bondage, misery and despair."

Although the debate turns mainly on the differences in view, the disputants stand on some common ground, too. Catholics, like Protestants, do not insist that the procreation of children should be the invariable objective of conjugal relations. Protestants, like Catholics, do not condone all methods of sexual gratification. The Catholic position on "artificial" contraception has its parallel in the Protestant attitude toward other practices which are commonly but not universally regarded as subversions of the sexual act. The parallel may seem forced to some Protestants; it may help others to understand why the Catholic Church insists its position is a moral and religious one from which no retreat is possible. This position does not require Catholics to belittle the gravity of population pressures, although it does incline them by and large to affirm confidence in the unrealized potentials of science and technology to provide for all.

Convictions are obviously strong, displays of rancor are frequent, and responsible public officials are discomfited by the dangers of offending religious sensibilities. Despite the political complications, the problem receives continuing study in government echelons below the policy-making level. In July 1959, the Department of State released a report on "World Population Trends and Problems." The cover sheet contained the Department's standard legend of disclaimer, in capital letters: "THIS IS AN INTELLIGENCE REPORT AND NOT A STATEMENT OF DEPARTMENTAL POLICY." The report was carefully worded, moreover, to give minimum affront to the sensibilities. Only the more sensitive anti-Malthusians would squirm at the final conclusion: "Rapid population growth may prove to be one of the greatest obstacles of economic and social progress and the maintenance of political stability in many of the less developed areas of the world."

The problems associated with population growth in underdeveloped countries are also being reviewed in the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. A study group in the Department is examining the subject, but there have as yet been no formal conclusions and recommendations.

The Report of the President's Commission on National Goals in November 1960 gave further evidence of official concern and caution. "Population increase," it noted, "is a major drag on the progress of the underdeveloped countries, preventing any real rise in individual standards of living . . . and above all deferring the date when those nations can attain economic momentum on

their own.” The use of U.S. aid funds to spread birth control information was suggested as a possible course of action, but not made as a flat recommendation. In any case, the report averred, aid must never be made conditional on a nation’s handling of its population problem. The whole problem was unhappily a matter of some controversy, “as difficult an issue as any democracy can face.”

III

The difficulties, however, are not limited to the democracies. The Communists, too, have a heritage of dogma and doctrine that is hostile to Malthusian arguments. The theory of Malthus, concluding that the phenomenon of mass poverty transcended the particular social order, was to Marx sheer apologia for the status quo. He reacted with the venom that has become so characteristic of Communist polemics. Malthus, he said, was not merely wrong but dishonest, a “slavish plagiarist” who copied and paraphrased others. When he brought the argument from *ad hominem* to substantive grounds, Marx took a position that even his followers have not found fully persuasive. His collaborator Engels acknowledged the possibility that the Communists might one day have to come to grips with the problem of population growth. In a letter to Kautsky in 1881, he wrote:

If at some stage Communist society finds itself obliged to regulate the production of human beings, just as it has already come to regulate the production of things, it will be precisely this society, and this society alone, which can carry it out without difficulty.

Many Communists feel that the stage for regulating “the production of human beings” has already arrived. Polish planners, in particular, believe that a cutback in the rate of population growth would facilitate the fulfillment of their economic programs. In April 1958 the illustrated weekly *Swiat* put the widely accepted attitude as follows:

Let us reject the fictitious suggestion that a high birth rate is proof of improvement in the standard of living. One should admit boldly that the excessive birth rate is one of the factors which adversely affect the standard of living and is even . . . the cause of misery.

Abortion in Poland has been legalized, a birth control association organized and planned parenthood centers established. The propaganda on birth control has taken on strong anti-religious overtones. In January 1960 the party daily, *Trybuna Ludu*, charged that the clergy had organized a campaign against

planned parenthood, abortions and the sale of contraceptives, and had further blackmailed pharmacists into refusing to sell contraceptives. The newspaper took Cardinal Wyszynski to task for asserting that the Polish people had no reason to fear high birth rates. The State not the Church, it pointed out, would have to build houses and factories for a rising population.

In the Soviet Union, the official attitude is more favorable to population growth, but there has been a considerable evolution of outlook over the years. Soon after the Revolution, the sale of contraceptives was authorized, the legal ban on abortions repealed and the laws on family relationships made extremely liberal by Western standards. Divorce, for example, was readily granted on the request of either party. These legal sanctions for smaller families, however, were enacted on feminist not Malthusian grounds. "We are unconditional opponents of neo-Malthusianism," said Lenin, but "this does not prevent us in the slightest from demanding the abolition of all laws which place penalties either upon abortion or upon the circulation of medical writings dealing with models of preventing conception, or similar laws."

Lenin's hostility to Malthus notwithstanding, the enactments emboldened a few academicians to advance neo-Malthusian concepts. This limited license was ended in the Stalin era. In the middle 1930s, Soviet population policy became avowedly expansionist. Academic circles denounced all statements that showed signs of Malthusian taint; Soviet demographers elaborated the proposition that a decline in fertility was associated with a decaying society. On the legislative and administrative fronts, abortions were first restricted and then forbidden entirely except on medical and eugenic grounds. No further effort was made to promote contraceptive practices. A new emphasis was placed on the virtues of the socialist family and measures were adopted to make divorce more difficult. Maternity and nursery facilities were enlarged. Financial assistance to mothers was extended. In addition, the elaborate system of awards set up in 1944 stipulated a range of honorifics for mothers with five children on up: Motherhood Medal (First and Second Class); Order of Glory of Motherhood (First, Second and Third Class); and Order of Mother Heroine (Gold Star), with Scroll from the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. As a further inducement to child-bearing, discriminatory taxation was levied on couples with fewer than three children.

The post-Stalin era brought a modification but not a reversal of the Soviet outlook on the population question. Khrushchev, like the Soviet demographers of Stalin's day, associates an expanding population with a vigorous society. Speaking to Komsomol members in January 1955, he warned: "If each family has only one or two children, the population of the country will not grow but will be on the decline. And we must think about the development of society."

Unlike Stalin, however, the Soviet leadership today seems disposed to respect the considerations that impelled Lenin to approve such measures as the legalization of abortions in the 1920s. Criminal sanctions against women who procured abortions were discontinued in 1954. Other prohibitions against abortions were repealed in 1955. According to members of an American health delegation which toured the Soviet Union in 1957, abortions ranged from 30 to 85 percent of live births in individual hospitals.

The same ambivalence characterizes Russian attitudes toward the problem of the more crowded countries. It is standard Soviet practice in all international forums to deride analyses showing that in many underdeveloped countries lower birth rates are a prerequisite of progress. Yet a Soviet broadcast to Southeast Asia in July 1958 was critical of a French demographic journal for the statement that Marxists opposed birth control propaganda. The Soviet Union, said the speaker, did indeed encourage a high birth rate, but individuals were free to choose; contraceptives were available in any chemist's shop and freely advertised in the medical journals. It was necessary to oppose the "anti-scientific and reactionary" theory of Malthus, but this was not to preclude "a realistic and truly humane policy on the question of population under socialism."

IV

On several occasions, Khrushchev has been pressed to disclose his attitude about Chinese population pressures. In 1958, for example, he was asked if the expanding population of China and the comparative emptiness of Siberia did not give cause for concern. The Soviet Premier dismissed the question with a show of impatience. Those who understood the nature of socialist society, he averred, would not entertain such a view. But others have been more frank about their misgivings.

Soviet suspicions have apparently been deepened by Peking's

intimations that nuclear war would not be as disastrous for overpopulated China as for other countries—that China might, in fact, emerge from a nuclear holocaust with more than enough survivors to make it the dominant power. The attitude of morbid confidence is described by one correspondent in Peking as follows:

In fact, it is not difficult in present-day China, in medium-level party circles, to hear some one state with great assurance: "We do not want war; however, we do not fear it either. If the imperialists begin a war they will surely lose it and will be destroyed. It may happen that in such a conflict two or three hundred million Chinese might die . . . and yet with modern technical means we could reconstruct China rapidly, and at least we would have gotten rid of imperialism once and for all."

Many European Communists are dismayed at this line of thought. An article in *Kommunist* in September 1960 was typical of Soviet comment during the height of the Sino-Soviet polemic. Nuclear war, it was stated, would not bring the victory of socialism closer: "Only madmen can want such a catastrophe."

Only in their first years of power, however, were the Chinese Communists unqualified adherents to the tradition that flowed from Marx's original attacks on Malthus. In 1949 the official New China News Agency affirmed that China's large population is a "very good thing." As late as April 1952, the party newspaper *People's Daily* denounced birth control as a "means of killing off the Chinese people."

The arithmetic of national planning and the results of the 1953 census stimulated a reexamination of these Chinese views. The public commentary on the census results hailed the totals and used the occasion for attacks in the old vein against defeatist Malthusians. But with the total population now revealed as 100,000,000 above the previous estimates, and increasing by 12,000,000 or so every year, the demographic-economic calculus apparently persuaded all but the more extreme doctrinaires that a campaign to limit births was in order.

The Party nevertheless moved gingerly. The first public appeal for birth control was in the nature of a trial balloon, and it was sounded not by a Communist but by a "democratic personage," Shao-Li-tzu. Shao tried manfully to show that there was no contradiction between birth control practice and anti-Malthusian doctrine. It was not a question of overpopulation, suggested Shao, but of such considerations as the health of mothers and the temporary shortage of educational facilities.

The top-ranking Communists stayed aloof from the discussion,

but in 1955 instructional articles on contraceptive techniques began to appear in Party and semi-official journals. By the summer of 1956, the campaign was well under way. Illustrative posters and models, embarrassingly graphic to some Western observers, illustrated contraceptive techniques; apothecaries featured large displays of birth control devices to the public; discussion meetings, lantern slides, all the customary vehicles of mass propaganda were employed to bring the message to the people. Training programs in birth control were set up for cadres. Clinics to furnish information on the subject were established.

The Communists felt constrained to stress that they were not borrowing from Malthus. In October 1955 the theoretical journal *Study* addressed itself with characteristic Marxist venom to unregenerates who said, "Look! The Communists too need Malthus no less than they need Marx." Birth control, the journal declared, "has nothing at all in common with Malthus." Personal and family interests rather than the broader economic concerns of state and society were emphasized as the reasons for fewer children.

But as the birth control campaign progressed, the Communist rationale took on a clear if unconscious affinity for neo-Malthusian logic. Premier Chou En-lai in 1956 conceded that "in a country like ours where . . . the population is large, shortages of materials will occur frequently. . . ." In February 1957 the *China Youth Daily* deplored the necessity for diverting output to such non-productive outlays as crèches, schools and other facilities to care for the young. Still the refrain "we are not Malthusians" was recurrent and vehement.

Clearly, Peking was uncomfortable about its birth-control campaign, for it contained an implication of official defeatism about the economy's ability to keep pace with population increase. The leadership would have preferred to vindicate the classic Marxist conviction that the release of energies under a socialist reorganization of society would bring vast increases in output and more than take care of expanding population.

The "leap forward" period from 1958 to 1960 was therefore much more congenial to the faith. The movement itself set out to demonstrate that miracles of production could be achieved if China's manpower was properly organized and inspired. Hortatory slogans (e.g. "Catch up with Britain in 15 years") aimed to raise the popular tolerance for long overtime hours and speed-up techniques. The new mood, no longer favorable to birth control

arguments, was expressed in May 1958 by Liu Shao-chi—Mao's heir apparent. Liu leveled his sharpest criticism at the pessimistic scholars who "argued that as the population grows, consumption will increase and there won't be much of an increase in accumulation." Their views, said Liu, "go counter to Marxism-Leninism." The great leap forward "has not only completely knocked the bottom out of their contention that agriculture cannot make quick progress but also blown sky high the argument that a big population impedes accumulation."

What followed was not so much an about-face in the régime's birth control policy as a decision to hold the campaign in abeyance. The practice of birth control has official sanction, and the means are available to those who can afford to buy them. But the posters have virtually disappeared; the subject is no longer an important propaganda theme. And thus the matter stands in 1961, even after the mood engendered by the leap forward has dissolved. As the régime once again faces up to the difficulties of growing enough food for more and more people, the arguments for resuming the birth-control campaign grow more and more persuasive. Still the leaders hesitate to underscore again the contradictions between sacred scripture and stern necessity.

v

The parallels are obvious. In the Communist as well as Christian world, fundamentalist doctrine often seems at odds with practical counsel. In both worlds too, the signs of rethinking are evident.

In the Catholic Church, the sanction for the rhythm method represents a considered adaptation to recognized social needs. The method is the subject of some criticism, on the grounds that it entails calculations and margins of error which would defeat even the mathematically gifted among unschooled wives of the world's poor. Its shortcomings in the underdeveloped countries, however, are matched by the imperfections of today's practical alternatives, which are either inherently unsatisfactory or require resources unavailable to the potential users. And all of them, like the rhythm method, demand conjugal coöperation that is not compatible with occasional impatience or insobriety. When a cheap, facile method is developed that any woman can use to determine with certainty that she is in her infertile period, the breach between effective birth control and Catholic morals may

be spanned. Meanwhile, there will of course be competitive advances like the oral contraceptive—most of them probably obnoxious to Catholics. But at least Catholic support of population programs in underdeveloped countries will have reached new ground. The Vatican is already on record with a number of statements which acknowledge that there can be medical, eugenic, economic and social grounds for birth control, and which express the hope that medical research on the rhythm method will eventually succeed in making it more reliable.

Alternately, one can easily summon up a disheartening vision of the world as it may be if present rates of population growth should long continue. Within 800 years, under one impossible assumption, there would not be enough space on the land surface of the earth for all the people, not even if they stood shoulder to shoulder and stomach to spine. This cannot, of course, be the actual outcome, but the calculation has value as a *reductio ad absurdum* of arguments which regard the technological potential of industry and agriculture as limitless.

The short-term prospect is for continued population growth and its correlative difficulties. United Nations demographers always caution that their projections are models, not predictions; but they make the straightforward statement that a doubling of the world's population by the end of the century is "almost a matter of practical certainty barring a global catastrophe."

Will the tide turn? Some signs that it may are to be found in the countries that are hardest beset. The Egyptians have set up a population commission, which is doing work with family planning clinics. India's economic program provides for family planning activities, demographic research and promotional work; and some 70-odd percent of couples interviewed in Indian surveys expressed the wish to limit family size. Pakistan has launched a campaign to educate the people on the subject of birth control. Puerto Rico, Ceylon and Taiwan support work in family planning with public funds.

The scale of these efforts has in most cases been too small to have had a noticeable effect on demographic statistics. They nevertheless reflect a growing awareness of the problem that cuts across lines of religion, politics and class. Popular attitudes encourage statesmen to express views that would have been deemed impolitic a few years ago. The old precepts still hold up decisions, but the will to action becomes increasingly apparent.

RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By Henry L. Roberts

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General: Political, Military and Legal

THE FUTURE OF MANKIND. BY KARL JASPERS. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, 342 p. \$5.95.

One of the world's most eminent philosophers addresses himself to this very stark problem: "An altogether novel situation has been created by the atom bomb. Either all mankind will physically perish or there will be a change in the moral-political condition of man." An important book that demands the full attention of the reader.

THE NEW POLITICS: AMERICA AND THE END OF THE POSTWAR WORLD. BY EDMUND STILLMAN AND WILLIAM PFAFF. New York: Coward-McCann, 1961, 191 p. \$4.00.

The authors suggest that there is a time lag between our policies and attitudes and the changing realities in the world, evident especially in our failure to recognize the rapidly growing diversities of the international situation. They see the danger that the United States "may end up a gigantic historical irrelevancy, a state with nothing significant to say to the world."

EINSTEIN ON PEACE. EDITED BY OTTO NATHAN AND HEINZ NORDEN. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960, 704 p. \$8.50.

A collection of Einstein's writings and statements from 1914 to 1955 on the subjects of war, peace and international affairs.

STRATEGY AND ARMS CONTROL. BY THOMAS C. SCHELLING AND MORTON H. HALPERIN. New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1961, 148 p. \$2.50. (Paper, \$1.25.)

An examination of the meaning of arms control with respect to modern weapons, and an evaluation of various control proposals. The point is stressed—and it is a theme that Mr. Schelling has developed in earlier works—"that our military relation with potential enemies is not one of pure conflict and opposition, but involves strong elements of mutual interest."

THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD AFFAIRS, 1960. BY RICHARD P. STEBBINS. New York: Harper (for the Council on Foreign Relations), 1961, 436 p. \$6.00.

The most recent volume of this distinguished annual presents a clear and straightforward account of American foreign relations in the year of the U-2 incident and the abortive Paris "summit," President Eisenhower's good-will visits to South America and the Far East, and the deepening crises in Cuba, Laos and the Congo. Illustrated with maps and cartoons, the volume includes a useful chronology of world events as well as detailed source references.

SKETCHES FROM LIFE. BY DEAN ACHESON. New York: Harper, 1961, 206 p. \$4.00.

A lively album of informal portraits of various public figures, foreign and do-

mestic, with whom the former Secretary of State has dealt over the last 20 years.

BUILDERS OF EMERGING NATIONS. BY VERA MICHELES DEAN. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, 277 p. \$5.00.

Brief sketches of political leaders, chiefly in Asia, Africa and Latin America, together with a discussion of some of the leading problems of their régimes—authoritarianism, economic and social transformation and diplomatic alignment.

DRAGON IN THE KREMLIN. BY MARVIN L. KALB. New York: Dutton, 1961, 258 p. \$4.50.

A C.B.S. correspondent reports on a trip about the world in quest of information and enlightenment on the nature, problems and prospects of the Russian-Chinese alliance. At the end he draws some conclusions and proposals for U.S. policy.

THE PATH TO LEADERSHIP. BY FIELD-MARSHAL THE VISCOUNT MONTGOMERY OF ALAMEIN. New York: Putnam, 1961, 255 p. \$4.50.

Field Marshal Montgomery criticizes Western, and especially American, leadership in recent years; offers prescriptions; and outlines, on the basis of some biographical sketches, the qualities a leader must display.

NATIONAL SECURITY IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. EDITED BY GORDON B. TURNER AND RICHARD D. CHALLENGER. New York: Praeger, 1960, 293 p. \$6.00. (Paper, \$1.85.)

In these essays, by the two editors and other contributors, the effort is made to treat the issue of national security in both theoretical and historical terms. Their principal theme is the search for means to keep conflicts limited, in scope and levels of violence.

DISARMAMENT: THE CHALLENGE OF THE NINETEEN SIXTIES. BY JAMES P. WARBURG. Garden City: Doubleday, 1961, 288 p. \$4.50.

Mr. Warburg, who seems to be able to write faster than most of us can read, tackles—in his 28th book—the problem of achieving universal disarmament.

THE WAR CALLED PEACE: KHRUSHCHEV'S COMMUNISM. BY HARRY AND BONARO OVERSTREET. New York: Norton, 1961, 368 p. \$4.50.

An effort to track down the actual meaning, in Soviet strategy and tactics, of such concepts as "peaceful coexistence," "self-determination," etc.

AMERICAN OPINION ABOUT RUSSIA 1917-1920. BY LEONID I. STRAKHOVSKY. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961, 135 p. \$4.75.

In these lectures Professor Strakhovsky, of the University of Toronto, reviews the confused state of American public opinion and policy, under the impact of the Russian Revolution.

ENSIMMÄISEN MAAILMANSODAN VOITTAJAT JA SUOMI. BY JUHANI PAASIVIRTA. Helsinki: Söderström, 1961, 270 p. Fmk. 800.

A first-rate study of the relations between Finland and England, the United States and France during 1918-1919, based on extensive research in the Allied and German archives. In 1957 the author, a lecturer at the University of Helsinki, published the ground-breaking "Suomi Vuonna 1918."

SOWJETRUSSLAND UND DEUTSCHLAND 1917-1922. BY GÜNTER ROSENFELD. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960, 423 p. DM-Ost. 25.

A quite extensively "researched" Communist history of Soviet-German relations

from the Revolution to Rapallo. The author has had access to archival materials in East Germany and the U.S.S.R.

SCIENCE AND GOVERNMENT. BY C. P. SNOW. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 88 p. \$2.50.

This book, which has aroused quite a bit of controversy, including some refutations, centers on the conflict in wartime Britain between Sir Henry Tizard and Frederick A. Lindemann (Lord Cherwell): a conflict that casts considerable light on the role of scientists in government.

SEAPOWERS IN THE NUCLEAR AGE. BY ANTHONY E. SOKOL. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961, 268 p. \$6.00.

An investigation of the role of sea power under conditions of thermonuclear weapons and missiles. The author's thesis is that sea power remains a very important part of our power structure.

THE FIGHT FOR THE SEA. BY COMMANDER DAVID D. LEWIS. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1961, 350 p. \$6.00.

An analysis of submarine warfare in the Atlantic in two world wars, with some concluding observations on Soviet sea power and the prospects for the future.

THE FORBIDDEN VOYAGE. BY EARLE REYNOLDS. New York: McKay, 1961, 281 p. \$4.95.

An account of the protest voyage into the prohibited atomic testing zone in the South Pacific in 1958.

L'OCCUPATION MILITAIRE. BY ODILE DEBBASCH. Aix-en-Provence: La Pensée Universitaire, 1960, 476 p. NF. 28.

A juridical study of the rights of armed forces occupying territory beyond their national frontiers.

TRAITÉ DES TERRITOIRES DÉPENDANTS. TOME I: LE SYSTÈME DE TUTELLE D'APRÈS LA CHARTE DE SAN FRANCISCO. BY NICOLAS VEICHOPOULOS. Athens: The Author, 1960, 521 p. Drachmas 300.

A massive theoretical and legal treatise.

INTERNATIONALISED TERRITORIES. BY MÉIR YDIT. Leyden: Sijthoff, 1961, 323 p. Florins 24.

A study in the historical development of the theory and practice of the internationalization of territories in the last century and a half. Case studies include Cracow, Tangier, Danzig, Trieste and Jerusalem.

TRANSFER OF POWER. BY SIR CHARLES JEFFRIES. New York: Praeger, 1961, 148 p. \$4.00. (London: Pall Mall Press, 1960, 17/6.)

A discussion of the problems accompanying the passage from colonial status to independence. The author was formerly Deputy Under-Secretary of the Colonial Office with considerable experience in planning for the transfer.

RESISTANCE, REBELLION, AND DEATH. BY ALBERT CAMUS. New York: Knopf, 1961, 272 p. \$4.00.

A selection, made by the author shortly before his untimely death, of 23 of his essays, previously collected under the title of "Actuelles," dealing with the major political and social problems of his time.

PROLETARISCHER INTERNATIONALISMUS. EDITED BY ALFRED ANDERLE

AND KONRAD HECKTHEUER. Berlin: Rütten, 1961, 235 p. DM-Ost. 9.20.

A symposium of Communist academic essays prepared for a meeting in 1959.

THE PROMISE OF WORLD TENSIONS. EDITED BY HARLAN CLEVELAND. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 157 p. \$3.50.

Papers prepared in connection with a 1960 conference on world tensions.

POLITICS AND CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL HISTORY. BY ADDA B. BOZEMAN. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, 560 p. \$10.00.

While this book deals with international relations before the modern era—the author ranges over the ancient Near East, Greece, China, Rome and Byzantium—the purpose of this comparative study is to cast light on the nature of international relations today.

General: Economic, Social and Cultural

PEOPLE! CHALLENGE TO SURVIVAL. BY WILLIAM VOGT. New York: Sloane, 1960, 257 p. \$4.50.

Another discussion of the demographic explosion—too many people now in parts of the world, and many, many more on the way—together with recommendations for control.

TRADITION, VALUES, AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT. EDITED BY RALPH BRAIBANTI AND JOSEPH J. SPENGLER. Durham: Duke University Press (for the Duke University Commonwealth-Studies Center), 1961, 305 p. \$6.00.

A symposium of nine essays dealing with selected problems of economic development and modernization.

H. G. WELLS AND THE WORLD STATE. BY W. WARREN WAGAR. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961, 301 p. \$6.00.

A dissertation on H. G. Wells as a prophet and critic of our civilization.

ASSAULT ON THE UNKNOWN. BY WALTER SULLIVAN. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961, 460 p. \$7.95.

A popular survey of the achievements of the International Geophysical Year.

The Second World War

JAPAN SUBDUED. BY HERBERT FEIS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 199 p. \$4.00.

In this final volume of his admirable series of works on the diplomacy of the Second World War, Mr. Feis deals with the plans and actions of the Allied and Japanese Governments between the defeat of Germany and the end of the War in the Pacific. Looming over the whole narrative is the atomic bomb and the question of its use to hasten the Japanese surrender.

DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG. BY HELLMUTH GÜNTHER DAHMS. Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1960, 607 p. DM. 29.50.

A quite comprehensive one-volume military and political history of the war.

THE WATERY MAZE: THE STORY OF COMBINED OPERATIONS. BY BERNARD FERGUSON. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961, 445 p. \$7.50.

The story, by the former Director of Combined Operations, of the development of amphibious attacks in the course of the Second World War; includes a chapter on the Suez campaign of 1956.

THE PRICE OF VICTORY. BY R. W. THOMPSON. London: Constable, 1960, 281 p. 25/.

In this book on the background and planning of the Normandy landing the author concludes with the bitter observation that on D-day Britain ceased to be a major power in the world, no longer able even to shape her own ends.

THE DIPLOMACY OF THE WINTER WAR. BY MAX JAKOBSON. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 281 p. \$5.75.

A revised translation of a study of the Russo-Finnish war of 1939-40, first appearing in Finnish (noted here April 1956).

THE GREAT WALL OF FRANCE. BY VIVIAN ROWE. New York: Putnam, 1961, 328 p. \$4.50.

This book rises to the defense of the Maginot Line—that “magnificent weapon”—and some of the strategic conceptions that underlay its construction.

THE GODS WERE NEUTRAL. BY ROBERT CRISP. New York: Norton, 1961, 220 p. \$3.95.

A British tank commander's account of the unsuccessful British effort to check the German drive through Greece in 1941.

THE FOXES OF THE DESERT. BY PAUL CARELL. New York: Dutton, 1961, 370 p. \$5.95.

An informal but serious and well-researched narrative of the operations of Rommel's Afrika Korps.

THE DESERT GENERALS. BY CORRELLI BARNETT. New York: Viking, 1961, 320 p. \$6.00.

Portraits of O'Connor, Cunningham, Ritchie, Auchinleck and Montgomery.

THE WAR AT SEA, 1939-1945. VOLUME III: THE OFFENSIVE. PART I, 1st JUNE 1943-31st MAY 1944. BY CAPTAIN S. W. ROSKILL. London: H.M.S.O., 1960, 413 p. 45/. (New York: British Information Services, \$8.40.)

This volume in the official British war history deals with the mounting Allied naval offensives in the Atlantic, Mediterranean and Pacific.

CLIMAX AT MIDWAY. BY COMMANDER THADDEUS V. TULEJA. New York: Norton, 1960, 248 p. \$3.95.

A brief history of the decisive Battle of Midway, fought on June 4-6, 1942.

UNITED STATES ARMY IN WORLD WAR II. THE TECHNICAL SERVICES. THE CHEMICAL WARFARE SERVICE: FROM LABORATORY TO FIELD. BY LEO P. BROPHY AND OTHERS. Washington: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1961, 498 p. \$3.50.

This volume in the Technical Services sub-series deals with “research, development, procurement, and distribution of chemical warfare matériel.”

WAR MEMOIRS: DOCUMENTS. BY GENERAL DE GAULLE. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1959-1960, 2 v. \$10.00.

A selection of documents to accompany the second and third volumes of de Gaulle's memoirs (French edition of Volumes II and III noted here July 1957 and April 1960, respectively; American edition, October 1959 and October 1960).

PAULUS: “ICH STEHE HIER AUF BEFEHL!” BY WALTER GÖRLITZ. Frankfurt/Main: Verlag für Wehrwesen, 1960, 272 p. DM. 24.

A documentary biography of the German Field Marshal, up to his capture after Stalingrad.

CIVIL AFFAIRS AND MILITARY GOVERNMENT, NORTH-WEST EUROPE, 1944-1946. By F. S. V. DONNISON. London: H.M.S.O., 1961, 518 p. 42/. (New York: British Information Services, \$7.85.)

This volume in the official British war history deals with the role of the British forces in reestablishing civil administration in Belgium and the Netherlands, France, Denmark and Norway, Germany and Austria.

The United States

ORGANIZING FOR DEFENSE. By PAUL Y. HAMMOND. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 403 p. \$7.95.

This very substantial study of the development of the American military establishment in the twentieth century is concerned with the political forces that have been involved as well as with the problems of organization as such.

A NATION OF SHEEP. By WILLIAM J. LEDERER. New York: Norton, 1961, 194 p. \$3.75.

The co-author of "The Ugly American" makes another assault on American shortcomings in the foreign field—especially our policies and actions in Laos, Formosa and Korea. In his view it is a dreary mixture of bungling and ignorance, based largely on a lack of reliable information available both to the public and to the Government.

PEACE WITH JUSTICE: SELECTED ADDRESSES OF DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER. New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, 273 p. \$4.00.

This selection of the former President's speeches, from 1950 to 1960, includes one that was never delivered—for his Russian visit that vanished with the U-2 episode.

FREEDOM AND EQUALITY. By HARRY S. TRUMAN. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1960, 85 p. \$2.95.

Nine addresses and messages by the former President.

POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT DURING CRISES. By J. MALCOLM SMITH AND CORNELIUS P. COTTER. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1960, 184 p. \$5.00.

An analysis of the various uses of emergency powers by the Executive in the years since 1933.

REGIONS, RESOURCES, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH. By HARVEY S. PERLOFF AND OTHERS. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press (for Resources for the Future), 1960, 716 p. \$12.00.

A study of the interrelationship between regional differential economic growth and the natural resources picture in the United States.

PROFESSIONAL DIPLOMACY IN THE UNITED STATES, 1779-1939. By WARREN FREDERICK ILCHMAN. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, 254 p. \$6.00.

This study in administrative history traces the development of a professional diplomatic service in the United States since its founding.

THE FUTILITARIAN SOCIETY. By WILLIAM J. NEWMAN. New York: Braziller, 1961, 412 p. \$6.00.

An effort to analyze "conservative" thought in contemporary America. The au-

thor includes under this label an amazingly disparate array of writers; it is doubtful that the term he applies to them—"futilitarian"—is likely to add clarity.

AMBASSADORS ORDINARY AND EXTRAORDINARY. BY E. WILDER SPAULDING. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1961, 302 p. \$5.00.

An informal sketch of a number of the ambassadors and ministers who have represented the United States abroad in the course of its history.

NEWTON D. BAKER: A BIOGRAPHY. BY C. H. CRAMER. Cleveland: World Publishing Co., 1961, 310 p. \$6.00.

A solid biography of Wilson's Secretary of War.

Western Europe

THE EUROPEAN COMMON MARKET. BY ISAIAH FRANK. New York: Praeger, 1961, 324 p. \$8.50.

An experienced State Department economist made good use of a Rockefeller Public Service Award to write this careful study of the European regional arrangement that is, for commercial policy, "already the most important event of this century." After analyzing the significance of what has been done about tariffs, quotas and related matters he judiciously examines alternative solutions to the problems that remain unsolved, including relations with the rest of Europe and the possible effect of balance-of-payments difficulties on the common market.

DIE EUROPÄISCHE WIRTSCHAFTSGEMEINSCHAFT. BY ERNST WOHLFARTH AND OTHERS. Berlin: Vahlen, 1960, 953 p. DM. 63.

SISTEMI FISCALI E MERCATO COMUNE. BY GAETANO STAMMATI. Rome: Editrice Studium, 1959, 201 p. L. 300.

LES PROBLÈMES JURIDIQUES ET ÉCONOMIQUES DU MARCHÉ COMMUN. Paris: Librairies Techniques, 1960, 301 p. NF. 18.

LE MARCHÉ COMMUN: CHÔMAGE OU PROSPÉRITÉ? Paris: Éditions du Monde Ouvrier, 1959, 263 p. NF. 6.

ZONE DE LIBRE ÉCHANGE OU COMMUNAUTÉ ÉCONOMIQUE EUROPÉENNE. Brussels: Éditions de la Librairie Encyclopédique, 1959-60, 2 v.

DIE SCHWEIZERISCHE WIRTSCHAFT VOR DEM GEMEINSAMEN MARKT UND DER FREIHANDELSZONE. Zurich: Polygraphischer Verlag, 1959, 214 p. Swiss Fr. 24.

More material on the Common Market and the European Free Trade Area.

BRITAIN AND THE NETHERLANDS. EDITED BY J. S. BROMLEY AND E. H. KOSSMANN. New York: Humanities Press, 1960, 255 p. \$5.00.

Papers delivered at the 1959 Oxford-Netherlands Historical Conference and dealing with a variety of topics over the past four centuries.

THE DE GAULLE REVOLUTION. BY ALEXANDER WERTH. London: Hale, 1960, 404 p. 30/.

Mr. Werth, the author of numerous studies of contemporary France, including a major review of the years 1940-1955, here presents—in a work lying between journalism and history—the political origins of the Fifth Republic.

THE NEW FRANCE. BY EDWARD R. TANNENBAUM. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961, 251 p. \$5.00.

An amiable and perceptive view of political and cultural developments in contemporary France, a "nation in search of a mission."

THE GOVERNMENT OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC. BY J. A. LAPONCE. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961, 415 p. \$6.50.

An extensive analysis of political parties and the constitutional system of the Fifth Republic.

PAUL CAMBON: MASTER DIPLOMATIST. BY KEITH EUBANK. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1960, 221 p. \$4.00.

This review of Cambon's career gives particular, and deserved, emphasis to his role in strengthening France's diplomatic position in the years prior to 1914.

THE FRENCH RADICAL PARTY FROM HERRIOT TO MENDÈS-FRANCE. BY FRANCIS DE TARR. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 264 p. \$5.60.

An excellent history of that complex and disorderly political grouping that played a major, if symptomatic, role in the Third and Fourth Republics and appears to have petered out in the Fifth. Has fine sketches of some of the leading Radicals.

MODERN SWEDISH GOVERNMENT. BY NILS ANDRÉN. Stockholm: Almqvist, 1961, 252 p. Kr. 15.

A concise survey of the constitutional and political organization of modern Sweden, designed explicitly for an English-speaking audience.

GERMANY BETWEEN TWO WORLDS. BY GERALD FREUND. New York: Harcourt, 1961, 296 p. \$5.75.

Based on a painstaking survey of current material, this study is notable both for its perceptive discussion of politics in the Federal Republic and for its analysis of the international problems involved in the partition of Germany and of Europe. The author's conclusions on American and West German policies, which differ sharply from official thinking in Washington and Bonn, should stimulate fresh thought and discussion. His principal recommendations, argued strongly if not always convincingly, are for a new German policy of reconciliation with the satellite nations of Eastern Europe and a strong American effort to negotiate with Moscow on disengagement.

RESTORING DEMOCRACY IN GERMANY. BY RAYMOND EBSWORTH. New York: Praeger, 1961, 222 p. \$6.00.

An account of the activities of the Administration and Local Government Section of the Control Commission in the British Zone of Germany after the Second World War—based in good part on the author's own experience.

A GERMAN COMMUNITY UNDER AMERICAN OCCUPATION. BY JOHN GIMBEL. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961, 259 p. \$5.50.

A case report on the occupation of Marburg, 1945-1952.

SAARPOLITIK 1945-1957. ZWEITER BAND: ENTFALTUNG DER SAARPOLITIK ZWISCHEN "WIRTSCHAFTSANSCHLUSS" UND "EUROPÄISIERUNG" 1945-1953. BY ROBERT H. SCHMIDT. Berlin: Duncker, 1960, 784 p. DM. 66.

The second volume of this massive study (Volume I noted here July 1960) deals chiefly with political developments and elections in the period between the end of the war and the reunification with West Germany.

GERMANY: A MODERN HISTORY. BY MARSHALL DILL, JR. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1961, 467 p. \$8.75.

This volume for the general reader, one in the University of Michigan series of histories of the modern world, reviews Germany's vicissitudes since the Reformation, with heavy emphasis on the twentieth century.

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Interesting sketches of East and West Berlin since the war by a Swedish journalist.

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A symposium of pieces on economic developments in territories east of the Oder-Neisse line. Obviously critical of the Polish administration in the area.

GOD AND CAESAR IN EAST GERMANY. BY RICHARD W. SOLBERG. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 294 p. \$4.95.

A review of church-state relations in East Germany since 1945.

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An extensive but rather formal monograph.

MEMOIRE (1915-1919). BY VITTORIO EMANUELE ORLANDO. Milan: Rizzoli, 1960, 630 p. L. 3500.

These posthumously-edited memoirs—Orlando died in 1952 at the age of 92 before completing his work—deal with the years of the First World War, Caporetto and the Peace Conference.

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M. Vaussard, author of a history of contemporary Italy, traces the evolution of nationalist and imperialist sentiments in that country.

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A useful translation of an important Soviet study in physical geography.

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The story of a Latvian wartime deportee to Soviet Central Asia; livelier and less painful than most such accounts.

THE DYNAMICS OF COMMUNISM IN EASTERN EUROPE. By R. V. BURKS. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, 244 p. \$5.00.

On the basis of interviews with former Greek Communists and some very revealing multiple correlation analyses of election statistics, Mr. Burks sheds important light on the social composition and motivations of Communist Party members in Eastern Europe. His findings indicate clearly that Marxist categories are quite inadequate in describing Communism as a political force, at least in this part of the world.

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A critical review of Poland's policy with respect to its non-Polish nationalities—Ukrainians, Byelorussians, Lithuanians, Germans and Jews—in the inter-war period.

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A study of the methods and effectiveness of indoctrination carried out by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, among its members and among the Czech intellectuals.

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A critical examination—topical rather than narrative—of Britain's responses to the international cold war that has prevailed since 1945. The author, now Conservative M.P. of Oxford, was formerly Director General of the Royal Institute of International Affairs.

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The former Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office reflects on the ups and downs of Britain's place in the world since the days of Henry VIII. A rewarding and wide-ranging essay.

HERBERT MORRISON. AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY BY LORD MORRISON OF LAMBETH. London: Odhams, 1960, 336 p. 30/.

These chatty and informal memoirs—Lord Morrison was not a diarist—review a long and successful career in the British Labor movement, from secretary of the London Labor Party in 1915 to Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in the last Labor cabinet.

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A careful, and rather gloomy, study of the recent migration of West Indians.

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Information relating chiefly to questions of trade between the nations of the Commonwealth and of Western Europe.

DEVELOPMENT FROM BELOW. BY URSULA K. HICKS. New York: Oxford University Press, 1961, 549 p. \$5.60.

In this important study Mrs. Hicks investigates the efforts made to build up local government in preparation for independence in the formerly colonial territories of the Commonwealth. A wide-ranging inquiry covering East and West Africa, the West Indies, India and Ceylon.

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A narrative framework for materials drawn from Mackenzie King's diary for the war years 1939-1944.

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In this concise review Mr. Kirk, who writes with bite and vigor, argues that talk of "underdevelopment" is likely to obscure the point as far as recent Arab politics are concerned.

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This informal but quite informative autobiography by the Shahanshah of Iran includes his observations on recent Iranian and world politics.

South and Southeast Asia

INDIA AND THE WEST. BY BARBARA WARD. New York: Norton, 1961, 256 p. \$4.50.

After reviewing the Western and Soviet modes of economic development, Miss Ward turns to the recent Indian plans, appraises their chances for success and emphasizes the importance of this experiment to the world at large.

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The notes and memoranda of the late Sri B. N. Rau trace the stages in the creation of the Indian constitution. Dr. Pylee's work provides a comprehensive survey of the structure and function of that constitution.

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A solid history of the origins, establishment and political development of Pakistan. The author is a political scientist at the University of New Brunswick, Canada.

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A symposium mainly relating to fairly primitive social groups.

THE EMANCIPATION OF FRENCH INDOCHINA. BY DONALD LANCASTER. New York: Oxford University Press (for the Royal Institute of International Affairs), 1961, 445 p. \$7.20.

This is chiefly an account of events in French Indochina following the Japanese occupation up to the fall of Dien Bien Phu and the Communist take-over in Northern Vietnam. The author served on the staff of the British Legation in Saigon from 1950 to 1954.

STREET WITHOUT JOY: INDOCHINA AT WAR, 1946-54. BY BERNARD B. FALL. Harrisburg: Stackpole, 1961, 322 p. \$4.95.

A study, based in part on personal experience, of the war in Indochina from 1946 to 1954.

THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. BY C. HARTLEY GRATTAN. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961, 273 p. \$5.00.

This volume in the American Foreign Policy Library is chiefly a concise and knowledgeable summary of the history of Australian-American relations, with briefer treatment of New Zealand, the islands and Antarctica.

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A quite intensive study of economic conditions in Indonesia, capital requirements, savings, tax structure and the role of foreign aid. The author was Monetary and Fiscal Adviser to the Indonesian Government in 1952 and 1953.

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The Far East and Pacific Ocean

THE LOTUS AND THE ROBOT. BY ARTHUR KOESTLER. New York: Macmillan, 1961, 296 p. \$3.95.

Mr. Koestler returns from a visit to India and Japan vigorously denying "ex oriente lux"—he finds little in the culture, religion or philosophy of the East that has any relevance to our Western ills.

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MILITARY POLICY AND ECONOMIC AID: THE KOREAN CASE, 1950-1953. BY GENE M. LYONS. Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1961, 298 p. \$4.50.

A study of American economic aid in conjunction with the Korean conflict. The author was affiliated with the U.N. Korean Reconstruction Agency.

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A concise account of Antarctica and its explorations. The author was a member of Scott's last expedition.

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The editor of *The New York Times* editorial page reports perceptively on his recent journeys in Africa and Eastern Europe.

AFRICAN AFFAIRS: NUMBER ONE. EDITED BY KENNETH KIRKWOOD. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1961, 164 p. \$3.75.

This tenth volume of St. Antony's Papers comprises eight essays on various contemporary African topics, including a piece on African studies in the U.S.S.R.

AFRICA SPEAKS. EDITED BY JAMES DUFFY AND ROBERT A. MANNERS. Princeton: Van Nostrand, 1961, 223 p. \$4.95.

A collection of essays and speeches on contemporary themes by prominent Africans south of the Sahara, including Mboya, Touré, Nkrumah, Lumumba.

LUGARD: THE YEARS OF AUTHORITY, 1898-1945. BY MARGERY PERHAM. New York: Oxford University Press, 1960, 748 p. \$8.00. (London: Collins.)

This second volume of Miss Perham's admirable life of one of the great British proconsuls is also an excellent introduction to recent Nigerian history.

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A set of demographic, anthropological and economic studies.

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A volume in the official Italian history of colonial wars and operations.

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A critical review of the history of American policy toward Cuba with its emphasis on "order, stability, and the protection of American interests." The book was completed before the more recent crises in U.S.-Cuban relations.

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The purpose of this solid study is "to analyze the class structure of Puerto Rico in order to see more clearly and systematically the ways in which class characteristics and class relationships bear upon the major aspects of social change."

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An inquiry into political activities in Puerto Rico and the interrelations between San Juan and Washington during the years 1932-1938. The author is presently at the University of Puerto Rico.

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By Donald Wasson

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
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
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